International Interventions and their comparability

So we've been having a debate in the Ukraine thread about how well NATO interventions in places like Kosovo compare with Russia in Crimea and if certain interventions are right while others are wrong. I figured we were starting to derail so I've made this topic for the discussion. I thought I'd open it up to comparing all interventions and not just the ones we were talking about, so we can compare things like Iraq, Libya and Mali to.

To try and pick up where we are currently in the Ukraine thread I'll make my latests point again.

I think there is a big difference between interventions where the intervener sets up a government and outright annexation. At least with the latest NATO ones the occupier eventually leaves. Russia has no plans to leave Crimea, while NATO/the US has slowly left/is leaving the likes of Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and others. The people there get to decide things for themselves one NATO/US troops are gone, while in Crimea the Russians are in charge forever (or at least intend to be).

NATO was "soft" power, then "hard" power, then back to "soft" power. Russia was "soft" power as a preliminary step to "hard" power, then there is no transition back to "soft" power.

There is also the Responsibility to protect as potential grounds, which was not used at all by Russia; it would be hypocritical of them, as they always criticize NATO and the rest of the West for bringing it up, whether in Africa, or the Balkans.

EDIT: The Russia of the 90s is different (they acquiesced enough to cooperate in the Balkans) from the Russia since the 2000s however (an independent Kosovo is not recognized), I wonder why...hmmmm maybe that guy named Putin has something to do with it?

edited 13th Apr '14 7:20:11 AM by entropy13

Russia did not do what it did in the 90s willingly. Yeltsin is seen as a Western stooge and an embarrassment besides. Putin is a reaction to that, not the cause.

So the argument I'm hearing is that unless everyone copies NATO's MO exactly, it's illegitimate? How very self-serving.

Any mention of Boris Yeltsin requires the posting of this video:

It should be pointed out that NATO intervened in Libya after inescapable evidence of atrocities on the part of the Qadaffi regime, invitations from the rebel factions and the approval of the Arab League. The lack of the last is a major reason why we haven't gone into Syria.

NATO happens to be doing the right things. Doesn't mean it had done it all the time, or will be doing it all the time. They're that flawed guy who at least tries to help. Compare that to the emo guy who says "I'm not like the others!" then complains when he's treated differently, like he isn't the same as the others, so he goes out of his way to throw some "adult" tantrums.

Which one of those is self-serving?

There is a presumption in that statement, that the West has good intentions and Russia doesn't. It's not really based on anything thats not, ultimately, about the interests of NATO versus Russia.

They both have their interests, and just their interests. Every major bloc and power goes through it differently, but the goals are the same.

Except NATO is hardly a unified block as witness the divisions over the Iraq War.

X6 I'm not sure where you're hearing that argument from because it's not the one I'm making. Frankly I don't buy the idea that NATO/the West has an actual MO beyond "what's best for us followed by helping people if it's not to much work and won't hurt us".

NATO doesn't have an MO, they're far from that organised. Just look at the differences between Former Yugoslavia, Libya, Mali, Iraq and Afghanistan. Throw in the lack of intervention in many places and the condemnation of the Georgia war and I don't see how how one can think that NATO has an MO so much as it just reacts to each situation differently.

What I'm trying to say is that I think there are some key things required for an intervention to be legitimate. 1: To be clearly wanted, 2: To be acting to protect the people where you are intervening, 3: A willingness to leave once the situation has stabilized, 4: Not to have created the situation via doggy means (what counts as doggy is admittedly subjective), 5: In the post-intervention phase to return (or grant depending on if they ever had it) to the people power of their own affairs (or at least make an honest effort to).

A 6th one that is very much desirable but I wouldn't say key is for UN/regional approval. Also 7: a willingness to not bail out halfway, is very much a plus.

Now that's interventions, acting to protect your national security in another ball game completely.

That's not a doctrine NATO follows, it's simply what I feel is needed for an intervention to be legitimate. Iraq only passes numbers 3, 5 and 7. Georgia manages everything but 6 from what I understand (though I'm sure 4 and 1 are disputed by some). Afghanistan wasn't an intervention so much as a national security thing. Libya I'd give all 7 with the addition that 5 only counts because NATO didn't take control over Libya. Mali I'd put in the same boat as Libya.

Mali was more the French cleaning up their former colony's messes, even if it was done under the UN's guise.

And my argument, even if we leave aside NATO's MO (I agree with you, but what you describe is how NATO describes themselves, which I find patently false), is that that particular view of the various points that need to be covered aren't how most nations operate, particularly on points 3, 4, and 5.

3 is too broad to be applicable in all cases. Some nations simply aren't economically viable and exist arbitrarily (Central African Republic or Tajikistan for example). In some cases, even if the nation is viable, the stability may still require foreign presence beyond their mandate, which isn't always understood by the locals (or it might be, but for local reasons is ignored, such as with Karzai).

4 is subjective, as you've said.

5, I'd argue is also subjective. The power/bloc involved will not put people who are against it's interests in power after all, even if they happened to be popular.

As for 6 and 7, I agree with you about 6, but I'd argue 7 is more important than all the others except for 1 and 2.

Though 1 is also subjective, to a point. Not as much so as some of the others though.

Agreed with 2.

It's very hard to determine if a power is wanted or not, because in any given situation, no matter how dire, most of the population is apathetic to such ideas (since they're more focused on day to day needs). It boils down to whoever can provide the most and is willing to stick around.

edited 13th Apr '14 8:35:38 AM by FFShinra

There is no presumption there of Western "good intentions". You don't have to have good intentions to do the "good things", right?

Technically you're right...They can be self-interested in their interests or they can have interests "beyond" their self as well, blasting to pieces the realist connotation of international politics.

Indeed...

Only in technical terms, i.e. they have a goal that they imposed on themselves, will be worked on using parameters that they have determined, under conditions that they encounter, as seen through their specific lens of international politics.

I would like to say more but my internet connection here at home is really iffy. My undergraduate thesis is relevant to the topic, although only to a certain extent (it's titled Hoisting Which Flag?: A Look at the Relationship of National and Regional Identities in the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). I haven't really discussed interventions per se (just a few paragraphs, if ever, since such actions are essentially a form of "cooperation" which is a primary subject already), so what I think would be relevant is my personal viewpoint of international relations in general, in a rational choice framework with a primarily game theory flavor (Thomas Schelling actually calls it "strategy of conflict"), operating under a non-zero-sum environment which was primarily espoused by major international politics analysts in the past.

edited 13th Apr '14 8:49:51 AM by entropy13

I'm not a pure realist, but the idea that cooperation at other levels isn't to ultimately serves the core interests by other means is silly.

Russia's got good intentions the same as the West, it's just the West, and those associated with it, assume otherwise. The Abkhaz (an actual people, distinct from Russians or Georgians) recieved protection and self rule and did most of the liberating themselves. Does Moscow get credit? No, because it's Russia. Saakashvili gets more sympathy, despite being at fault.

I agree with you that with 3 there's the problem of being needed beyond the mandate, but I don't see why a nation can't be viable on their own. Now many won't be able to just after the end of the conflict, but that's why I said once the situation is stabilised, not once the fighting is over.

4 is subjective, I'd argue that you've crossed the line once you're creating the situation instead of just supporting a side in it. Pretty much I just put this is to make the point that it's not legit for say the CIA to organise a coup in a nation then the US to declare that it needs to intervene to protect the people. Though there's also an expiry date on such things, otherwise Britain and France wouldn't be legit in cleaning up their colonial messes.

Yeah nobody is going to follow 5 strait out, but it goes with 3 that you stabilise the situation, transfer power then leave. So even if the person you put in is a stooge, the people can change that person if they so desire.

With not bailing out, the problem is the massive subjectiveness of what's bailing out halfway and what's finishing and heading home. Libya isn't stable but Gadfafi was stopped, that a completed intervention or one half done? Basically I think nation's need to be in it for the long haul, when a country just goes "fuck it, you guys all hate me and I'm sick of this, you're on your own" things can get even worse, look at Israel and Palestine.

I'm glad that you agree with 2, but I should point out that as I see it to be protecting the people there has to be something that you're protecting them from, which is questionable in Crimea.

It's certainly not easy to tell if an intervention is wanted, after all you have to determine who is a legit representative of the people, but I think it can be done. Gadfafi didn't want an intervention in Libya but the people seemed to. The separatists in Mali won't have wanted the French to turn up, but the government did. So it's not easy, but I believe it's possible.

One of the primary problems with Russia is that they have the tendency of being well-intentioned but they end up framing it in a way that they present the "other" as not helping, or at worse would be a detriment, i.e. a zero-sum.

And as I've said, the implicit concept of "difference" is constantly there.

That's why I'm personally at a loss with the likes of Russia and China today. They're undermining the potential of a better outlook with regards to international politics, the relationship among countries, their interactions.

And I've mentioned the "strategy of conflict" previously. The word "strategy" is not used in a strict military sense, and "conflict" does not necessarily mean two sides (or multiple sides) going against each other.

I am of the opinion that the interventions that have happened can be easier to look at within a rational choice framework (esp. game theory). In game theory, there are multiple players, with varying levels of information available to them, and therefore the potential choices they make also vary. But certain players at least have a consistent "internal framework" that they utilize to make those choices, as seen among those various interventions that have happened. There are no 'rules' per se in the game, but players can make 'rules' through cooperative action, or make 'rules' through their strategies (which is essentially the only 'rule' in the game: to be a player, you have to have at least one strategy).

edited 13th Apr '14 9:10:58 AM by entropy13

With 3, I'm saying in certain situations the nations simply can't stabilize because they aren't viable at the economic or social level. Look into the examples I gave (and they aren't, by any means, the only examples, a list of which would probably contain half the world's states).

With 4, even that condition can be subjective if the regime getting overthrown was itself illegitimate. It's a good rubrik, but it has to be applied with a case by case basis.

I agree with you that 5 is intrinsically tied to 3, but the issues of national solvency also affect 5.

2 is questionable for Crimea, but it's not deniable either. To say Crimea isn't legitimate on its face, as some have done, papers over actual issues which creates problems down the line.

On 7, I don't disagree. I'm just saying its more important than has been previously thought in the last two or three decades.

With Gaddafi, the problem wasn't overthrowing him, it's the aftermath, much like with Iraq. In Mali, I'd argue all France did was restore the status quo ante, instead of fixing what has been a chronic problem of North Mali not wanting to be part of the south. I'd argue further that the best way would be to legitimize them, thus preventing AQ from being a viable alternative and starting necessary negotiations. Otherwise, it all unravels down the line, just a question of years.

The perception of zero-sum isn't unfounded, though I agree they don't help with their reactions. There are hawks in the West after all, who very much see it the same way.

edited 13th Apr '14 9:18:03 AM by FFShinra

I think the biggest issue with Russia and China is that there aren't many checks on the governments there. Yes, the same issue exists in Western countries, but there are more checks and measures against the government doing whatever it wants. And most of the people who have talked to Putin outside of an official televised context say that Putin seems to be really unbalanced, like he's not really aware of what the global situation actually is.

edited 13th Apr '14 9:29:41 AM by Zendervai

I don't see why there should be a situation where a nation can't stabilise. Now there will be plenty of situations where stabilisation would require decades of hard work to manage, but that's not the same thing. I guess a lot depends on what you consider stable.

If you're acting to overthrow a regime that presumably that is the intervention, you're intervening to remove an illegitimate leader not because there's chaos because the leader was removed. Personally I don't think the presence of an illegitimate leader is enough to justify an intervention alone, an intervention needs to be wanted, otherwise you get Iraq.

I don't think we've abandoned interventions halfway so much recently, it's more that we've underestimated how hard it will be and the whole thing has dragged on. The assumption is made that things will be over in a couple of years, when in reality it normally takes over a decade.

Thinking about it Mali was in truth more about national security than anything else, they didn't go in to fix the issues. Just to ensure that the islamists didn't get a nation to hide out in and strike from.

Libya is more stable than Iraq, though I agree that it's not doing as well as it could, if it counts as a success or not is probably not something we'll be able to tell for some time.

"With Gaddafi, the problem wasn't overthrowing him, it's the aftermath,"

That's always the problem, blowing up someone you don't like is the easy bit, nation building has been the harder part for a long time now.

A book that anyone interested in nation building and interventions might find interesting is Swords and Ploughshares by Paddy Ashdown, I certainly found it informative.

Libya is not more stable than Iraq (if anything, it's the other way around, though I think their about par).

Stability is when the state matches (and thus can operate based on) historical, cultural, and economic realities of a particular area. The Democratic Republic of the Congo only exists on paper because none of those features match the state. It just exists because Belgium willed it so way back when. There is only so much intervention can be done before you have to consider redrawing the borders.

On overthrowing governments, not disagreeing. Just saying each case must be determined independant of others.

On abandoning interventions too soon, this was a lesson learned by the Imperial powers back in the day. Unfortunately, because of that, such lessons were thrown out with all the trash in baby out with the bathwater style and newer powers forgot.

On Mali, I don't disagree. However, I think that shortsightedness will cost the region and it's backers down the line.

I mean more stable than Iraq was at the equivalent time, so more stable than Iraq was in 2006.

Right we're using different definitions of stable, I'm using stable to mean when there is a government with control over its territory.

Yeah all interventions need to be considered individually, I make no claim to my list being the be all and end all of how to determine if an intervention is right or wrong, I'm just putting forwards what I consider a good baseline.

Interventionism does have a tendency to forget all the lessons learned from previous interventions. Nation building was managed in Germany and Japan after WW 2, but god knows most of what was learned has since been forgotten.

You're right on Mali, the core problem hasn't gone away.

Indeed, on us using different definitions of stable, though I'd argue that government control is tied in with local legitimacy. Otherwise, it requires more force to hold the state together.

Not sure what it says about Russia that, at the time of Libya events, people here were throwing around phrases like "So what now, are they going to invade us next?!". Or, toward those who supported the intervention: "Do you want their army invading Russia?"

Sure it requires force to hold an illegitimate state together, but it's still stable, and if the force is used alongside a program of building legitimacy than it can work. The force is just there to hold the place together while you build economic and cultural stability.

Ignoring the fact that Russia allowed Libya to happen (could have vetoed the UNSC resolution), the fact that Libya hardly counts as an invasion and the fact that nobody in the West wants to invade Russia. Wouldn't you like an intervention if Putin went full Gaddafi and tried to wipe out half the country?

edited 13th Apr '14 10:47:45 AM by Silasw

Well considering what NATO was designed for, one can see where they'd be coming from, even if it is bat-shit paranoid to think it'd actually happen.

Pakistan is much the same way. Most of their opposition to the OBL raid was "Our nukez are next!!!"

It takes longer than a few decades to do something like that. More like a few centuries. It's simply easier and less costly for all involved to break up a state to match the local situation than to change the local situation to match lines drawn by people who didn't know what they were doing.

The state, after all, is meant to represent the society, not the other way around.

edited 13th Apr '14 10:48:06 AM by FFShinra

That speaks to a rather high and unrealistic degree of paranoia.

edited 13th Apr '14 10:46:01 AM by Mio