The South Asia Politics, News, and Analysis Thread

Why do governments default on their debt payments? How is the island nation planning to rejuvenate its foreign reserves?

The story so far: The Sri Lankan government on Tuesday decided to default on all its foreign debt worth $51 billion as it awaits financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government stated that it took the decision to preserve its dwindling foreign reserves to pay for the import of essential items. Ratings agencies such as Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s have downgraded Sri Lanka’s sovereign debt.

What is sovereign debt?

Sovereign debt refers to the debt issued or accumulated by any government. Governments borrow money to finance the various expenses that they cannot meet through their regular tax revenues. They usually need to pay interest on such debt along with the principal amount over time although many governments simply choose to borrow fresh debt to repay existing debt. Historically, governments have tended to borrow more money than they could actually repay in order to fund populist spending.

It should also be noted that governments can borrow either in their local currency or in foreign currency like the U.S. dollar. Governments usually find it easier to borrow and repay in their local currency. This is because governments with the help of their central banks can easily create fresh local currency to repay debt denominated in the local currency. This is known as debt monetisation and it can lead to increased money supply which in turn causes prices to rise. Making good on their foreign debt which is denominated in a foreign currency, however, can be a tricky affair for governments. This is because governments depend on the inflow of foreign currency to gather the necessary foreign exchange to pay their foreign debt. The Sri Lankan government or the central bank, for example, cannot create U.S. dollars out of thin air to pay their foreign debt denominated in U.S. dollars. Instead, they depend on U.S. dollars flowing into Sri Lanka in the form of foreign investment and payments received in exchange for the export of various goods and services to build up their foreign reserves.

Why is Sri Lanka unable to make good on its foreign debt commitments?

Sri Lanka depends heavily on its tourism sector to bring in the foreign exchange necessary to import essential items such as food and fuel. The tourism sector contributes to about 10% of Sri Lanka’s gross domestic product. Since the coronavirus pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns, Sri Lanka’s tourism sector has been hit hard. This, in turn, has affected the inflow of U.S. dollars into the Sri Lankan economy. Sri Lanka’s forex reserves have dropped to $2.3 billion in February this year from over $7.5 billion in 2019. Thus, the Sri Lankan government has been finding it hard to obtain the U.S. dollars necessary to make good on its foreign debt obligations. It has thus sought help from the IMF as well as countries such as India and China. India this week agreed to offer additional financial assistance of $2 billion to Sri Lanka by rolling over debt that the island nation owes India.

Sri Lanka’s efforts to fix the exchange rate of the Sri Lankan rupee against the U.S. dollar in order to prop up the price of the rupee may have also played a role in the foreign debt crisis. As foreign exchange inflows dried up during the pandemic and the Sri Lankan rupee came under increasing pressure, the country’s central bank at a certain point banned the payment of more than 200 Sri Lankan rupees for one U.S. dollar. This rate was way below the actual market price of the dollar, which caused trades to be pushed into the black market and also caused a drop in the supply of U.S. dollars in the forex market.

What is the cost of defaulting on foreign debt? International lenders may be reluctant to lend any more money to the Sri Lankan government unless such lending is part of a restructuring agreement. This fact will also be reflected in the ratings that international ratings agencies give to debt issued by the Sri Lankan government. Going forward, the cost of fresh borrowing is likely to be high for the Sri Lankan government as lenders will be incurring greater risk while lending to a government that has been unable to make good on its previous commitments.

A bailout by the IMF could be on the cards, but the Sri Lankan government will have to agree to implement structural reforms as a pre-condition for such aid. The IMF may require the Sri Lankan government to end its aggressive push towards 100% organic farming that has caused food supplies to be affected and food prices to rise. It may also recommend getting rid of price controls on food and other essential goods. It should be noted that price controls on any commodity affect the incentive that producers have to bring fresh supplies into the market. Controls imposed on the exchange rate of the rupee may also need to go in order to re-attract U.S. dollars. An end to price controls and the ban on non-organic farming can help the domestic economy return to normalcy. This, in turn, can help in the return of tourists. At the moment, mass protests due to rapidly rising prices may be causing many tourists to avoid visiting Sri Lanka, thus worsening the country’s foreign debt crisis.

Sri Lanka’s relationship with China has been a controversial discussion during the last decade, dominating both domestic and international political conversations. The strengthening relationship between the island nation and the emerging global power has been largely economic. Yet it is quite clear that Sri Lanka’s closest neighbor, India, and the United States are diligently monitoring these developments in the China-Sri Lanka relationship.

China has been a major economic partner for Sri Lanka. Beijing’s assistance has been crucial in saving the poorly performing Sri Lankan economy during the last three years. At the same time, Sri Lanka is compelled not to antagonize India, the closest neighbor of the island, with which Sri Lanka’s relationship runs deep and far back. The India-Sri Lanka relationship is vastly different than its ties with China.

With India, Sri Lanka’s relationship during the post-colonial era goes well beyond economic relations. India has been extremely influential in Sri Lanka’s domestic politics. For instance, India played a key role in introducing the 13th Amendment to the constitution of Sri Lanka, which brought power devolution to the country to provide a solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. Concerns that ethnic conflict, particularly the problems of Tamil minorities living in Sri Lanka, are often amongst the political discussions in India, especially in Tamil Nadu. In 1987, India sent its army to fight against the domestic terrorist group LTTE, which demanded a separate country for Tamils in Sri Lanka. The mission is often considered a failure, and the then-Indian premier, Rajiv Gandhi, called back the Indian army given their failure to defeat the LTTE. Later, the LTTE killed Gandhi, claiming revenge for the operations against the LTTE. The war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE ended in 2009. However, the concerns about power devolution to the Tamil minority remain unaddressed and India has been consistently pushing Sri Lanka for full implementation of the 13th Amendment. Most recently, the same concern was raised by India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar during his visit to Sri Lanka in early 2021.

China’s relationship with Sri Lanka has been vastly different, due in part to China’s greater distance from the island. While China has been an ally of Sri Lanka in the post-independence period, its involvement in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs has been minimal. The growth of the China-Sri Lanka relationship is a recent phenomenon and one largely anchored on economic and financial ties. However, in recent years, military and political relations between the two countries have also grown.

The Rise of Economic Relations With China

Upon upgrading to a middle-income country, Sri Lanka has been heavily exposed to severe and recurrent Balance of Payment (BOP) crises. This compelled successive governments to seek solutions to escape from economic troubles, which resulted in stronger economic ties with China – and an increased reliance on China in Sri Lanka’s development process.

While there are many vague claims about the strengthening economic relationship between Sri Lanka and China, which sometimes includes claims such as Sri Lanka becoming a cat’s-paw state for China, it is vital and essential to investigate the avenues through which bilateral economic relations have developed and the underlying reasons. While much discussion of the growing China-Sri Lanka relationship has focused on the increased reliance on Chinese loans, which is often (and inaccurately) depicted as Sri Lanka falling into a Chinese debt trap, growing bilateral economic relations go far beyond debt. The blooming China-Sri Lanka economic relationship, which Colombo seems to cherish as a blessing currently, is taking place through three main avenues: debt, investment, and trade. Therefore, restricting the focus of Sri Lanka’s reliance on China to merely Chinese loans downplays the growing relationship between the two countries.

In terms of public debt, China over the last decade and a half has been the second-largest foreign lender for Sri Lanka. Several large infrastructure development projects, including the Colombo-Katunayake expressway, which connects the main commercial city and the major airport; Hambantota port; and the second international airport of the country, Mattala Airport, all were funded by Chinese loans. This of course has been a much-discussed phenomenon, used to strengthen claims of debt-trap diplomacy.

By the end of 2019, China owned a little over 10 percent of Sri Lanka’s outstanding foreign debt stock. While most of these debts consist of loans obtained for large-scale infrastructure development projects, recently obtained Chinese loans were for budgetary and BOP support. On top of that, in early 2021, the Sri Lankan government obtained a 10 billion renminbi (RMB) currency swap facility from China to tackle the ongoing foreign currency shortage. These indicate Sri Lanka’s changing relationship to Chinese Loans and increasing reliance on loan instruments such as Foreign Currency Term Financing Facilities and swaps to save the country from a severe Balance of Payment crisis, or even from defaulting on its debt.

Sri Lanka obtained a Foreign Currency Term Financing Facility (FTFF) of $1 billion from the China Development Bank in 2018, and another $500 million in March 2020. Most recently, in early April 2021, Sri Lanka signed another agreement with the CDB to obtain $500 million as an FTFF. These loan facilities, along with the currency swap provided in March 2021, indicate that Sri Lanka is heavily relying on China to avoid external sector vulnerabilities (i.e., BOP issues).

Secondly, similarly to Chinese lending, over the past decade, Chinese investments have also played a crucial role in Sri Lanka’s economic development. During the decade of 2010-2020, China has been the largest foreign investor in Sri Lanka. These investments include two controversial projects: the Colombo Port City Project and the investment in Hambantota Port by the China Merchants Port Company. Under the port city project, 116 hectares of reclaimed land in Colombo was leased to CHEC Colombo Port City (Pvt) Ltd, owned by a Chinese state-owned enterprise for 99 years. The port city project has drawn much controversy in the recent past. The opposition claims that proposed legislation intended to facilitate investment in the port city threatens Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.

Third, during the last two years, China has become the top import partner of Sri Lanka, surpassing India, which had long been Sri Lanka’s largest source of imports. In 2020, China continued to be the largest goods exporter to Sri Lanka despite the heavy import restrictions imposed by the Sri Lankan government to control foreign currency outflows. This policy, however, does not seem to have affected China as much as it impacted India. Chinese imports were reduced by 8 percent in 2020, while in contrast, imports from India went down by approximately 19 percent.

The reason for is the type of goods imported from China. Over the years, China has become the major source from which Sri Lanka obtains raw material for textiles and garments. These, in turn, are the major merchandise exports for Sri Lanka; 45 percent of Sri Lankan exports are textiles and apparels. The availability of textile raw materials, such as yarn and fabric, at a low price from Chinese suppliers appears to be the major reason for Sri Lanka to import these goods from China instead of from India or Pakistan, which previously used to be major importers of textile materials to Sri Lanka.

India’s Economic Role in Sri Lanka

What is interesting to notice is how Sri Lanka’s economic relationship with India had progressed through these same three avenues: debt, investment and trade. India has never been a major lender for Sri Lanka, nor can they lend to Sri Lanka in a capacity similar to China. Unlike China, India runs on a trade deficit above $100 billion and runs into foreign exchange issues from time to time. This means India’s lending capacity is limited and their lending support will largely be based on export credits.

However, up until this year, Sri Lanka had been relying on India to manage its foreign exchange problems by obtaining currency swaps. Early this year, though, India refused to extend the term of its currency swap agreement with Sri Lanka, quoting concerns about Sri Lanka’s economic climate. New Delhi said it was unwilling to extend the swap facility unless Sri Lanka entered into an IMF program.

To many, however, this seemed like retaliation for Sri Lanka’s sudden reversal on a deal to lease a part of the East Container Terminal (ECT) of Colombo port to the Indian business conglomerate Adani group. Having promised earlier to lease out 51 percent of the ECT to India, amid rising opposition from nationalist groups, the Sri Lankan government abruptly reversed course, claiming they had decided not to lease the terminal.

This could be a concern for India for a few reasons. First, 85 percent of the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT), which is the largest terminal of Colombo port, is controlled by the China Merchant Port Company, which operates as a joint venture with Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA). This deal was also inked under a Rajapaksa government, a few years back. Second, Hambantota port was leased to China for 99 years and the deal went ahead despite the controversies surrounding it. Against such a backdrop, India inevitably feels that they are being undermined or ignored in light of the growing presence of China.

However, Sri Lanka’s Cabinet has cleared the West Container Terminal (WCT) of Colombo port to be developed as a 35-year joint venture with India’s Adani Group and its local partner, John Keells Holdings PLC, as well as with an investment from Japan.

This brings us to the question of investment. Sri Lanka has received very little FDI from India and that number looks even smaller in comparison to the investment from China during the past decade. Additionally, the number of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka has been state-led and governed by strategic interests. The two best examples of such investment are Colombo Port City and Hambantota port, both of which serve strategic purposes for China. India, on the other hand, has made no such investments in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the only investment India has made that is of strategic interest is the Lanka Indian Oil Company, a subsidiary of state-owned Indian Oil Company, which controls approximately 15 percent of the auto fuel supply in Sri Lanka. This investment was facilitated in 2003 as a part of the then-government’s policy to break the state monopoly in fuel distribution. Since then there have been very little strategic FDI coming into Sri Lanka from India.

Trade has been the strongest part of the economic relationship between India and Sri Lanka. Historically, India has been Sri Lanka’s largest source of imports, until China surpassed India recently. The very first free trade agreement (FTA) of Sri Lanka was signed with India in 1998 and interestingly, the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISFTA) was the very first FTA for India as well. This FTA has been in effect for a little over two decades now and there have been a few efforts to expand the FTA to an Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement. However, these negotiations failed given the strong opposition of nationalist groups and professionals, as well as a regime change in Sri Lanka.

While there are issues regarding the Indo-Sri Lanka FTA, including concerns on non-tariff barriers imposed by India, more than 70 percent of Sri Lanka’s export to India are routed through the FTA, utilizing the tariff-free access. India on the other hand takes little advantage of the FTA benefits. As per existing data, only 10-20 percent of Indian exports are routed through the ISFTA to Sri Lanka. What is interesting to note is that China has overtaken India as the largest exporter to Sri Lanka without having an FTA with Sri Lanka, and thus without any tariff-free access.

China becoming the largest importer to Sri Lanka, including the major supplier of raw material to Sri Lanka’s textile industry, has significantly increased Sri Lanka’s reliance on China the trade front. This may have been seen as less of a concern compared to growing reliance on Chinese loans; however, the recent decision of Sri Lanka to obtain a 10 billion RMB credit swap from China was a clear indication of increasing Chinese influence tied to the rise of Chinese imports.

However, Sri Lanka’s exports to China have failed to match the growth of Chinese exports to Sri Lanka. In 2020, Sri Lanka’s exports to China amounted to just 2.3 percent of total exports, while exports to India represented 6.1 percent of total export. Sri Lanka relies more on India as an export market, especially as most of its products can enter India tariff-free, thanks to their FTA.

Balance of Power

Currently, the Sri Lankan economy is grappling with serious external sector issues. The country is struggling to meet its foreign debt repayments due to insufficient foreign currency inflows. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation worsened, largely due to the significant loss of tourism earnings, which constitute a major foreign currency inflow for Sri Lanka. On the other hand, Sri Lanka’s foreign debt repayment obligations remain the same.

Taken together, the circumstances have put Sri Lanka in a vulnerable position. The biggest concern is that Sri Lanka cannot address its problems as merely a domestic political issue. Tackling Sri Lanka’s external sector vulnerabilities, including the shortage of foreign currency, will require support from external parties, whether China, India, the United States, or even international organizations such as the IMF or World Bank.

Thus far, Sri Lanka has excessively relied on China to tackle its external sector vulnerabilities while economic relations with India seem to remain stagnant. At the same time, Sri Lanka tries not to irritate India. Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka is now struggling hard to balance between China, India, and domestic nationalists, all the while trying to save the country from a potential economic crisis. Thus far, it does not look easy.

Sri Lanka is often portrayed as a country that fell into a debt trap as a result of public investment projects financed by China. One such investment project was Hambantota port, which was leased to China Merchant Port Holdings Limited (CM Port) for 99 years for $1.12 billion in 2017. This project is largely the reason as why Sri Lanka is widely cited as a clear example of getting trapped in Chinese debt and being forced to hand over assets with national and strategic importance to China. The general belief seems to be that Sri Lanka was unable to pay off the loans obtained from China to construct Hambantota port in the first place, and therefore had no choice but hand over the port to Chinese control to pay off the debt.

However, the real picture of Sri Lanka’s debt crisis, which is not often explained, is very different and far more destructive. Debt owed to China is in fact the tip of the iceberg, and that should make the debt crisis all the more alarming. The famous Hambantota port deal is not merely an issue of Chinese debt — Sri Lanka has much larger economic issues that go well beyond the debt owed to China.

It is true that the EXIM Bank of China funded the construction of Hambantota port and the project certainly was not an economically sensible decision at the time given the fiscal constraints of the economy. In fact, there were serious concerns about the necessity of constructing an additional international port in Sri Lanka, particularly one financed through borrowing at commercial rates, and whether such a port would be able to generate enough revenue to break even. Sure enough, Hambantota port was not making enough revenue to repay China when loan payments came due. However, the real reason Sri Lanka moved to lease the port to China goes well beyond the difficulties of paying off the loan installments on debt obtained to construct the port. Alarmingly, the Hambantota handover indicates a far bigger economic crisis underway in Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lankan government obtained several rounds of loans to construct Hambantota port from 2007 to 2016. All these loans were obtained from China EXIM Bank, most at commercial rates. However, each loan had a grace period of around five years and a payback period of 15-plus years. For this very reason, the loan repayments for Hambantota do not amount to a large portion of Sri Lanka’s external debt servicing payments; some loan repayments have not even started yet. Debt repayments for the loans obtained for Hambantota port amount to only around 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s total annual foreign debt payments, and even less among total debt repayments.

The economic reality is that Sri Lanka leased out Hambantota port to China largely due to a persistent balance of payment (BOP) crisis resulting from the reduction of trade over the years even while external debt servicing costs have been soaring. Sri Lank faced a severe shortage of foreign reserves in light of the upcoming debt servicing payments, due to the maturity of international sovereign bonds. Therefore, the country had to look for various avenues to obtain foreign currency inflows. Leasing out Hambantota port was one of the ways to increase the country’s foreign reserves.

Although Hambantota port was leased to CM Port, the loans obtained to construct Hambanota port were not written off and the government is still committed to loan repayments as per the original agreements. The money obtained through leasing Hambantota port was used to strengthen Sri Lanka’s dollar reserves in 2017-18, particularly in light of the huge external debt servicing due to the maturity of international sovereign bonds in early 2019.

Sri Lanka’s debt problem goes well beyond China. It is related to a change in foreign debt composition and structural weaknesses of the economy, such as an overall reduction of trade, the rise of protectionism, and the reduction of government revenue.

By the end of 2017, only little over 10 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was owed to China and most of that was in the form of concessionary loans.

Instead, the largest portion of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was international sovereign bonds, which amounted to 39 percent of the total foreign debt as of 2017. These are commercial borrowings obtained from international capital markets since 2007, and such bonds have resulted in soaring external debt servicing due to the nature of the debt. Unlike in concessionary loans obtained to carry out a specific development project, these commercial borrowings do not have a long payback period or the option of payment in small installments. When sovereign bonds mature, it results in a significant increase of external debt servicing costs, as the entire face value of the bond should be paid once as opposed to paying installments for concessionary loans.

The danger of rising external debt repayments is they require a large amount of foreign currency. To put it in simple terms, a country should have a sufficient amount of foreign currency inflows (through exports, FDI, or more external debt) to finance foreign debt repayments. Sadly, though, Sri Lanka has failed to increase exports or FDI by a sufficient margin to match its rising foreign debt repayment obligations. On the contrary, the country’s export-to-GDP ratio (including exports of both good and services) has declined from 39 percent in 2000 to 21 percent in 2017, raising serious concerns regarding external debt sustainability. Meanwhile, the foreign debt servicing-to-exports ratio, a major indicator of external debt sustainability, reached a peak of 28 percent in 2015. The ratio was only 10.6 percent in 2007 and had increased to 22.5 percent by the end of 2017. Since 2011, the foreign debt servicing-to-exports ratio has remained above 20 percent except for a slight drop to 19.7 percent in 2016. By 2017, Sri Lanka was compelled to increase the level of foreign reserves despite the unfavorable global economic environment for emerging markets in light of the pending maturity of sovereign bonds amounting to $5 billion, which are due between 2019-2022.

This scenario forced the government to seek out for various ways to raise foreign currency and leasing Hambantota port, which was not generating sufficient return on investment, was among the options. In addition to that, media reports have indicated that the government is planning to lease Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA), one of the emptiest airports in the world, also located in Hambantota, to India. Both these infrastructure projects were constructed using Chinese loans and severely criticized as economically nonsustainable investments.

It is true that, thanks to financing a number of infrastructure projects, the portion of Sri Lankan foreign debt owned by the Chinese has increased drastically during the last decade or so. From 2008 to 2012, approximately 60 percent of foreign borrowing has come from China.

However, having said that, Sri Lanka would have encountered concerns pertaining to external debt sustainability and persistent balance of payment (BOP) issues even in the absence of Chinese debt. Of course, there were serious concerns regarding the economic sustainability and the necessity of the projects financed by the Chinese at the time those were initiated. Yet the bigger issue behind Sri Lanka’s debt crisis was the choice to borrow from international capital markets at commercial rates at a time when the country’s exports were going down even while the government consistently failed to fix structural issues such as the reduction of trade, rising protectionism, and reduction of government revenue. With those structural issues, serious concerns regarding debt management are inevitable. Resolving the problem will require a consistent effort for reforms, which involves serious political challenges.

For the second month in a row, temperatures in India and Pakistan are abnormally high because of a string of strong and prolonged heat waves — and now another surge is building.

This week, temperatures are soaring to dangerously high levels. They topped 110 degrees in the Indian capital of Delhi on Thursday. The city of Nawabshah in Pakistan hit 117.5 degrees (47.5 degrees Celsius) — the hottest temperature in the Northern Hemisphere this year so far.

The heat wave has heightened the fire danger in recent days, threatened crop yields and even accelerated melting of some glaciers. While this part of the world is no stranger to extreme heat, scientists say conditions have been worsened because of climate change.

“Heat waves happen more frequently now and they are spread around throughout the year,” said Amir AghaKouchak, a professor at University of California at Irvine, in an email. “This is the new normal and most likely it will only get worse in the future unless we take serious actions.”

The India Meteorological Department has placed much of that nation under a “heat watch” through the weekend, with some locations like Madhya Pradesh in the center of the country one step higher at “heat alert.”

Temperatures in this episode are expected to peak over the next few days, although the hot temperature regime over the subcontinent seems entrenched, with little meaningful relief in sight.

Most of India and a large area of Pakistan spent Thursday scorching under temperatures ranging between 104 to 113 degrees (40 and 45 Celsius). Between the two countries, nearly 1 billion people roasted under these extraordinary temperatures.

More than three dozen locations in India recorded temperatures of 113 degrees (45 Celsius) or greater, including the sprawling capital of Delhi, where readings rose as high as 115 degrees (46 Celsius) at the sports complex. Its official high was 110.3 degrees (43.5 Celsius), its highest April temperature in 12 years, according to the India Times.

The heat may escalate further Friday and Saturday, with little relief at night.

Temperatures of 110 degrees (43 Celsius) or higher are expected Friday throughout central India, including in the city of Nagpur. Another zone of similar temperatures is anticipated in north and east India from near Delhi, running southeast through much of Uttar Pradesh, and toward the border of Jharkhand nearer the coast.

Similar conditions are likely Saturday and Sunday, with some slight easing thereafter.

It’s probable that Pakistan ends up with the highest temperatures overall. Some locations north of the capital of Karachi could hit 120 degrees (49 Celsius) or higher through the weekend. Forecasts for Jacobabad, known as one of the hottest cities on Earth, are as high as 122 degrees (50 Celsius), which could test major records.

According to Maximiliano Herrera, an expert on world weather extremes, the highest April temperature in India is 118.9 degrees (48.3 Celsius), reached in Barmer during 1958. Nawabshah, Pakistan, about two hours inland from the Arabian Sea, hit 122.4 degrees (50.2 Celsius) four years ago.

The intense heat has caused significant power disruptions, described as the worst in years. Much of rural India lacks access to air conditioning. The unprecedented early-season heat waves are causing major health concerns in a country accustomed to the perils of hot conditions.

“The unfortunate reality is that people who are more vulnerable are the ones who will be impacted the most,” AghaKouchak said. “Lack of access to air conditioning, which is more common in poor and underserved communities, significantly increases the likelihood of heat stroke and heat wave caused mortality.”

Even without extreme heat waves, AghaKouchak found that just moderate increases in temperature can drastically increase mortality rates. Over the past five decades, around 0.92 degrees (0.5 degrees Celsius) of warming has increased the probability of heat-related mortality events of more than 100 people by 146 percent.

Most of those hazards are due to an increase of nighttime temperatures. AghaKouchak said temperatures typically tend to dip at night, providing a chance for our bodies to cool down. Without this cool-down, the prolonged heat increases the risk of heat exhaustion, cramps, strokes and even death.

“While we typically look at daily temperature extremes, nighttime temperatures are also really important for human health. … Nighttime heat waves have also increased significantly in densely populated areas of India,” AghaKouchak said. He and his colleagues previously found that the hottest nights from 1981-2013 have warmed by 0.92 degrees (0.51 degrees Celsius) per decade.

India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, also said the elevated temperatures have increased the risk of fires across the country. Just in the past few days, satellites have detected a large increase in fire hot spots, especially in the northern part of the country. One fire at a landfill outside of New Delhi spewed toxic fumes, prompting a nearby school to shut down Tuesday.

Waves of relentless heat are also impacting the harvest. Wheat arrivals have been reported as running 20 percent below 2021 values in parts of the country this year. The decrease is mainly due to consistent temperatures above 104 degrees (40 Celsius) across Punjab — a breadbasket of the country — during the growing season.

A drop in yield is largely due to crops that matured too quickly and have shriveled grains because of the early heat. It comes at a time when India was hoping to fill some of the gaps in the world market, like those created by Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

There are also concerns that the heat wave is rapidly melting glaciers, which might lead to flash and river flooding, according to the Pakistan Meteorological Department.

While India is often exposed to intense heat episodes, research shows the frequency, duration and intensity has increased as global temperatures rise.

A February study revealed that human activity played a larger role than natural causes, stating “anthropogenic factors have cause a twofold increase in the occurrence probability of severe heat waves in central and mid-southern India during twentieth century.” The risk of heat waves is projected to increase tenfold during the 21st century under some future climate change scenarios as well.

“The extreme heat wave hitting India this week comes on top of 1C warming that country has already experienced,” [[https://twitter.com/hausfath/status/1519407921058119680? tweeted]] Zeke Hausfather, a climate researcher at Stripe, a global technology company. “On our current emissions trajectory (SSP 2-4.5) India is headed for around 3.5C warming by the end of the century.”

Hellacious high pressure “heat domes,” like the one that has persisted over India in recent months have been found to be more common and more intense than in the past. Similar record-breaking temperature setups occurred in the Pacific Northwest during 2021, among other recent instances across the globe.

Temperatures tend to peak in India during April and May, or just before the rainy season — a seasonal shift in winds called the monsoon — gets underway. Cloudier and rainier conditions of the monsoon typically sweep north and west out of the Indian Ocean by late May and into early summer, lasting through early fall.

While readings are expected to drop somewhat after this weekend, there are signs of a resurgence thereafter.

Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa resigned on Monday, his office said, hours after his supporters brutally assaulted peaceful, anti-government protesters amid a worsening economic crisis in the island.

The resignation was accepted, according to a gazette notification, and consequently, the Cabinet stands dissolved as per the Sri Lankan Constitution.

Three persons died outside the capital in ensuing clashes, while at least 150 were injured in Colombo. Government MP Amarakeerthi Athukorala reportedly shot two people and then himself after being surrounded by a mob in the neighbouring Gampaha district, police told AFP. Homes of several ruling party lawmakers were torched, while some among anti-government protesters assaulted government supporters who turned up in Colombo, amid escalating violence on the streets.

After peaceful citizens’ protests for a month at Colombo’s seafront, and longer in other parts of the country, Sri Lanka descended into violence Monday morning, after several busloads of supporters of Mr. Mahinda came to Colombo amid speculation of his resignation. They chanted slogans praising their beleaguered leader who, along with his younger brother President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, is the target of anti-government protests in the island that is facing a grave economic crash, marked by acute food, fuel, and cooking gas shortages. The agitations intensified last week, in the wake of a worsening crisis for which demonstrators blame the ruling Rajapaksa brothers.

Earlier, addressing supporters at Temple Trees, his official residence, Mr. Mahinda said he was “willing to make any sacrifice for the people of the country.” Soon after the meeting, the supporters were seen pulling down tents of protesters in front of Temple Trees, and they soon proceeded north towards the Presidential Secretariat where they demolished several tents, including one of St. John’s Ambulance, that have come up at the agitation site ‘Gota go gama’ or ‘Gota go village’. They torched a library set up in the area and injured several protesters.

A group of pro-government men pushed and continuously kicked activist Vimukthi De Silva, badly injuring her leg. She was at the spot to attend a discussion on the government’s environment policy — several talks have been held at the agitation site regularly — when the raging mob approached her.

“I was trying to stand far away and stream the attacks live on social media. They tried to pull away my phone. They asked me are you Tamil, don’t remember that he [Mahinda Rajapaksa] ended the war? How could you protest against him, and violently attacked me,” she said, hours later, with her right foot heavily bandaged. Video footage of men carrying poles and savagely assaulting young protesters went viral on Sri Lankan social media.

Both President Gotabaya and Prime Minister Mahinda condemned the violence on Twitter, only to be slammed by critics who held them directly responsible for the attacks that police failed to prevent or arrest, despite being present in large numbers.

Cricket star Kumar Sangakkara told Mr. Mahinda in a tweet: “The only violence was perpetrated by your “supporters” - goons and thugs who came to your office first before going on to assault the peaceful protestors.”

Former Speaker Karu Jayasuriya said in a tweet: “These thugs of the regime who attacked the peaceful protestors came to the Prime Minister's residence on his invitation, and walked miles beating unarmed civilians. What was the police doing all that time? Is this what the President declared emergency regulations for?”

On Monday evening, massive crowds descended at Galle Face, the sea-side promenade in Colombo, defying the curfew, to express solidarity with the protesters. “We have come to support the young crowd who have sacrificed so much for our futures. If we don’t come today, when can we come?” asked Sriyan Jayawardena, a retired IT professional.

Ancestral home torched

Meanwhile, violence escalated outside capital Colombo, with several incidents of vandalism and torching of government lawmakers' homes reported.

A mob targeted the controversial Rajapaksa memorial monument in Medamulana, the ruling clan’s ancestral village in the southern Hambantota district, and razed it to the ground, according to the police.

The Rajapaksas' ancestral home was also set on fire. The group attacked wax statues of the Rajapaksas’ parents kept inside the structure built in 2014, during Mr. Mahinda’s second term as President.

A court case, in which Mr. Gotabaya was indicted for embezzlement of nearly a million dollars, is pending. The destruction of this monument was symbolic of the anger that people in a Rajapaksa stronghold feel against Mr. Mahinda, who they once revered and propelled to Presidency for two successive terms.