Eastern European Politics

"Putin knows that the flaw of the Soviet Union was that it did not have soft power."

But that is not the case. Russians have a large extended family. Despite the failures and disappointments of the post-Soviet period, Russia's extended family in Europe includes a significant part of the former Yugoslavia — primarily Serbia and Montenegro, probably Bulgaria and to some extent Greece.

Those are places where nobody would think that Russians live, but if you analyze these countries' immigration statistics, you will see that Russians have gradually come to comprise a significant percentage of their populations. Serbia and Montenegro have had a difficult time gaining recognition in the European Union's system for determining who is a "local" and who is an "outsider."

Bulgaria cannot pride itself on seamlessly integrating into the EU either — not to mention Greece, where the affirmation "Long live Russia and Greece, and forget America!" sounds frequently, even after Moscow imposed a ban on the imports of Greek agricultural products that spelled ruin for numerous Greek farmers.

And obviously, the members of this Russian extended family are happy whenever they happen to meet each other. And whether we want it or not, Ukraine — or at least a large part of it — is part of this family also. Ukraine and Russia are in conflict, but family members often quarrel. The main problem is that, apart from the immediate thrill of recognizing one another and the recognition of common everyday difficulties, there is nothing more to make it a viable family relationship.

When Russian leaders launch into their anti-Western rhetoric, they find support beyond Russia's borders. Those sentiments resonate with many in Eastern European countries as well. This, in large part, is because the West tends to show little interest in anyone or anything not directly connected with the West, and has done little to achieve real and meaningful integration with others.

The EU itself is a good example: Some member countries receive preferential treatment, some carry very little importance in the organization, and some non-member states know they will never receive an invitation to join.

But anti-Western rhetoric alone will not solve anything. Russia needs a constructive program for how it will help itself after it is done complaining about the fools over in Brussels and Washington. Currently Russia has no such program, but it does have an embargo on European agricultural products that will in no way increase love for Russia among such countries as Greece.

Putin's primary goal is to counter what he perceives to be an existential threat in NATO. Russia cannot return to the level of greatness Putin desires so long as NATO exists. So the question then becomes "what do about NATO".

If you're the Russian president, do you actively seek open conflict with NATO? Probably not; NATO's conventional forces are still stronger than Russia's, and Russia would likely need to use tactical nukes in order to prevent any NATO columns from reaching Moscow. Russia may devastate NATO forces with such a strike, but Putin would simply become emperor of a nuclear wasteland.

Rather, the way you attack NATO is by undermining the very fabric of its existence: collective defense. Nibble at the edges, whisper in their ears, and undermine the confidence in NATO's commitment to upholding Article V. By poking a member like Estonia, a comparatively weak member of NATO, Putin is essentially trying to remind all NATO members that the US will not send Marines off to die for some Eastern Europeans. If Putin can successfully convince NATO members that the US will not follow through with upholding its obligations to collective defense, then the alliance falls apart.

The Kremlin is rolling the dice. They know the American public does not want a shooting war in Europe. The Kremlin knows the Europeans have become complacent with defense. The hope is that Russia can walk the finest of lines: poke and prod enough to undermine confidence, while at the same time not being so overt as to actually trigger a full NATO mobilization. It is an incredibly dangerous game being played.

It is akin to boiling the frog by slowly turning up the temperature and hoping it doesn't realize what's happening until its too late.