History UsefulNotes / YamamotoIsoroku

-->'''Admiral Yamamoto''', shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor[[note]]And the reversal of Japanese fortunes, the Battle of Midway, would occur almost six months to the day after Pearl[[/note]]

As a result, Yamamoto decided he needed to maximize Japan's defences by taking the atoll of Midway, which has an US base, while luring out the American carriers into a battle of his choosing. The Japanese government was resistant, but the US' daring Doolittle Raid, which had bombers launch from carriers to strike at the Japanese Home Islands convinced them. Against his better judgement, Yamamoto's refined plan proved overly complex with a grand diversionary attack at the Aleutian Islands which dangerously dispersed their forces. Unfortunately, the Japanese's necessary element of surprise was lost thanks to American codebreakers learning of their attack and then tricking them into confirming their target was Midway. The result was Japan attempting to take a forewarned and heavily armed target while the US carrier fleet prepared an ambush of its own. The result was the battle of Midway, which ended in a disastrous defeat that resulted in the utter decimation of the bulk of Japan's main aircraft carriers, closing Yamamoto's projected window of military advantage of six months after Pearl Harbor to the day.

Today, Yamamoto is respected as a master naval strategist, largely innocent of the Japanese military's notorious brutalities to the point where he was threatened to be assassinated by Japanese militarists, whose warnings of what Japan was taking on should have been heeded, but was ultimately undone by his ego, interference by his superiors and factors out of his control like his navy's compromised encryption.

As a result, Yamamoto decided he needed to take maximise Japan's defences by taking the atoll of Midway, while luring out the American carriers into a battle of his choosing. The Japanese government was resistant, but the US' daring Doolittle Raid, which had bombers launch from carriers to strike at the Japanese Home Islands convinced them. Against his better judgement, Yamamoto's refined plan proved overly complex with a grand diversionary attack at the Aleutian Islands which dangerously dispersed their forces. Unfortunately, the Japanese's necessary element of surprise was lost thanks to American codebreakers learning of their attack and then tricking them into confirming their target was Midway. The result was Japan attempting to take a forewarned and heavily armed target while the US carrier fleet prepared an ambush of its own. The result was the battle of Midway, which ended in a disastrous defeat that resulted in the utter decimation of the bulk of Japan's main aircraft carriers, closing Yamamoto's projected window of military advantage of six months after Pearl Harbor to the day.

As a result, Yamamoto decided he needed to take maximise Japan's defences by taking the atoll of Midway, while luring out the American carriers into a battle of his choosing. The Japanese government was resistant, but the US' daring Doolittle Raid, which had bombers launch from carriers to strike at the Japanese Home Islands convinced them. Against his better judgement, Yamamoto's refined plan proved overly complex with a grand diversionary attack at the Aleutian Islands which dangerously dispersed their forces. Unfortunately, the Japanese's necessary element of surprise was lost thanks to American codebreakers learning of their attack and then tricking them into confirming their target was Midway. The result was Japan attempting to take a forewarned and heavily armed target while the US carrier fleet prepared an ambush of its. The result was the battle of Midway, which ended in a disastrous defeat that resulted in the utter decimation of the bulk of Japan's main aircraft carriers, closing Yamamoto's projected window of military advantage of six months after Pearl Harbor to the day.

As a result, Yamamoto decided he needed to take maximise Japan's defences by taking the atoll of Midway, while luring out the American carriers into a battle of his choosing. The Japanese government was resistant, but the US' daring Doolittle Raid, which had bombers launch from carriers to strike at the Japanese Home Islands convinced them. Against his better judgement, Yamamoto's refined plan proved overly complex with a grand diversionary attack at the Aleutian Islands which dangerously dispersed their forces. Unfortunately, the Japanese's necessary element of surprise was lost thanks to American codebreakers learning of their attack and then tricking them into confirming their target was Midway. The result was a disastrous defeat that resulted in the utter decimation of the Japanese fleet at Midway, closing Yamamoto's projected window of military advantage of six months after Pearl Harbor to the day.

Today, Yamamoto is respected as a master naval strategist, largely innocent of the Japanese military's notorious brutalities, whose warnings of what Japan was taking on should have been heeded, but was ultimately undone by his ego, interference by his superiors and factors out of his control like his navy's compromised encryption.

In 1941, the United State decided to take action against Japan's aggressive expansionist policies in China. They cut off all oil and scrap metal trade with the resource-poor islands, leaving the Japanese with an eighteen month supply of oil. The General Staff decided they would need to seize the oil-rich Dutch colonies of the South Pacific but feared the US Pacific Fleet, which had recently relocated to Hawaii as a sign of American power. Though, as mentioned above, Yamamoto believed that Japan would inevitably lose a prolonged war against America, he could only guarantee a window of six months of Japan having the advantage upon the opening of open hostilities, the honor-bound officer was obliged to agree.

His strategy would involve crippling the Pacific Fleet while at anchor at Pearl Harbor, leaving the IJN free to seize much of the Pacific before America could recover. After that, he would need to turn the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle to buy more time or force America to a negotiated peace. Although the attack on Pearl crippled the Pacific Fleet's battleships, well beyond their most optimistic projections, the American carriers were not in port. Thus, America was forced to depend on these vessels, which, coupled with the fact that the Japanese did not target Pearl's shore facilities and oil storage meant the US Pacific Fleet was still a dangerous threat.

His strategy would involve crippling the Pacific Fleet while at anchor at Pearl Harbor, leaving the IJN free to seize much of the Pacific before America could recover. After that, he would need to turn the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle to buy more time or force America to a negotiated peace. Although the attack on Pearl crippled the Pacific Fleet's battleships, well beyond their most optimistic projections, the American carriers were not in port. Thus, America was forced to depend on these vessels, which, coupled with the fact that the Japanese did not target Pearl's shore facilities and oil storage (allowing the remnants of the fleet to maneuver immediately).

As a result, Yamamoto decided he needed to take maximise Japan's defences by taking the atoll of Midway. The Japanese government was resistant, but the US' daring Doolittle Raid, which had bombers launch from carriers to strike at the Japanese Home Islands convinced them. Against his better judgement, Yamamoto's refined plan proved overly complex with a grand diversionary attack at the Aleutian Islands which dangerously dispersed their forces. Unfortunately, the Japanese's necessary element of surprise was lost thanks to American codebreakers learning of their attack and then tricking them into confirming their target was Midway. The result was a disastrous defeat that resulted in the utter decimation of the Japanese fleet at Midway, closing Yamamoto's projected window of military advantage of six months after Pearl Harbor to the day.

Like many officers of Japan, he spent a considerable amount of time in the United States, having gone to Harvard and serving as a naval attaché in Washington. Because of this, he was well aware of the great industrial potential that America had and correctly knew that they would be able to outproduce Japan if the two nations went to war.[[note]]And America did outproduce Japan. In one year, from 1943 to 1944, the US Navy commissioned more ships than the IJN had in their ''entire'' seventy year existence.[[/note]]

Today, Yamamoto is respected as a master naval strategist whose warnings of what Japan was taking on should have been heeded, but was ultimately undone by his ego, interference by his superiors and factors out of his control like his navy's compromised encryption.

In 1941, the United State decided to take action against Japan's aggressive expansionist policies in China. They cut off all oil and scrap metal trade with the resource-poor islands, leaving the Japanese with an eighteen month supply of oil. The General Staff decided they would need to seize the oil-rich Dutch colonies of the South Pacific but feared the US Pacific Fleet, which had recently relocated to Hawaii as a sign of American power. Though, as mentioned above, Yamamoto believed that Japan would inevitably lose a prolonged war against America, the honor-bound officer was obliged to agree.

His strategy would involve crippling the Pacific Fleet while at anchor at Pearl Harbor, leaving the IJN free to seize much of the Pacific before America could recover. After that, he would need to turn the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle to buy more time or force America to a negotiated peace. Although the attack on Pearl crippled the Pacific Fleet's battleships, well beyond their most optimistic projections, the American carriers were not in port. Thus, America was forced to depend on these vessels, which, coupled with the fact that the Japanese did not target Pearl's shore facilities and oil storage (allowing the remnants of the fleet to maneuver immediately), resulted in the utter decimation of the Japanese fleet at Midway.

* Actor Creator/ToshiroMifune played him three times, including the 1976 film ''{{Film/Midway}}''.

After Midway, the Japanese were forced onto the defensive. Yamamoto himself went to Guadalcanal to oversee operations against the American Marines. In April 1943, his transport airplane was intercepted by American fighters and shot down, providing America a much-needed vengeance for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Yamamoto Isoroku was a leading admiral of the [[UsefulNotes/KatanasOfTheRisingSun Imperial Japanese Navy]]. He was responsible for their strategic direction which culminated in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway.

In 1941, the United State decided to take action against Japan's aggressive expansionist policies in China. They cut off all oil and scrap metal trade with the resource-poor islands, leaving the Japanese with an eighteen months of oil. The General Staff decided they would need to seize the oil-rich Dutch colonies of the South Pacific but feared the US Pacific Fleet, which had recently relocated to Hawaii as a sign of American power. Though, as mentioned above, Yamamoto believed that Japan would inevitably lose a prolonged war against America, the honor-bound officer was obliged to agree.

In 1941, the United State decided to take action against Japan's aggressive expansionist policies in China. They cut off all oil and scrap metal trade with the resource-poor islands, leaving the Japanese with a surplus of eighteen months. The General Staff decided they would need to seize the oil-rich Dutch colonies of the South Pacific but feared the US Pacific Fleet, which had recently relocated to Hawaii as a sign of American power. Though, as mentioned above, Yamamoto believed that Japan would inevitably lose a prolonged war against America, the honor-bound officer was obliged to agree.

[[quoteright:350:http://static.tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pub/images/yamamoto_isoroku.jpg]]

His strategy would involve crippling the Pacific Fleet while at anchor at Pearl Harbor, leaving the IJN free to seize much of the Pacific before America could recover. After that, he would need to turn the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle to buy more time or force America to a negotiated peace. The attack on Pearl, however, would cripple the Pacific Fleet's battleships, well beyond their most optimistic projections, but the American carriers were not in port. Thus, America was forced to depend on these vessels, which, coupled with the fact that the Japanese did not target Pearl's shore facilities and oil storage (allowing the remnants of the fleet to maneuver immediately), resulted in the utter decimation of the Japanese fleet at Midway.

His strategy would involve crippling the Pacific Fleet while at anchor at Pearl Harbor, leaving the IJN free to seize much of the Pacific before America could recover. After that, he would need to turn the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle to buy more time or force America to a negotiated peace. The attack on Pearl, however, would crippled the Pacific Fleet's battleships, well beyond their most optimistic projections, but the American carriers were not in port. Thus, America was forced to depend on these vessels, which, coupled with the fact that the Japanese did not target Pearl's shore facilities and oil storage (allowing the remnants of the fleet to maneuver immediately), resulted in the utter decimation of the Japanese fleet at Midway.

* ''Manga/Zipang''

* The Michael Bay film ''Film/PearlHarbor'' also featured Yamamoto, this time played by {{Creator/Mako}}.

Like many officers of Japan, he spent a considerable amount of time in the United States, having gone to Harvard and serving as a naval attaché in Washington. Because of this, he was well aware of the great industrial potential that America had and correctly knew that they would be able to outproduce Japan if the two nations went to war.[[note]]And America did. In one year, from 1943 to 1944, the US Navy commissioned more ships than the IJN had in their ''entire'' seventy year existence.[[/note]]

In 1941, the United State decided to take action against Japan's aggressive expansionist policies in China. They cut off all oil and scrap metal trade with the resource-poor islands, leaving the Japanese with a surplus of eighteen months. The General Staff decided they would need to seize the oil-rich Dutch colonies of the South Pacific, but feared the US Pacific Fleet, which had recently relocated to Hawaii as a sign of American power. Though, as mentioned above, Yamamoto believed that Japan would inevitably lose a prolonged war against America, the honor-bound officer was obliged to agree.

In 1941, the United State decided to take action against Japan's aggressive expansionist policies in China. They cut off all oil and scrap metal trade with the resource-poor islands, leaving the Japanese with a surplus of eighteen months. The General Staff decided they would need to seize the oil-rich Dutch colonies of the South Pacific, but feared the US Pacific Fleet, which had recently relocated to Hawaii as a sign of American power. Though, as mentioned above, Yamamoto believed that Japan would inevitably lose a prolonged war against America. However, the honor-bound officer was obliged to agree.

His strategy would involve crippling the Pacific Fleet while at anchor at Pearl Harbor, leaving the IJN free to seize much of the Pacific before America could recover. After that, he would need to turn the Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle to buy more time or force America to a negotiated peace. The attack on Pearl, however, would crippled the Pacific Fleet's battleships, but the American carriers were not in port. Thus, America was forced to depend on these vessels, which resulted in the utter decimation of the Japanese fleet at Midway.