The South Asia Politics, News, and Analysis Thread

Quetta, Pakistan (CNN) Three people have died and 15 were injured in an attack on paramilitary troops in the city of Quetta in Pakistan's southwestern province of Balochistan.

Quetta is the capital of Balochistan province near the Afghan border. The province has seen a decades-long insurgency by separatists who demand independence from Pakistan, citing what they say is the state's monopoly and exploitation of the province's mineral resources.

The District Inspector General of Police for Quetta, Azhar Akram, confirmed to CNN that the attack was caused by a suicide bomber and took place early Sunday morning at a checkpoint of the Frontier Corp, the paramilitary troops stationed within the city of Quetta.

The Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for the blast in a statement released to CNN.

While there have been targeted attacks by the TTP on the Frontier Corp in July, the deadliest recent assault carried out by the militant group was in April, when a blast outside a luxury hotel in Quetta killed four people and injured 12 others.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Imran Khan condemned the incident in a post on Twitter Sunday.

"Condemn the TTP suicide attack on FC checkpost, Mastung road, Quetta. My condolences go to the families of the martyrs & prayers for the recovery of the injured. Salute our security forces & their sacrifices to keep us safe by thwarting foreign-backed terrorists' designs," the tweet read.

TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud appeared buoyed by the Afghan Taliban gains in an exclusive interview with CNN six weeks ago. As the Taliban closed in on Kabul, Mehsud suggested "the victory of one Muslim was surely helpful to another Muslim."

He vowed to take control of Pakistan's tribal border region, hinting it would be easier with US forces gone and the Afghan Taliban in charge in Kabul. US drone strikes killed three of his predecessors.

The number of TTP attacks In August was more than double last year's monthly average, according to figures published by the group.

The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal V.R. Chaudhari, recently said that the delivery of the S-400 Triumf air defence systems from Russia is expected according to schedule. In response, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman hoped that both the U.S. and India could resolve the issue. The “issue” here is that receiving the missile systems could attract for India sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), enacted by the U.S. Congress. Ms. Sherman emphasised that the U.S. thinks it’s “dangerous” for “any country that decides to use the S-400”. India is scheduled to receive five squadrons of the surface-to-air missile systems under the $5.43 billion (₹40,000 crore) agreement it signed three years ago.

Enactment of CAATSA

Even though CAATSA was signed into law by then President Donald Trump in 2017, India stuck to its guns, signed the agreement with Russia a year later, and paid an advance in 2019. The missile systems were originally scheduled to be delivered between 2020 and 2023 and the supplies are expected to commence now. Both New Delhi and Washington have been in conversations over the deal. India has stressed on the tactical importance of the defence missile systems considering the environment in the Indian subcontinent.

The CAATSA was passed when the U.S. sought to discourage trade in the defence and intelligence sectors of Russia, a country perceived to have interfered with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The Act mandates the President to impose at least five of the 12 sanctions on persons engaged in a “significant transaction” with Russian defence and intelligence sectors. These sanctions include suspending export licence, banning American equity/debt investments in entities, prohibiting loans from U.S. financial institutions and opposing loans from international finance institutions.

The Act also built in a safety valve in the form of a presidential waiver. This was written into the law after much persuasion and is interpreted as one crafted to accommodate countries like India. Policy planners on either side are aware of the law and the provisions to work around it. Ms. Sherman and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who came to India earlier this year, cannot be expected to announce whether India can secure a waiver from President Joe Biden when the time comes for the White House to make a decision.

The “modified waiver authority” allows the President to waive sanctions in certain circumstances. He has to decide whether the move is in American interest; does not endanger the country’s national security; and affect its military operations in an adverse manner. In addition, he has to determine whether the country in question is taking steps to bring down its inventory of defence equipment from Russia and cooperating with Washington on matters of critical security. There are a few more provisions including one that allows for sanctions waivers for 180 days, provided the administration certifies that the country in question is scaling back its ties with Russia.

The debate in the U.S. hovers around the efficacy of such sanctions against India when the geopolitical situation in the region is undergoing a change. Today, there is a growing relationship between China and Russia with both countries seeking to expand engagement in Afghanistan from where the U.S. withdrew its military after two decades of war. India turned sullen over the manner in which the U.S. negotiated the exit deal with the Taliban. Yet, on the strategic plane, India remained on course by agreeing to the upgrading of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and sharing the same vision as the U.S. on the Indo-Pacific construct.

Sanctions have the tremendous potential of pulling down the upward trajectory of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India, which now spans 50 sectors, especially in the field of defence. The U.S.’s apprehension is that bringing India under a sanctions regime could push New Delhi towards its traditional military hardware supplier, Russia. Till about a decade ago, an influential segment of the Indian political leadership and top bureaucracy remained wary of deeper engagement with the U.S. Sanctions can stir up the latent belief that Washington cannot be relied upon as a partner.

Decrease in imports

Over the last decade, India’s military purchase from Russia has steadily declined. India’s import of arms decreased by 33% between 2011-15 and 2016-20 and Russia was the most affected supplier, according to a report by the Stockholm-based defence think-tank SIPRI. In recent years, though, there have been some big-ticket deals worth $15 billion including S400, Ka-226-T utility helicopters, Brah Mos missiles and production of AK-203 assault rifles.

On the other hand, over the past decade, government-to-government deals with the U.S. touched $20 billion and deals worth nearly $10 billion are under negotiation. The U.S. designated India as a Major Defence Partner in 2016. It later gave India Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 which allows access to critical technologies. Today, manufacturers in both countries are exploring ways to co-develop and co-produce military equipment.

What next?

There are advocates in the U.S. who strongly favour imposing sanctions on India following the U.S.’s decision to impose restrictions on its NATO ally, Turkey. China was the first country to attract the provision after it procured the S-400. Should India be treated with a different yardstick? A section of influential lawmakers in the Democratic Party hold a different view.

There are three clear steps in this regard. The first is the presidential determination on waiver; the second is the referral to the Congressional Committees; and the third is clearance by these panels. While referral to the Armed Services is spelled out, it is a distinct possibility that this will be sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committees. This powerful committee, headed by Senator Bob Menendez, wrote to Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin ahead of his visit to New Delhi in March this year that he must inform India of the perils of the deal, while a Republican, Todd Young, on the panel argued against it.

The CAATSA test will determine the course of the India-U.S. strategic partnership. Will the Biden administration sail through opposition within his party in allowing India a clear passage? While the administration will have to do the heavy lifting, the role of Indian-Americans should be significant just as they rallied around to support the historic Civil Nuclear Deal in the face of stiff resistance from Democrats opposed to nuclear proliferation.

The Union Home Ministry has enhanced the powers of the Border Security Force (BSF) to “arrest, search and seize” within 50 km from the international boundary in Assam, West Bengal and Punjab. Such operational powers of the BSF, a Central armed police force under the Union, will also be applicable to the newly created Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, according to a notification published in the Gazette of India on October 11.

Earlier, the BSF’s limit was fixed up to 80 km from the international boundary in Gujarat and 15 km in Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal and Assam.

The October 11 notification replaces a 2014 order under the BSF Act, 1968, which also covered the States of Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland and Meghalaya.

Though the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir that was bifurcated into two Union Territories in August 2019 was not mentioned in the 2014 order, references to it exists in a previous such amendment in 1973. The October 11 order specifically mentions the two Union Territories.

The violations for which the BSF carries out search and seizure include smuggling of narcotics, other prohibited items, illegal entry of foreigners and offences punishable under any other Central Act among others.

A BSF official said the amendment “establishes uniformity in defining the area within which the BSF can operate” as per its charter of duties, adding that this would enable improved operational effectiveness in curbing trans-border crimes.

After a suspect has been detained or a consignment seized within the specified area, the BSF can only conduct “preliminary questioning” and has to hand over the suspect to the local police within 24 hours. The BSF does not have the powers to prosecute crime suspects.

‘Attack on federalism’ Punjab Chief Minister Charanjit Singh Channi said the move was an attack on federalism. “I strongly condemn the Go I’s [Government of India’s] unilateral decision to give additional powers to BSF within 50 KM belt running along the international borders, which is a direct attack on the federalism. I urge the Union Home Minister @Amit Shah to immediately rollback this irrational decision,” he tweeted.

In 2012, Narendra Modi as Gujarat’s Chief Minister had written to the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh opposing the Centre’s proposed move of amending the BSF Act, 1968, to give wide powers to the Central armed police force to arrest and search anybody in any part of the country.

Punjab Deputy Chief Minister Sukhjinder Singh Randhawa termed the decision “illogical.”

“Policing in the hinterland is not the role of a border guarding force, rather it would weaken the capacity of the Border Security Force in discharging its primary duty of guarding the international border,” he said.

Mr. Randhawa added that Mr. Channi never asked the Centre for enhancing the jurisdiction of the BSF along the international border.

The Shiromani Akali Dal also termed the Union’s move “the imposition of the President’s rule through the back door in nearly half of Punjab. This virtually turns the State into a de facto Union Territory. This devious attempt to place the State directly under the Central rule must and will be opposed,” said senior Akali leader and former Minister Daljit Singh Cheema.

There is no response from the West Bengal government yet.

New Delhi: State-run Coal India Ltd, the world's biggest coal miner, has temporarily stopped supplying non-power users, the company said in a statement on Thursday, as India battles one of its worst power supply deficits in years. India is the world's second-largest coal producer, with the world's fourth-largest reserves, but a surge in power demand to above pre-pandemic levels means state-run Coal India's supplies are no longer enough.

Coal India said it had stopped all online auctions of coal except those meant for the power sector.

"This is only a temporary prioritisation, in the interest of the Nation, to tide over the low coal stock situation at the stressed power plants and scale up supplies to them," it said.

Most of India's 135 coal-fired power plants have fuel stocks of less than three days.

India is competing against buyers such as China, the world's largest coal consumer, which is under pressure to ramp up imports amid a severe power crunch.

The company noted that Indian customers have turned to using local coal due to higher global prices of the fuel.

India has asked power producers to import up to 10% of their coal needs amid fuel shortages and has warned states that federal companies will curb their power supplies if they are found selling electricity on power exchanges to cash in on surging prices.

In terms of direct gains, the revolutionaries achieved precious little; most of their attempts were either aborted or failed. Nor did they believe that assassinations or dacoities would alone bring in India’s liberation, as Aurobindo’s original idea was to prepare for an open armed revolution. But they also achieved a lot. The hanging of Khudiram and the Maniktala Bomb Conspiracy trial, publicised by the press and immortalised in folk songs, fired the imagination of the entire Bengalee population. C.R. Das, still a briefless barrister, appeared as the defence counsel for Aurobindo and argued that if preaching the principle of freedom was any crime, then the accused was surely guilty. To everybody’s surprise, Aurobindo was acquitted; but Barindra and Ullaskar Dutta were sentenced to death and ten others were to be deported for life. On appeal, the death sentences were reduced to life imprisonment; and some other sentences were reduced as well. The movement hereafter went underground and became decentralised, but did not die down. Revolutionary activities by now had acquired legitimacy in popular mind, as many people believed that it was an effective alternative to the earlier mendicant policies of the moderates. When the Morley-Minto Reforms were announced in 1909, many of these people believed it was because of fear generated by revolutionary activities.86 As one historian argues, the appointment of Lord S.P. Sinha as the law member in the viceroy’s executive council was surely the result of pressures generated by violent activities. The partition of Bengal itself was annulled in 1911 and although the measure was presented as a “coronation boon” from George V, it might not have been totally unrelated to such pressures.87 But there were other administrative calculations too, the most important of which was the transfer of capital from Calcutta to Delhi—a measure that certainly needed to be sugarcoated.88 This marked the end of Bengali dominance in national politics of India. The Curzonian aim of weakening the Bengali politicians was achieved in a different way and now with less resistance.

But the annulment of partition did not bring an end to militant nationalism, as violence was not generated by partition alone. The centre of activities now moved to Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, where the Bengali revolutionaries were joined by the Punjabis returning from North America, where they had formed the revolutionary Ghadr Party. They organised dacoities throughout north India to raise funds and in 1912 plotted an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Viceroy Lord Hardinge. In September 1914 the stranded Punjabi Ghadrites on board the Kamagata Mam, clashed with the army at Budge Budge near Calcutta. With the outbreak of World War One even more grandiose schemes of organising armed revolts in the Indian army with help from Germany or Japan began to appear. Rash Behari Bose operating from Lahore tried to organise an army revolt throughout north India, but failed to evoke any response from the sepoys and ultimately fled to Japan. In Bengal, the revolutionaries united under the leadership of Jatin Mukherjee tried to smuggle in arms from Germany, but the amateurish attempt ultimately ended in an uneven battle with the British police at Balasore in Orissa. The unbound repression of the government at this period, freely using the new wartime Defence of India Act (1915), made violent attacks more and more infrequent.89 But the spectre of revolutionary violence did not disappear at all and it made the Sedition Committee to draft in 1918 the draconian Rowlatt bills, which inflamed Mahatma Gandhi into action and to initiate a new phase in Indian politics, where the central focus would shift from violence to non-violence, from elite action to mass agitation.