The Military Thread

Bit late but it turns out that gif I found was taken from a little compilation of BrahMos missiles kicking all kinds of ass.

Marines Confront Apparent Military Faker

And yes, he does look like Wesley Snipes. He even seems to have Snipes' prima donna attitude.

That was most definitely me being in Sincerity Mode and not sarcasm; why would a person who spends their time posting whole paragraphs detailing armored warfare and reading online archives for the hell of it be not considered an expert? You're basically to armour as a particular Nation States user named G Oram is for aviation.

Like all smart people under authoritarian or totalitarian control, if they weren't being idiots themselves then they were being affected by some or at least one; for better or worse, the Soviet armoured forces suffered quite some blows during the Great Purge when several of its most influential proponents ended up on the wrong side of Stalin's mood.

I think I know what you're talking about, but I'll mention that Air Land Battle really only came into being as a thought during Vietnam.

The whole idea of having military driven by a "combined arms" doctrine has actually existed ever since the ancient Egyptians coordinated chariot cavalry with archers. Regarding the term as known by its modern association with the definition that you already provided, everything that I've read indicates that every single military of the 20th century had a theoretical combined warfare doctrine - the problem comes with the obvious economic limitations and military experience required to properly implement it, as one can clearly see in the half-century example of the Chinese Nationalists who went through three different doctrines with first Soviet, then German, and finally U.S influence, while maintaining a barely fledging military that seemed to stay stuck in World War I.

Successful implementation of combined arms warfare after World War I can be traced to the Italians during their counter-insurgency campaigns in Ethiopia and Libya, albeit only on the tactical level with miniscule publicity. Similarly, the Japanese ably demonstrated the effectiveness of combined arms in China, particularly while overcoming the German-trained Chinese Nationalists' initially effective World War I style trench defenses during the 1937 Battle of Shanghai. However, Imperial Japan isn't obviously renowned as being a paragon of effective and sympathetic PR, and whatever advancements in modern warfare the Japanese made faded with the Rape of Nanking and the like.

What propelled combined arms into the global spotlight was the German blitzkrieg (which according to a very knowledgeable user on NationStates named the American Tiger Kingdom was more overly effective propaganda than actual prowess) across Europe. The Soviets deserve an honorable mention for quite perfecting what their fiercest enemy demonstrated, with their Deep Battle doctrine being almost identical to blitzkrieg and their armies steamrolling the Germans on a level unseen before from Operation Bagration onwards to the end of war.

From a more sympathetic but still critical standpoint, the US forces were prepared, were professional, and most of all, had the capabilities of taking the fight to the North Koreans - the major problem arises from the one unfortunate requirement of needing time to do so. As the KPA came dangerously close to making a finishing move on all anti-communist forces in Korea, the U.S became so desperate that its commanders began resorting to the half-thought out strategy of using rapidly assembled Task Forces, which would function as delaying actions until the rest of the U.S' military might could land ashore and trickle down to the TF's to grow them back to full strength. The result on the strategic level was a successful PR maneuver and morale booster to the ROK's that gave them good reason to keep on fighting, and a strong statement to the world that the U.S was indeed determined to deter communism in Asia with its teeth if necessary.

On the tactical and operational level however, the result was entire units formerly at prime strength and supply being sent piecemeal into the meatgrinder with only a fraction of their former numbers and barely enough supplies and weaponry to last a single set-piece battle, much less a full on mechanized onslaught of determined Soviet-trained troops and their expensive toys. I'll cite the backdrop to the Battle of Osan as an example: Task Force Smith could have put up more punch against the already discussed KPA T-34's had its artillery contingent waited just another day for its requested supply of HEAT shells to be shipped to the tarmac, but instead, the higher-ups sent them a message basically stating "Get to Korea first ASAP, we'll send in the stuff right after you." Upon landing in Korea, instead of waiting for the supposed supplies tailing after them, TF Smith was bum rushed into the fire and into the frying pan in a desperate move to keep the KPA offensive in check.

edited 23rd Jul '14 9:03:00 PM by FluffyMcChicken

Aprilla: I see stuff like that on facebook all the time. Some of these guys don't even try.

I'd argue that the sheer logistical and command mess that caused the debacle with Task Force Smith and others like it argues against professionalism. Sure the core of professionalism was there, but the initial deployments were hardly professional at all. Instead, it took time for the US military to relearn lessons they learned in WWII.

The defeat inflicted upon the Eighth Army in November 1950, and the frankly terribly-managed retreat, is indicative. These were US troops who, in their complacency, had seemingly forgotten everything they learned in Europe and the Pacific: rations and grenades left in the truck, no perimeter security, half-loads of ammunition, et cetera. (Military Misfortunes by Cohen and Gooch is recommended reading here; Ridgway's memoirs, if you can find them, are a good primary source.) No wonder the first thing Ridgway did when he came into command was to order a wholesale purge of officers to clean out the dry rot; among the few printable phrases recorded was that the infantry ancestors of the army would be turning in their graves if they'd seen how roadbound they were. It took until 1951 for the Army units to really regain their professionalism. In contrast, the First Marine Division stayed at a high standard of training from the moment they entered the war, and as a result, well, the damn bootnecks still won't shut up about smashing eight elite Chinese divisions at the Chosin Reservoir.

To be fair, that possibly apocryphal Badass Boast about the enemy outnumbering them 29:1 and surrounding them is pretty badass.

Per wiki, the quote is, compliments of Chesty Puller:

"They are in front of us, behind us, and we are flanked on both sides by an enemy that outnumbers us 29:1. They can't get away from us now!"

Yeah but Chesty was a Marine leading a lot of Marines. That's like an ork battle wagon going faster because its painted red and has flame decals.

Well, the Red ones do go fastuh. Just like how any fighter plane becomes 20% more effective if you paint bitchin' awesome shark teeth on the nose.

Shark teeth, eh? That must be why Markov from Ace Combat Assault Horizon is such a badass. Shark teeth is sort of his "thing".

edited 24th Jul '14 12:50:24 AM by NativeJovian

AFP: Exactly. That is why they go faster.

Wow, that looks like a Call of Duty game for fighter pilots.

Incidentally, I once again would like to say that they need to paint sharkteeth on an F-16. That intake scoop is just begging for sharkteeth.

I still say Ace Combat was better before they started setting it in the real world.

Aw shucks. Sorry about that. But I'm still no expert, just an enthusiast - some of the guys on TankNet, or even the World of Tanks forums leave me well in the dust. And that's not even getting into the professional tank historians out there.

This is true, though by the same token the Great Purge was a lesson well learned for them, especially after De-Stalinization under Khruschev.

Khalkin-Gol, man!

@Korea

Sabre's Edge has basically said everything I would have replied to your (excellent) points.

Compare and contrast the People's Liberation Army, who had been fighting for the guts of two decades and had some very excellent fieldcraft, on which their "Zerg Rush" (actually not) tactics depended.

@Nohbody

I don't actually know that much about the War of 1812, beyond what I've read in novels about Wooden Ships and Iron Men. Care to elaborate? Sounds interesting.

@Teufel

I know, right. Oh Sparky... It's amusing that every single panelist laughed.

@Shinra

Yakovlev make some little light aircraft, like a trainer for the PLAAF, they used to make Gulfstream G200s, and as Sabre's Edge said, they make the adorable 130 jet trainer.

edited 24th Jul '14 3:51:10 AM by Achaemenid

The Yak-130 is the most precious little jet I have ever seen in my entire life.

And it's name is Mitten.

In reference to the yak-130: Oh my goodness look at it.

Fitness test for members of the Singapore armed forces reduced to 3 stations.

Hurray, now I can fail it even faster! (...but seriously, my fitness sucks)

2.4km run, sit-up and push-up, not sure if the removal of standing board jump and shuttle run would affect the soldiers if we ever need to be called up. (choy, touch wood, I hope not)

I dunno, even if I can pass it might not transfer well while wearing everything.

edited 24th Jul '14 6:34:47 AM by batter

For Air Force, our Physical Fitness Test is a waist measurement, one minute of pushups, one minute of situps, and a mile and a half run.

Assault Horizon is Call of Duty for fighter pilots.

Still awesome.

edited 24th Jul '14 10:16:35 AM by Cganale

http://www.duffelblog.com/2014/07/veteran-working-dog-trouble-marketing-skills-local-employers/

re: Achaemenid: Greg Goebel, the Air Vectors guy, has a decent write-up on the War of 1812. He also has an insanely detailed 90-part history on the American Civil War, which is just amazing.

Speaking of the ACW, Adam Elkus' insights on the war and its termination.

Hello chaps, need a bit of writing advice.

Is it dumb for an under-strength infantry battalion (in a fictional army loosely based off the British/US WW 2-era model) holding a town to have two companies of combat troops and one company of logistics personnel? They're also supposed to be behind the lines and not expecting to be attacked.

Another typhoon passed by. Unfortunately it's not the EU giving our Air Force new jets. lol

Anyway, to make the post on-topic, our president will be having his State of the Nation Address on Monday, and as part of the build-up for it military developments were discussed last night by one of our major networks, including an interview with the former AFP chief (recall that my previous post mentions a new one was appointed last week). There's the big bad news and just some good news. Although insurgencies are now considered less of a threat, that doesn't mean that they are no longer threats; one of our cities in the south got involved in heavy fighting between rebels and the military. And of course there's the literal big bad news of China, and their territorial grabbing. During the episode they featured the radio exchange between the Chinese Coast Guard and the Phil. Navy ship trying to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre, with the Chinese warning them about "encroaching upon Chinese territory", and the Philippine ship replying that they are on a ressuply mission of their own troops in Philippine waters.

The somewhat good news of course were the acquisitions (whether planned, or already "in the works") by the military. Almost all of the "new" things they got were acquired in the last 12 months, or their acquisitions confirmed during that period.

edited 24th Jul '14 9:41:53 PM by entropy13

It seems reasonable, and the state of combat readiness depends on the conditions of the war upon their respective side; the German panzer division(s) facing off against the British at Arnhem and Oosterbeek were originally there for R&R, but were able to rush into the fight quickly due to them being on the losing side of the war by then.

To me, the relationship and rivalry, along with each other's respective performances, between the U.S Army and Marines and just about any global counterparts, was always a struggle between the balance of quality, which tended to side with the Marines, and quantity, the traditional feature boasted by all Armies worldwide. Marines in general have their historical roots as elite corps of light infantry originally intended for boarding operations at sea, with the secondary function as being makeshift ground forces as needed arising due to the former purpose becoming mostly obsolete with time. That being said, marine forces seemingly always are among the smallest branch of any military with the sparest reserve pools; hence, the Few aspect of the USMC's slogan. However, this lack of quantity allows for marine corps to almost always invest more quality in less - hence, for all of their small sizes, marines such as the USMC, the Commonwealth's various R Ms, and Russian Naval Infantry are renowned for being some of the best troops of their respective militaries.

The Army is a different story, being the traditional main arm and sword of militaries ever since the dawn of humanity. Designed to support entire theatres of war and providing the backbone of whole frontlines, it's no surprise that Armies are known for their absolutely massive manpower reserves and abilities to mobilize if deemed necessary. As a result, Armies have historically tended to field larger numbers of citizen soldiers and militia troops when compared to the typically more standing and professional Marine forces; hence, Marines are known for their useful ability to be rapidly assembled and deployed whereas Armies must burn time to fully exploit their manpower advantages (hence my post regarding the early handling of Korea). All this being said, the operational quality of Army forces tends to greatly vary while Marines usually possess a more static standard of readiness and ability.

Regarding this thesis, it should be mentioned that the U.S Army's pivotal role in the Pacific Theatre typically has been overshadowed in favor of the more PR-attractive Marines, despite its troops fighting alongside the latter just as hard and providing the bulk of U.S forces as well (remember, this was the time when an independent U.S Air Force didn't exist yet) in campaigns such as New Guinea and China-Burma-India, not the mention the eventual grandiose build up in preparation for the invasion of Japan.

Regarding the Chosin Reservoir, it was less that they smashed eight Chinese divisions than that they gave three a black eye and two a bloody nose while managing to dash out of the bar in the nick of time before getting totally knocked unconscious. Plus, the Chinese also weren't fully intent on beating them up as a first priority; as tragic and overlooked their contribution may have been, the Army troops of Task Force Faith nevertheless required a good deal of the Chinese's strength to break and a little more to help mop up - TF Faith is in fact known as the "Polar Bear Regiment" in Chinese. Casting all pride and admiration aside and simply looking at the hard facts, the result was still a defeat of the U.S Marines Corps no matter how pyrrhic - in the end, the 1st Marine Division was unable to permanently hold its ground and force to withdraw to safety, the incredible odds of the Chinese simply being stacked too high for them to overcome. Thus you have a polarized interpretation of the same battle across the world: to Americans, Chosin is remembered as a shining example of a victory in defeat, where the beleaguered defense made the most out of the least to claw its way out of the jaws of annihilation. On the other hand, Changjin Lake, as Chosin is known to the Chinese, is seen as a high water mark in Chinese military history where an under supplied and equipped force completely made of infantry managed to overcome the industrial military machine of the United States - regardless of the horrific casualties and costs that it required.

As admirable a feat of resilience and determination against the odds Chosin may be, factually the Germans took it Up To Eleven with something on the Eastern Front that would make the jarheads and leathernecks roll over their heads in disbelief and awe: during the battle of the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket in 1944, the Wehrmacht did with an entire 200,000-strong field army what the U.N only did with half that number while pitted against two entire Soviet Fronts numbered 500,000 compared with a single 150,000 strong Chinese army.

Meh, even if it was less Zerg Rush and more tactics, I guarantee that that infamous We Have Reserves mentality taken Up To Eleven with an expendable Chinese population and former Nationalist troops had something to do with it as well.

The size of the Korean peninsula precludes the numbers in the Eastern front, but in terms of ratios you can say that they're roughly the same, if not even higher for the later war.

One of our battalion combat teams were able to hold off a whole Chinese division. And even with lowballing the estimate of a Chinese division (at 10,000) that's still more than almost a 10:1 ratio.

EDIT: scratch that. Another source (which also includes a map) points out that the "Fil 10" position was the only portion of the line where the red arrows of Chinese armies stop abruptly; the other area where this happens in the map was Gloster Hill...

The 10th BCT were forced to retreat not because of the enemy in front of them, but because they'll be surrounded by the 15th and 60th Armies if they "hold their line".

The 10th were able to withdraw and avoid encirclement. But after only a few hours of rest they're back into action as part of the last relief effort towards Gloster Hill, the closest they could have gotten towards the surrounded battalion.

edited 24th Jul '14 10:29:37 PM by entropy13

The quality-quantity debate does favor the Marines, but it doesn't account for the general lack of tactical preparedness in the Eighth Army troops and their general subsequent rout (individual units like Task Force Faith notwithstanding), versus the careful and organized withdrawal the Marines made. Report after report from the Army troops involved in the retreat speak of a dismal situation of their own making: Eighth Army infamously got every soldier a turkey dinner on Thanksgiving by suspending the airlift of winter jackets to the troops, and when it came into contact with the enemy it was short of everything from gasoline to barbed wire. Companies failed to maintain contact with their neighbors, battalions failed to establish communication with their companies because they were short of telephone wire, regiments failed to maintain contact with the enemy by failing to send out patrols. Or, to quote Cohen and Gooch's study...

In aggregate, this was not the same Army that fought so well in the Pacific and in Europe. The institutional knowledge hadn't been lost completely, but it'd been buried during the five years between WWII and Korea, so that infantry companies found themselves relearning lessons they'd first learned at the Kasserine Pass—not an indication of a well-run force. This was beyond "varying greatly"; in that case, battalions might have passed or failed muster but the overall organization would have been sound. This was organizational fiasco; fortunately the rot didn't run deep, and the army was able to turn things around while the Chinese attack reached its culmination.

As for Chosin, though, the First Marine Division managed to completely break contact with its attackers before withdrawing as an intact fighting force, with all its heavy equipment and assorted hangers-on, ready to be re-injected into the fight. It's a technical defeat, but given that it got out of the frying pan in good fighting shape while trashing a fair portion of the Chinese forces, it's a performance that in absolute terms overshadows Dunkirk, where the heavy equipment got left on the beach. (Of course, the RN and RAF didn't have the degree of total sea and air control the USN and USAF enjoyed.) And trading away territory that couldn't be sustained logistically in exchange for an intact infantry division and a large number of broken or damaged enemy formations would be a worthwhile trade, too.

(As for the Chinese remembrance of Changjin, they are understandably proud of having pushed a large Western army out for the first time. Though I do remember hearing, on the radio or secondhand from the Chinese internet, relatively unvarnished accounts by Changjin survivors for the first time. The image that stuck in their minds was of desperate fighting, and Marine defenders ducking their heads in the foxholes just in time for the napalm to sweep overhead, resuming their fire the moment after the explosion. It's a lot more grim than the official version, which is why it took until now for the accounts to come out. Still, I'm waiting for the published accounts by the veterans, and letting their side of the story come through—something like Ivan's War for the People's Volunteer Army. The huge loss ratio is more explicable once you factor in that this was an almost purely light-infantry army, short on heavy artillery and armor. Instead of artillery barrages or armored breakthroughs to soften up a defensive position, they had to rely on infiltration tactics, shock, and short-range firepower. It worked well until the UN forces learned to establish tight perimeters and to depend on firepower on a magnitude that the Chinese troops had never encountered before. Also a problem: the lack of a motorized logistical line, since the army's logistical organization was built on fighting a people's war on its own land. Contra to claims about well-dressed Chinese troops, they froze to death just like their American counterparts.)

And, yeah, the 1st Panzer Army breakout of the pocket was some masterful tactical work, and very much what you'd expect out of von Manstein. The man might be guilty of exaggeration and gross self-aggrandizement postwar, but there is no denying that von Manstein was a brilliant tactical commander. Pity about the loss in heavy equipment, though; 45 tanks for an entire Panzer Army sounds...depressingly par for the course for the 1944 Wehrmacht.

Yeah the lack of winter clothing really hurt. Most of the 10th BCT's casualties for example, were before China started their offensive, i.e. non-combat in nature.

EDIT: In other news, Marine Battalion Landing Team 5 (MBLT5) arrived two days ago in the capital, after almost a decade of deployment against insurgents in the south of the country.

EDIT 2: Damn, just realized now that the 3rd US Infantry Division (to which the 10th BCT was attached) is nicknamed the Rock of the Marne, guess which unit was the only "US" one that held the line...

edited 24th Jul '14 11:40:46 PM by entropy13