The idea of Thermopylae was to delay the Persian army's advance into Greece for as long as possible, until the city states could raise their own levies and/or logistics started faltering for the absurdly large Persian army, but because the battle only lasted 3 days, it was a strategic defeat for the Greeks who had intended to hold out for longer. However, an unintended consequence of the early loss was that the Greek fleet retreated from the simultaneous sea battle of Artemisium instead of fighting to the death (because their strategy depended on holding both points). This led to the Persian fleet growing overconfident, overextending themselves, and suffering a devastating defeat against the surviving Greek fleet at the Battle of Salamis weeks later. This ultimately cost the Persians the war by forcing their fleet to withdraw to Persia and destroying their army's supply lines, effectively showing just how well long-term planning and war go together (i.e. not at all).
The Spartans in general were known for being rather good at tactics, and rather bad at strategy. Their troops were well-equipped and well-conditioned, and their ability to maneuver was at the very least above-average, but they generally sucked at logistics and diplomacy. A large chunk of why the Peloponnesian War dragged on as long as it did was that Sparta could regularly beat Athens in the field, but capitalizing on those victories was very difficult, with multiple advances deep into Athenian territory basically ending when the Spartans had to go home because they ran out of food.
In their war with Sparta, the Thebans showed a mastery of both strategy and tactics. At the Battle of Leuctra, they overweighted one side of their phalanx to collapse the Spartan host. Their strategy however was to remain in Spartan territory long enough for the Helots to run away. With most city-states, the agricultural economy couldn't be destroyed by raiding simply because destroying crops is even harder than farming them. But the Spartans' agriculture, based on slave Helots kept in line by the other citizens, could be ruined simply by taking the workers away.
Pyrrhus of Epirus, second cousin of Alexander the Great, was well-known for winning many of his battle against Rome. The problem was, though, that the amount of casualties he was suffering was weakening his army, while Rome seemed able to throw legion after legion at him. It was clear to him that if he kept losing as many fighting men as he was, then it would be impossible for him to carry out his grand strategy and win the war. Thus, the term Pyrrhic Victory was coined in his "honor". Though this is slightly unfair to him as even though he had to abandon Rome and Sicily, that period of time was a large free-for-all. Sicily at the time was being riled up by the Carthaginians and the Punic War was only a few years away. The fact that Epirus survived conflicts with Rome, Carthage, and Sparta during his rein speaks wonders for his ability to lead. In fact, Hannibal himself admired him as the second best military commander of the age just behind Alexander the Great. Of course, Hannibal himself was a brilliant tactician, but an awful grand strategist, so that can be taken with a just a bit of salt. As such, he was probably within the top ten commanders of that time period.
In The Punic Wars, Hannibal Barca was an amazing tactician who defeated Roman armies with ease and slaughtered their forces. The Romans were unable to compete with his brilliance, but they didn't give up, helped by the fact that not matter how many victories Hannibal achieve, capturing or merely besieging the gigantic urbs of Rome with his meager resources was out of the question. The Romans simply began a war of attrition and cut off Carthage's supply lines to Hannibal using sea vessels that Hannibal could not counter (the last Punic war ended with an agreement that said Carthage had to give up its fleet). Hannibal rushed to his country's aid, but was defeated at the Battle of Zama. He is now one of the best examples when discussing the importance of strategic thinking used in conjunction with tactical thinking.
Another factor that made the Carthaginians lose is that they counted on Rome's allies to defect after suffering so many defeats. Rome's policy of extending citizenship to (the elites of) their allies and refraining from demanding tribute made their allies very loyal and thus Hannibal didn't find many friends during his 15-year long pillaging of Italy. In general, while Rome could be very brutal, its willingness to grant outsiders political rights was a long-term strategy that made their empire possible.
Given Rome's advantages in manpower, superior land troops, and naval supremacy, Carthage's defeat was only a matter of time right from the start. Hannibal's best chance was to bring war to Roman homeland and win battle after battle until Rome was brought to its knee before Carthage itself got exhausted. He almost achieved that - a string of defeats costing as much as one fifth of total adult male population would have broken any other civilization, but unfortunately this was Rome, whose pride and morale was unbreakable, and whose ability to adapt was almost unseen. Rome's losses were ultimately not enough to even the strategical imbalance. Eventually, Carthagian losses in the Iberian Peninsula and attacks on their homeland forced Hannibal's retreat leading to Hannibal's famous loss at Zama.
Interestingly, Hannibal's loss at Zama was a tactical defeat. He forced his elephants to drink wine and sent them to ravage the Roman lines. The Romans simply parted ranks and did not antagonize the elephants, allowing them to pass through unharmed then drove them off with a missile attack. Some of the elephants then turned around and stampeded his own troops who proceeded to panic and fight back, drawing the elephants full ire. Without his heaviest assets and facing better trained and armed and armored troops, Hannibal lost unit after unit due to inexperience and, thus, couldn't surround his opponent as normal. It all ended when his forces hit from behind by Rome's cavalry fresh off their victory over the Carthagian cavalry.
The Byzantine Empire habitually refused battle, knowing they had only so many soldiers, and instead raided their enemy's foraging parties, used their castles (including Constantinople) to take shelter in, and bought off the clients of invading princes with their large supply of money and fabled skill at conspiracy. Byzantine tactics were fairly sophisticated for the era depending on a part-professional, part-feudal army that still retained Roman traditions. It involved heavy use of technology and a scientific study of war, both of which were uncommon at the time though less rare than many think. On land they were famous for their cataphracts, heavy Horse Archer / lancer cavalry. At sea they were famous for their "Greek Fire" Naphtha grenades and flame throwers.
18-19th century
In The American Revolution the British could usually win engagements by their greater tactical skill. However the Americans figured out that they could win strategically just by continuing to exist until the British got tired of it.
The Battle of Valcour Island is seen as a tactical defeat but a great strategic victory for the Americans. The fleet assembled by Benedict Arnold for the fight was destroyed without inflicting much damage on the British fleet, but just by fighting the battle Arnold delayed the British advance until late enough in the year that snow was beginning to fall. The British decided not to continue that year, which gave the Americans time to regroup for the Saratoga campaign and may have saved the entire war.
The British had done it to the Americans the previous year when the Americans under Montgomery had advanced up Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River in order to reach Montreal and then march on to Quebec City. Although the American campaign succeeded in reaching the walls of Quebec, defeating and capturing all the fortified positions along the way, their victory at Fort Saint-Jean, which took a siege of 45 days, meant they arrived at Quebec in December instead of mid-October, and with only 15% of the force they started out with. The eventual attack on Quebec failed.
The later stages of the American Civil War saw a conflict between a master strategist and a master tactician when Ulysses S. Grant fought Robert E. Lee. Lee was the superior tactician, and would typically come out on top of most battles where the two men were in command. Grant, however, had a clearer view of the big picture, understanding both that the South could be brought down off the battlefield by attacking the South's logistics (food production, transportation of men and goods, etc.), and that every battle they fought left Lee's position more and more untenable: the South, with its smaller pool of manpower and lack of developed industry, could only afford to bleed for so long, while the North, with its giant population and burgeoning industrial economy, could pour men and money into the war effort for as long as the political will remained to pursue the war. So long as the Union could achieve a banner victory in the field every now and then to shore up popular support for Lincoln and the Republicans, Grant could focus on wearing Lee and the South down. As a result Lee won most of the battles, but Grant ultimately won the war. Case in point: the Overland Campaign in 1864 was a series of battles over the course of a month and a half. Most of these battles were inconclusive or Confederate victories, but at the end of the campaign the Confederates had retreated almost a hundred miles (keep in mind that the lines and territory controlled in this theater had barely changed in the past three years), Lee had lost half of his army (which were physically irreplaceable losses at that point in the war), morale in Lee's army was hanging by a thread (due to battlefield attrition, lack of supplies, disease, and desertion), and Grant had managed to outmaneuver Lee and force Lee into doing exactly what Lee had feared most from the start; settling in for a long, brutal siege at Petersburg in a last ditch attempt to prevent Grant from capturing the Confederate capital of Richmond.note The siege would last nine and a half months, and when Lee's broken army finally abandoned Petersburg and Richmond, Lee surrendered just two weeks later. While Lee was stuck fighting Grant over and over again, first at various battles and then during The Siege, Grant had other Union generals (most notably Sherman and Sheridan), lead their own forces into the heart of the Confederacy and cut it to pieces, doing things such as torching farms and wrecking railroad lines, which destroyed the South's ability to support the war, supply their troops, or make a counterattack that could threaten the North or force Grant to abandon the siege at Petersburg. This turned the South's strategic situation from desperate to hopeless even before the Union won any major victories that year. note That said, Lee was aware enough of grand strategy to know that political will was the North's key weakness: his invasions of the North and willingness to continue engaging Grant and his commanders despite heavy losses were partially influenced by the knowledge that the more depressing the news that the Northern public got from the front, the more likely it was that support for the war would fall and Northern citizens would urge their leaders to end the war. As that became increasingly unlikely after Gettysburg in 1863, the next hope was that Lincoln would be voted out of office in the 1864 election and replaced by a peace candidate who would come to terms with the Confederacy. For awhile in early and even mid-1864 it seemed like this was possible, but divisions among the anti-war and anti-Lincoln factions hamstrung them, and when Sherman captured Atlanta in early September 1864, the Union had exactly the kind of victory it needed to boost public morale just months before the election in November, more or less ensuring Lincoln's reelection.
Modern warfare
In World War II the opening stages sometimes seem like a series of opportunistic attacks and desperate reactions called strategy after the fact, or not as the case may be. To some degree this is true; it is harder to develop strategy than it sounds, and the combatants were feeling each other out. As it developed the main German strategy seems to have been to expand their territory eastward. Britain's strategy was to survive and annoy Germany. Russia's was to wear Germany out by attrition until it could start attacking and roll over her (once nicknamed "the steamroller"), allowing Germany the initiative until the middle of the war. When America entered, the main strategy of the Allies was to concentrate on Germany (the "Europe First" grand strategy); as Germany and Japan were too far away to effectively help each othernote Consider trying to get a shipment from Germany to Japan by sea. If going directly from Germany, you have to exit the North Sea which was easy enough for the Royal Navy to close, and they did. No matter, for the Nazis: they controlled most of Europe, and could go from the Netherlands, France, or Italy. Except no: The fastest route from Europe to Japan goes through the Mediterranean and then the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea... which means that (1) you have to get in the Mediterranean (good luck getting past British-controlled Gibraltar if your shipment is coming from the Atlantic), you then (2) have to get out of the Mediterranean, and the only exit of any use to you is the Suez Canal... which is controlled by the British. OK, forget the Suez shortcut, just do it the old fashioned way where you go around Africa. Except that doesn't work either, as you have few friendly ports where you can resupply in Africa (some of the Vichy-controlled colonies- although they didn't stay Vichy-controlled for very long- and possibly some of the Spanish ones, although probably not), so that doesn't work. This, incidentally, is one reason the Germans were so interested in gaining control of Iraq and other bits of the Middle East; send your shipment across neutral Turkey to Iraq, then go out by sea to Japan. Except no, because the Royal Navy holds the Strait of Hormuz, and also you will have no resupply between Basra and Jakarta (Japanese-held pretty early on). And don't even think about trying to get it overland: Anglo-Soviet occupied Persia, British India, and Soviet-American-backed Republican China are all in the way!. All of this explains why most exchanges between Germany and Japan were practiced using submarines (Yanagi missions, for example), all the Allies could get a chunk of Germany; and Germany had more resources, which meant if they ended up only able to subjugate one, they could afford to think about Japan later, but not vice-versa. Meanwhile, Mussolini concentrated on tactical victories early in North Africa, trying to seize routes between Axis-friendly colonies and local states, but neglected to think about the kind of long-term, well-buffered logistics and training needed to keep the distrusting Royal and Party forces working together, well-fed, and in solid morale. When the Vichy French and Royal Marina navies started taking heavy losses, the Italians couldn't defend themselves, and the Allies rolled through their positions after some early hitches. Eventually, the Germans took over Mediterranean defense, and even that wasn't enough: the Allies could outspend them three-to-one, and had regained control of the entire Med within a year and a half after that.
Because countries can seldom change their geographical position and usually don't want to change their culture (at least not too much), this often means that both strategy and tactics will take on recognizable similarities through several wars. Especially strategy as tactics is affected more acutely by technology changes. However tactics is also affected by environment; for instance, a mountain country will want more snipers, whether they use old time Pushtun jezails (a local specialty type of musket with a long barrel) or modern sniper rifles, and a flat desert country will want more cavalry-type for mobility, shock, and pursuit, whether mounted on horses and camels, or driving tanks.
Germany, which is a valley country with a well organized system of cities and cultivated land, as well as (usually) the largest population in Europe outside of Russia, concentrated from the nineteenth century onward on the strategy of winning enough victories to scare any enemy into making a favorable peace. This worked as long as they had an enemy like themselves who was willing to make peace, which in turn assumed German leadership willing to demand no more than a tolerable adjustment of political hegemony (I.E. someone like Otto von Bismarck or Wilhelm I)note Her military leaders went to war on sports-fighting terms: use better skill and manoeuvering to earn benefits in lands or resources - not for mere survival. It did not work with Adolf Hitler who in Eastern Europe wanted his foes to become a Slave Race and was often fighting in unfavorable terrain (the Soviets made peace offers in 1941 along the lines of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, but Hitler rejected all of them because he wanted nothing but total annihilation of the USSR as part of his plans to expand German territory eastwards). In effect German strategy was the same as its tactics, or rather the same as its operations. However its tactics and operations were extremely well developed and when used by a leader with common sense against a state like an Habsburgs, who were beset on multiple sides and more concerned about a peace that would maintain them as as the resident Feudal Overlord of Austria than about fighting for total victory.
British military strategy from the days of Elizabeth I to World War II was truly imperial in scope. Superior financial resources, naval power and extensive contacts with allies and vassals abroad made it possible for the British to use the whole world as a battlefield. In wars involving their European rivals, they would financially support an ally on the continent while using the Royal Navy to cut off trade or seize overseas colonies, which in turn increased their imperial possessions or otherwise provided valuable bargaining chips at the Peace Conference. Lack of numbers and incompetent leadership tended to plague British forces in their struggles on land, though this was often mitigated by their superior logistics capabilities and the use of native auxiliaries. In a way Britain is a curious example of an empire that habitually uses Hit And Run Strategy against other empires on a global scale. However, the limitations of this approach became apparent during WW2. The fall of France in 1940 deprived the British of their chief ally, which meant that for a time, they were forced to confront Germany and Italy alone. This went From Bad to Worse after Japan entered the war: Britain's geographically-extensive assets then became liabilities, especially as the Imperial Japanese Navy was more than a match for its British counterpart.
A classic example is Russia, a nation which spans half the globe. Due to its enormous landmass, invaders need to be incredibly well-stocked as they push deeper and deeper into Russian territory. Meanwhile, Russians simply withdraw ahead of advancing invaders, destroying any infrastructure that will be useful to the oncoming armies, waiting for them to become weak and vulnerable to counterattack, especially during the brutal winters. While it worked flawlessly against Napoleon, this strategy only half-worked against the Wehrmacht. Unable to simply surrender the Ukraine, the Baltic states, or Leningrad due to their new industrial and supply importance, millions of Russian troops were killed or forced to surrender. Though Operation Barbarossa failed to decisively defeat the Russians in a single campaign, the Germans remained in control of much of Western Russia for the next two years. During the Cold War, Russian strategy shifted to having satellite states in Eastern Europe that were well-armed and would take the blows any invader from the West would send. Russian tactics could be very mixed. They are often stereotyped as We Have Reserves, but while Russia has seldom been shy about using this, they have tended to be more sophisticated than all that. They have often had armies of extremely mixed quality, some being quite crude tactically and led by incompetent officers, and others as good as the best any other country can field. However though they had weaknesses they had strengths including a large supply of manpower that grew up in harsh conditions. The flip side is that, despite the enormous landmass, the majority of the population is concentrated in the western, or European, area of the country, and they are not as easy to move as armies. In both The Napoleonic Wars and World War II Russia was forced to resort to guerilla warfare on a large scale while building up its forces, and the enemy's long supply lines made them very vulnerable to partisans. Russia also had a large supply of cavalry dating from the steppe warfare traditions, and while it was very weak at sea its navy has a strong heritage of riverine and coastwise combined operations with the Army which was noticeable in the Turkish wars and in World War II. The tactics of the Red Army in World War II could be odd by Western European standards, but they were often very ingenious making clever use of nature and elaborate deception operations. By the last stages of the war they had enough tanks to engage in blitzkriegs in the German style and while these weren't usually carried out with the German smoothness they had their own touches like support from aforesaid guerillas and fresh-water vessels and a large supply of horse cavalry which they maintained long after the other allies had phased it out.
When not in periods of isolationism, the United States has been protected by the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, making strikes on the mainland logistically difficult. The only times in its history that it's been under a full-scale invasion since independence were the War of 1812, where the British invaded using their Canadian and Caribbean colonies as bases (an advantage literally nobody else who has ever seriously threatened the security of the United States has ever had), and its own Civil War. However these barriers also mean that foreign engagements mean sending forces tremendous distances. This has resulted in the US military focusing heavily on logistics, the ability to get things where they need to be. A great example being the famous "Left Hook" during the 1991 Gulf War, where the Iraqis were led to expect a massed amphibious operation in Kuwait, only to be met by a land invasion from Saudi Arabia. The "carrier strike group" is the ultimate expression of this mindset. An American supercarrier with an escort consisting of a cruisers, destroyers, and submarines can bring the military power of the United States to almost anywhere in the world, able to defend the position while raining down missiles and deploying an extensive airforce. Combined with a tremendous economy and a vast pool of technological resources this has made the United States the world's defacto superpower. Ironically the biggest problem the US has faced recently is guerrilla forces that drag out conflicts by avoiding direct confrontation, exactly the strategy that won the United States its independence. The problem is not so much the guerilla tactics as it is that the only real counter is devastating large areas of land. Perfectly possible for the US, but the American culture frowns greatly on that. Fortunately, eyes in the sky and skill of ambushed soldiers to butcher their attackers makes guerilla warfare relatively ineffective against American forces. Attackers take far greater casualties than the Americans and cannot sustain such operations indefinitely. Eventually, the guerillas run out of people whereas the Americans graduate more recruits per-year than the guerillas kill. However, the US does tend to run out of political will to fight certain wars indefinitely, especially if the goals are unclear and no progress appears to be made. Afghanistan would be a perfect example, US forces pretty easily ousted the Taliban from power and killed or captured most of their senior leadership - but didn't eliminate them completely. Eventually the Taliban stepped back to replenish their ranks and just wait for the US to decide it was no longer worth the trouble. It took 20 years, but as soon as the US left in 2021 the Taliban quickly overran the Afghan military (many of whom just said "Screw this" and either deserted or immediately surrendered), took Kabul within weeks, and Afghanistan today is in pretty much the exact same place it was before 9/11.
An example of a tactical victory and a strategic loss is the Battle of the Glorious First of June, between the British and the French in 1794. The French harvest in 1793 had been bad, and the French government feared a popular uprising because of it. To avert this, in the spring of 1794, they bought over a hundred shiploads of grain from the United States, and sent a fleet of warships to escort the convoy of grain ships. Of course, the French couldn't buy such a large amount of grain without the British hearing about it. So the Admiralty sent the Channel Fleet under Lord Howe to intercept the convoy. The cheerful French Admiral Villaret de Joyeuse, commanding the French escorts, after a few preliminary brushes with the British fleet, joined battle with Howe on June 1st (13 Prairial in the French Revolutionary calendar). Howe won a great victory, taking or sinking seven French ships and damaging 13 more, with none of his ships taken or sunk. HOWEVER, the grain convoy, which was the centerpiece of the whole affair, made it into Brest, losing only one ship, and that to bad weather. The French people were fed, the government was saved and Howe screwed the pooch. Howe was given the Order of the Garter, more for propaganda reasons than anything else, and his retirement from active command was accepted. (Admittedly, he was 68.)
Much like Britain, Japan is an island nation that is dependent on foreign trade. Unlike Britain, it did not even have enough resources to help kickstart its economy when it moved to industrialization. One of the main reasons for its empire building in the early half of the 20th Century was to help make Japan less dependent on foreign trade. Tactically, Japan was one of the first nations to fully demonstrate the capability of aircraft carriers. Even then, Japan still failed to appreciate their importance since they pretty much threw strategic planning out of the window. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto used his carriers as support ships for his battleships rather than as the lead offensive weapon, as the Americans were forced to do after Pearl Harbor. He and the Imperial Staff envisioned that the final decisive battle would employ the mighty Yamato. Then came Midway, and the Japanese offensive was crushed.
The difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is thus: unlike the former, the latter are never meant to be launched. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed to annihilate concentrations of enemy forces or hardened military installations in the context of Ground-Air-Sea Operations, aiding other forces in accomplishing strategic goals. Strategic nuclear weapons are designed to accomplish strategic goals by themselves, in destroying hardened military installations and igniting firestorms to destroy enemy cities. Both can give politicians significant leverage in diplomatic negotiations — and where they are paired with "Second Strike Capability" (retaliation), they can deter wars with other nuclear powers due to Mutually Assured Destruction.
As time has gone on, however, it has become more and more clear that the concept of tactical nuclear weapons is fundamentally flawed; all nuclear weapons are strategic because the decision to use nuclear weapons is made at the level of grand strategy, and by extremely senior political leaders rather than anyone who would be managing a battle.
Of course, the USA didn't come around to this view until the 1980s Cold War. The United States maintained a tactical First Strike policy against Warsaw PACT (WP) conventional forces in the early-mid Cold War, and in the late Cold War decided to only execute a tactical First Strike when it began losing to WP conventional forces. The USA maintained that using nuclear weapons against WP conventional forces and WP cities (Warsaw, Prague, Lwow, etc) through which supplies and reinforcements would travel constituted "tactical" use. However, they were wrong because tactical First Strike use of Nuclear Weapons will almost always lead to (tactical) Second Strike at the very least. At this point no study has ever seriously suggested that the party to execute the First Strike, will refrain from executing a Third. Or the party of the Second, a Fourth. And so on and so forth until there's basically no difference between these "limited" exchanges and a "full" nuclear war.
Just as importantly, nuclear weapons have the effect of limiting the strategic options and flexibility of a nation in possession of them. This is due to the fact that a nuclear state has to be very careful with its strategic choices to avoid escalation, regardless of whether or not the other state or non-state actor has them. Some would contend it's actually more troublesome if the other party doesn't have any as they can simply be stubborn, intractable, and frustrating enough to outlast the nuclear state's attempts at winning. They know full well that if the nuclear state uses even one nuclear weapon, they instantly lose the moral argument and look as irresponsible as they do untrustworthy.
Effectively, a sufficiently-sized nuclear arsenal can be seen as the concept of Grand Strategy imposed, overwhelmingly and instantly: no matter its battlefield or strategic losses, a nuclear power retains the option of nullifying these results, declaring all players losers, and ending the game (and incidentally, all human life). There is a very good reason why no nuclear power has ever gone to war against another one.
All of the above points regarding the use of nuclear weapons were precisely summed by a senior Chinese official in The Bear and the Dragon by Tom Clancy:
Chinese Official: Nuclear weapons are only good for deterrence. The moment you launch one, it becomes useless.
In The Vietnam War, the Tet Offensive was a textbook example of a tactical disaster which was still a strategic victory. The attack failed all of its objectives, and the Vietcong guerillas were essentially ended as an independent force. However the news broadcasts of the battles shattered the Americans' already faltering political will, leading to American troop withdrawal and ultimately a Northern victory.
Combat Sports
The best MMA fighters and kickboxers are this. They are extremely versatile in terms of their techniques (Tactics)and know exactly when to employ them (Strategy).
In Muay Thai, a Muay Femur and Muay Bouk are this. Both are capable of effectively using all of Muay Thai's different strikes and defensive maneuvers (Tactics) but where the Femur is elusive and fights from the long-range, the Bouk relentlessly pressures and closes in on their opponent (Strategy).
); as Germany and Japan were too far away to effectively help each othernote , all the Allies could get a chunk of Germany; and Germany had more resources, which meant if they ended up only able to subjugate one, they could afford to think about Japan later, but not vice-versa. Meanwhile, Mussolini concentrated on tactical victories early in North Africa, trying to seize routes between Axis-friendly colonies and local states, but neglected to think about the kind of long-term, well-buffered logistics and training needed to keep the distrusting Royal and Party forces working together, well-fed, and in solid morale. When the Vichy French and Royal Marina navies started taking heavy losses, the Italians couldn't defend themselves, and the Allies rolled through their positions after some early hitches. Eventually, the Germans took over Mediterranean defense, and even that wasn't enough: the Allies could outspend them three-to-one, and had regained control of the entire Med within a year and a half after that.