The IUCN's latest list of threatened species, published on its website on Thursday, showed that 100 per cent of the world's remaining 26 sturgeon species are now at risk of extinction, up from 85 per cent in 2009.

"The assessments are based on new calculations [that] show their decline over the past three generations to be steeper than previously thought," the conservation group said, adding that the reassessment had also confirmed the extinction of the Chinese paddlefish.

Both the Chinese paddlefish and the Yangtze sturgeon — one of the oldest vertebrates in the world that has existed for more than 200 million years — were common species in the Yangtze River basin, which has been plagued by heavy shipping traffic, overfishing, and water pollution.

The extinction of the two species became one of the most discussed topics on China's Weibo — a social media platform similar to Twitter — with users urging greater environmental protections.

"A biological population that lived for 150 million years was actually made extinct by modern civilisation? I want to ask: Where is our civilisation?" one user posted.

The Chinese paddlefish was one of the world's largest freshwater fish species and could grow up to 7 metres in length. The IUCN first declared it "critically endangered" in 1996.

The Yangtze sturgeon — which could grow up to 8 metres in length — was highly sensitive to increased noise on the river. Its meat was considered a delicacy in China and it was also fished as a source of caviar.

"Everyone, support the ban on fishing in the Yangtze River, and protect the habitats that are still in the Yangtze River," another Weibo user posted.

Despite maintaining a breeding program for the sturgeons, the country has not been successful at maintaining them in the wild. China implemented a fishing ban in some parts of the Yangtze River in 2021.

In 2005, more than 10,000 sturgeon fry, 200 junior sturgeon and two adult fish were released into the Yangtze River as part of a continued effort to repopulate the species' battered numbers. They were only the latest in the five million of the fish, bred in captivity, to have been released into the wild over the past two decades.

The government has responded by working frantically to boost coal production and power generation. Investment in coal mines and power has soared, despite signs of overcapacity in the industry. At least five new major coal-fired power projects were approved for construction in the first six weeks of the year; three “billion-dollar” coal mine projects were greenlit in February. And in May, the central government announced 10 billion yuan ($1.5 billion) in favorable loans for coal power generators. Overall, 8.63 gigawatts of new coal power projects were approved for construction in the first quarter of 2022, equal to half the yearly new approved capacity for 2021.

This massive investment in coal complicates China’s carbon reduction goals. The aim to reach carbon neutrality before 2060 requires an almost complete phase-out of conventional coal-fired power by 2050, leaving little time for these new plants to operate — and giving their owners a vested interest in a slower transition. Ensuring adequate power supplies in an era of increasingly dangerous heat waves and a growing reliance on electrification for both heating and cooling is important. But what China faces today is less a problem of insufficient supplies — in fact, the coal power industry suffers from overcapacity — than bottlenecks in transmission.

China owns the world’s largest coal power fleet; its coal power capacity increased by 56% over the past decade to reach 1,110 gigawatts in late 2021. However, data shows the average utilization of coal power plants — the proportion of time they spend generating power — fell from 60% 11 years ago to just 50% in 2021. That’s 800 fewer hours a year on average, the equivalent of each plant sitting idle for an additional month.

Part of the issue is that coal power generation isn’t economically viable. As coal prices have gone up, the profitability of China’s major power companies has fallen. Electricity prices are regulated by the central government. When northeast China experienced widespread power shortages last fall, coal prices spiked, but electricity prices were kept artificially low. The gap between the two was so high that power companies lost money when they generated power. In the runup to last fall’s power crunch, plants claimed technical malfunctions or even outright stopped purchasing coal to avoid being forced to operate at a loss.

Yet losses in the coal sector continue to rise. Twenty-six power companies listed on China’s Shanghai A-shares stock market lost an estimated 100 billion yuan on thermal power generation last year, while the big five state-owned power groups have increasingly shown little inclination to invest in coal power unless they are asked to do so by local governments.

Instead of focusing on making up short-term deficits in power generation through investing in coal, policymakers should look to improve power transmission and distribution. Meeting peaks in electricity demand, and managing variations in the output of wind, solar and hydropower, requires a flexible electricity grid in which different provinces import and export power to each other as needed.

Although regional networks like the East China grid exist, real-time power allocation is currently only feasible within provinces. Arranging the transmission of power from one province to another in real time will require cross-provincial agreements and a unified market. While some provinces, like Zhejiang and Anhui in eastern China, have signed limited power sharing agreements for the summer peak season, most local governments continue to emphasize self-reliance, preferring to use their own plants rather than rely on power from elsewhere. They have powerful incentives to do so: Generating power locally boosts local GDP, tax revenue, and jobs — whether the additional supply is needed or not.

But relying on local power generation means building abundant capacity to meet rapidly rising seasonal demand peaks. When summer heat waves hit Shanghai, peak loads driven by demand for cooling can jump as high as 40% relative to cooler times of year. The summer peak in the East China grid has almost doubled in the past decade alone. When summer ends, that demand disappears, leading to plants sitting idle.

As extreme weather becomes more common, the challenges involved in meeting demand peaks will only grow. Take the developed coastal province of Zhejiang, for example. Provincial authorities approved two coal power generation projects worth a combined 13 billion yuan in February, but the two new plants will only generate 3,320 megawatts; the province is estimated to face shortages of about 7,000 megawatts during the current summer peak.

If grid sharing agreements were more widespread, the flexibility of the grid would increase and these new plants might not be necessary at all. Research done by the Draworld Environment Research Center and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, during demand peaks, the capacity of the East China regional grid is sufficient to meet local demands — provided the power is properly allocated.

If we sweep away the obstacles to interprovincial power trading, the East China grid could reduce its need for power generation by 8%. That’s equivalent to cutting 30 big new coal power facilities — and a saving of 90 billion yuan. In central China, which experienced a power shortage crisis of its own last year, better integration could cut 11% of local demand for generation capacity.

This will require investment in new power lines connecting neighboring provinces to create fully integrated regional grids. So far, that investment has focused instead on long-distance connections between different regions. The country would also benefit from an interprovincial market for excess power, allowing provinces to better cope with sudden spikes in demand.

Although experts agree that the ramp-up of coal is a short-term policy adjustment and does not represent a “walk back” by China on its long-term climate commitments, the full implications of the coal power building spree remain unclear. With its goal of hitting carbon neutrality by 2060, China is running out of time to transition away from fossil fuels.

A spiraling crisis of stalled projects has dented the confidence of hundreds of thousands of homebuyers, triggering a mortgage boycott across more than 90 cities and warnings of broader systemic risks. The big question now is not if, but how much it will batter the nation’s $56 trillion banking system.

In a worst-case scenario, S&P Global Ratings estimated that 2.4 trillion yuan ($356 billion), or 6.4% of mortgages, are at risk while Deutsche Bank AG is warning that at least 7% of home loans are in danger. So far, listed banks have reported just 2.1 billion yuan in delinquent mortgages as directly affected by the boycotts.

“Banks are caught in the middle,” said Zhiwu Chen, a professor of finance at the University of Hong Kong Business School. “If they don’t help the developers finish the projects, they would end up losing much more. If they do, that of course would make the government happy, but they add more to their exposure to delayed real estate projects.”

Already rattled by headwinds from slowing economic growth, Covid disruptions and record high youth unemployment, Beijing is placing financial and social stability at the top of its priorities. Efforts that have been contemplated so far included a grace period on mortgage payments and a central bank-backed fund to lend financial support to developers. Either way, banks are expected to play an active role in a concerted state bailout.

The exposure of Chinese banks to the property sector tops that of any other industry. There were 39 trillion yuan of outstanding mortgages and another 13 trillion yuan of loans to developers at the end of March, according to data from the People’s Bank of China.

The real estate market is “the ultimate foundation” for financial stability in China, Teneo Holdings managing director Gabriel Wildau said in a note this month.

As authorities move to keep risks in check, lenders with high exposure could come under greater scrutiny. Mortgages accounted for about 34% of total loans at Postal Savings Bank of China Co. and China Construction Bank Corp. at the end of 2021, above a regulatory cap of 32.5% for the biggest banks.

About 7% of outstanding mortgage loans could be impacted if the defaults spread, according to Deutsche Bank analyst Lucia Kwong. That estimate may still be conservative given the limited access to information on the unfinished projects, she said.

To limit the fallout, China could tap into the excess capital and surplus loan provisions at its 10 biggest lenders, which amounts to a combined 4.8 trillion yuan, according to a report by Francis Chan and Kristy Hung, analysts at Bloomberg Intelligence.

Local banks — city and rural commercial lenders — could shoulder more responsibility than state peers, based on earlier bailouts and also due to their stronger ties with local governments, though their capital buffers lag far behind industry average.

Chinese banks have raised a record amount of capital in the first half from bond sales as they prepare for a potential spike in soured loans.

Bad loans at lenders, which amounted to 2.9 trillion yuan at the end of March, are poised to reach new records and further strain an economy that’s expanding at the slowest pace since the onset of the Covid outbreak.

While China’s total debt-to-GDP is forecast to climb to a fresh record this year, consumers have been reluctant to take on more leverage. That has ignited a debate over the risk of China falling into a “balance sheet recession,” with households and companies cutting back on spending and investing.

Disposable income growth is slowing, further hurting the ability of homebuyers to service their debts. China’s home price weakness had spread to 48 of 70 major cities in June, up from 20 in January.

S&P Global forecast home sales could drop as much as 33% this year amid the mortgage boycott, further squeezing the liquidity of distressed developers and leading to more defaults. Some 28 of the top 100 developers by sales have either defaulted on bonds or negotiated debt extensions with creditors over the past year, according to Teneo.

Property investments, which drive demand for goods and services that account for about 20% of the nation’s gross domestic product, plunged 9.4% in June.

Bank earnings are at stake. After recording the fastest profit expansion in nearly a decade last year, the nation’s lenders face a challenging 2022 as the government pressures them to support the economy at the cost of earnings.

A 10 percentage-point slowdown in real estate investment growth translates into a 28 basis-point increase in overall bad loans, meaning a 17% decline in their 2022 earnings, Citigroup analysts led by Judy Zhang estimated in a July 19 report.

The Hang Seng index of mainland banks has plunged 12% this month.

The protesters were desperate to recover about Rmb40bn ($5.9bn) in frozen deposits from four rural banks. Beijing’s deployment of Liu, a veteran of Chinese bank regulation, suggested the central government wanted a speedy solution to the stand-off.

A day after the rare outbreak of public dissent on July 10, Liu’s team doused the flames of unrest with a promise to reimburse funds the protesters had lost to fraud — but wider damage had already been done.

The protests in Henan drew national attention, partly because local officials manipulated the personal health apps of more than 1,000 depositors to imply that they were at high risk of Covid-19 and prevent them from protesting. Five officials linked to the case have been fired or demoted.

Whereas bank deposits should be the safest assets in any financial system, the Henan case — which also involves one bank in Anhui province — has raised concerns over lax regulation in China’s massive rural banking sector and exposed gaps in the country’s system of deposit insurance.

The problems at rural banks, although not regarded as a systemic financial risk in themselves, have heaped more pressure on an economy reeling from Covid-19, a years-long property downturn and a broader slowdown in growth.

“We are not worried about the rural banks in Henan per se,” said analysts from Citigroup. “However, the situation could worsen if the public were to start worrying about other banks, especially some larger financial institutions.”

A run on the banks began in April after local police opened an investigation into privately held Henan New Fortune, the largest shareholder in all four institutions. They accused a criminal gang led by Lü Yi, owner of Henan New Fortune, of defrauding the banks by falsifying loans and illegally transferring funds.

On July 11, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission promised to start paying back individual investors with savings of up to Rmb50,000 ($7,400). That will cost about Rmb20bn, according to S&P Global Ratings.

Bank runs in Henan province

Regulators hope their approach will placate the loud majority of smaller depositors. The initial payments will come from recovered criminal funds, said regulators, but it is not yet clear how larger accounts will be repaid nor who will pick up the final cheque.

Harry Hu, senior director at S&P Global Ratings, said how regulators resolve the case will have a “profound impact” as an example for other local governments and distressed borrowers.

Many people had deposited less than Rmb500,000 at each bank to ensure their savings were protected by the country’s deposit insurance scheme. However, this scheme has limited reserves compared with other countries, and the Chinese authorities have hitherto not been clear on the classification of the lost money — if they deem it was stolen by fraud, the insurance might not apply.

“As the nature of the missing funds remains unclear at this stage, it’s uncertain whether the deposit-protection scheme would be triggered,” said Hu.

In the wake of the Henan protests, China’s central bankers have played down the idea of a broader threat to the financial system. “Financial risks are largely under control, and 99 per cent of our banking assets are within a safe range,” said Sun Tianqi, chief of PBoC’s financial stability bureau.

Still, PBoC officials have also said that rural banks remain the country’s most stressed, accounting for one-third of the 316 institutions deemed “high risk” over their financial health.

For the past three years, they have been scrutinising the small banks and their shareholders, focusing on loans from the banks to their own investors, a practice reminiscent of the US savings & loan crisis in the 1980s.

Since 2019, the CBIRC has been “naming and shaming” unscrupulous bank owners, leading to a slew of mergers in weak regions such as Shanxi and Liaoning, as part of its bid to improve regional bank governance.

Yet the resurgence of frauds in rural banking has left a question mark about the complicity of local regulators and whether the CBIRC has done enough to insulate the system from pervasive moral hazard during an economic downturn.

Instead, Beijing is accelerating the issuance of special local government bonds to inject capital into smaller banks. A quota of Rmb103bn of such bonds was granted to the provinces of Liaoning, Gansu and Henan, plus the city of Dalian, in the first half of 2022. The banking watchdog has said more bonds will be issued by August.