“We will request the Centre that a caste-based census should be done at least once,” said Kumar. “I have been saying for a long time that once caste-based census must be done, as it will give a clear idea about the population of different castes. It will help in planning for them. An attempt was made in 2010 but it was not done properly. It was completed in 2013 but never published.”
Kumar said they have shared their thoughts about a caste-based census in the House in February 2019 and 2020. He said it will help expand the benefits of government schemes and make it easier to work for development.
In 2019, the Bihar assembly passed two resolutions favouring a caste-wise census in 2021 and for continuing with the old 200-point roster system, which treats the university as the unit, for job quotas while opposing the 13-point system that treats the department as the unit.
In 2020, ahead of the state elections, the assembly passed resolutions against the National Register of Citizens and for the caste-based census in 2021.
The Centre has said, as a matter of policy, there will be no enumeration as per caste other than that for Scheduled Castes (S Cs) and Scheduled Tribes (S Ts) for the census. It has cited the provisions of the Constitution and reservation of seats for S Cs and S Ts in Lok Sabha and in the assemblies as per their proportion in the population.
Kumar’s emphasis for a caste-based census is based on the proposal of the Justice Rohini Commission for the sub-categorisation of reservation for Other Backward Class (OB Cs). The commission was set up in 2017 and has recommended splitting 27% reservation for the OB Cs into different categories for equitable distribution of benefits among different sub-castes to ensure that the benefits reached the really deprived sections.
After several extensions, the panel submitted its report in February 2021 dividing 2,633 OBC castes on the Central list into four sub-categories for splitting the 27% quota into 2, 6, 9, and 10%.
India’s last caste census was conducted 90 years ago in 1931.
Opposition leader Tejashwi Yadav questioned Kumar what the ruling Janata Dal (United) or JD (U) will do if the Centre does not consider the caste census. “JD (U) has a stake in the Centre now with a cabinet minister. Why did JD (U) still have to persuade the Bharatiya Janata Party.”
I have been reading M.N. Srinivas's "Caste in the 20th century" and after reading about the description of the methodology used for the 1980 Mandal Commission report, I feel we really could use a proper caste census (preferably by an independent commission) especially for the OBC. The method:
The Commission’s list of OB Cs incorporated the lists prepared by the different states of India ignoring the fact that they did not apply uniform criteria in preparing the lists, and that political considerations had played no small part in decisions to include or exclude. Further, West Bengal and Orissa had not prepared any lists.
The Commission claimed the authority of that magic instrument, the computer, in preparing the lists. The data thus obtained was compressed into 31 tables and they were to be included in Volume V of the Report. But, according to Radhakrishnan, ‘what passes for this volume is a single page (167) index of the serial numbers of 13 tables and their titles, based on the 31 tables.’
Any comment on the Commission’s ‘methodology’ is superfluous. But thanks to its ‘methodology’ and the computer, 3, 743 sub-castes among the Hindus alone were listed as backward. Thus the number of backwards had registered an impressive increase from 2, 394 in 1955.
Given that for SC ST while they have their own hierarchies too, even the most well off of them are treated worse than the worst of shudras while for shudras (which most but not all OB Cs are), their political and socio-economic status varies wildly from landowning dominant castes to castes just above the untouchable line. Especially when the former become part of the problem by discriminating and persecuting the latter lower shudras, S Cs and S Ts while simultaneously demanding backward status.
China, Pakistan outline ‘joint action’ to align Afghanistan strategies
Meeting in the Chinese city of Chengdu at the third strategic dialogue, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his counterpart Shah Mahmood Qureshi outlined a five-point joint plan on working in Afghanistan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
Mr. Wang described the current situation as arriving “at an important juncture” as he criticised “the hasty U.S. withdrawal of troops” for having “neither fulfilled the purpose of fighting terrorism nor brought peace to Afghanistan but created a new security black hole,” the statement said.
He said “both China and Pakistan are most directly affected by the situation in Afghanistan” as its neighbours and it was “necessary for both sides to strengthen cooperation to cope with the change”, which he described as one of the focuses of the dialogue.
Mr. Wang outlined “joint actions” in five areas, starting with “the immediate priority of avoiding the expansion of war and preventing Afghanistan from falling into a full-scale civil war.” The second focus would be to promote the intra-Afghan negotiations between Kabul and the Taliban and establish “a broad and inclusive political structure”.
He said the third joint action would be “to resolutely combat terrorist forces”. Mr. Wang only named the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which China has blamed for attacks in its western Xinjiang region, underlining China’s concern that instability in Afghanistan could spill over into Xinjiang.
There do, however, appear to be stark differences in how both countries appear to view the terror issue and the role of other outfits in Afghanistan. Earlier this month, Mr. Wang said in a meeting with his Afghan counterpart Mohammed Haneef Atmar in Dushanbe that the “Taliban should stand clear of any and all terrorist forces.” At the same summit on connectivity, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani publicly slammed Pakistan for failing to take actions to stop foreign terrorists from entering the country amid “an influx of over 10,000 jihadi fighters”.
The fourth joint action would be to “promote cooperation among Afghanistan’s neighbours” and “explore the construction of a platform for cooperation among them”. Both would also more closely work on international fora on the Afghan issue, Mr. Wang said.
Terror attack in Pakistan Both sides, in a “joint press release” issued after the talks that was put out by Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “reaffirmed their commitment to facilitate and support ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace and reconciliation process” and “their support for the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan”.
Both also “vehemently condemned” the recent terrorist attack in Pakistan in which nine Chinese engineers working on the Dasu hydropower plant were killed, along with four Pakistani nationals. Both sides “expressed their firm resolve to expose the culprits and their reprehensible designs through the ongoing joint investigation, give exemplary punishment to the perpetrators, ensure comprehensive safety and security of the Chinese projects, nationals and institutions, and prevent recurrence of such incidents”, the statement said.
The joint release also carried the now customary reference to Kashmir, saying the Pakistani side “briefed the Chinese side on the deteriorating situation in Jammu & Kashmir” while China “reiterated” its stand that it “opposes any unilateral actions that complicate the situation”, a position it has repeated in the wake of India’s 2019 reorganisation.
The Chinese side “reiterated its firm support to Pakistan in safeguarding its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence” and “striving for a better external security environment,” the joint release said, adding that both sides had agreed to push forward the CPEC “with the aim to continuously unleash the great potential of CPEC to make it a hub of regional connectivity.”
China’s Foreign Ministry said in May both countries had been in communication with Afghanistan over extending the corridor. “Afghanistan has imported and exported related goods through the Gwadar Port and Karachi Port. China, Pakistan and Afghanistan are discussing issues related to extending roads and expressways in Pakistan to Afghanistan,” spokesperson Zhao Lijian said, adding that “the CPEC is an economic initiative that is not aimed at third parties, and has nothing to do with territorial sovereignty disputes… and won’t affect our principled position on the Kashmir issue.” India has opposed the CPEC, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, although China has pushed ahead with projects and stepped up its investments in Po K.
Edited by xyzt on Jul 26th 2021 at 3:04:43 PM
Beware the Crazy Man.
Not at all surprised Beijing is exporting its Afghan policy to Pakistan. Islamabad is currently selling the line to several capitals as to how well they can control the Taliban...for the right price (Pakistan is perpetually broke).
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
Evaluating India’s options in Afghanistan
But there is one problem. India, unlike the other members, is the only continental Asian power in the Quad, which shares a contested land border with China and is vulnerable to the geopolitical changes in the Eurasian landmass. The U.S. may have retreated from Afghanistan as part of a grand strategy to take on China in maritime Asia, in which it needs India’s involvement, and India might find it tempting to join the ranks, especially after China’s aggression on the Line of Actual Control last year. But the irony is that the American withdrawal and the vacuum it leaves in Afghanistan and continental Asia in general — which is being filled by China and Russia — is reinforcing India’s identity as a continental Asian power.
Barring a brief interregnum in the 1990s, India has historically enjoyed good ties with Afghanistan, which go back to the 1950 Treaty of Friendship. Indian interests and influence suffered when the Taliban, backed by Pakistan, captured Kabul in 1996. But India was back in action as soon as the Taliban were ousted from power after the U.S. invasion in 2001. It has made huge investments and commitments ever since, which run into over $3 billion, and cultivated strong economic and defence ties with the Afghan government. Now, it is again staring at uncertainty with the U.S. pullback having effectively changed the balance of power in Afghanistan and the Taliban making rapid territorial gains.
The U.S.’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan were limited, as U.S. President Joe Biden himself pointed out earlier this month — killing Osama bin Laden and disrupting al-Qaeda networks. Defeating the Taliban and nation-building were part of the neoconservative ideological project, which has evidently failed. This means, the U.S., having met its realist objectives, can abandon the Afghan government and exit the theatre — which is what Mr. Biden is doing. But India cannot. It has to protect its investments, prevent Afghanistan from becoming another safe haven for anti-India terrorist groups, and also check Pakistan deepening its influence in Kabul.
Talking with the Taliban
So what should India do? One option, as many commentators have already pointed out, is to hold talks with the Taliban. India has already established contacts with the Taliban in Doha. Talking to them would allow New Delhi to seek security guarantees from the insurgents in return for continued development assistance or other pledges (in the 1990s, India had backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance) as well as explore the possibility of the Taliban’s autonomy from Pakistan. At this point, talking to the Taliban looks inevitable. But India should not overlook the deep ties between Pakistan’s security establishment and the Haqqani Network, a major faction within the Taliban that’s driving the successful campaigns on the battlefield. The U.S. overlooked it while fighting the Taliban along with Pakistan, and it paid a heavy price for it. There is no guarantee that India’s quest for engagement with the Taliban would produce a desirable outcome. So India should broad-base its options. While talking to the Taliban to protect its interests, New Delhi should also enhance aid to Afghanistan’s legitimate government and security forces and work with other regional powers for long-term stability in the country.
Kabul versus the Taliban
True, the Taliban now control or contest most of Afghanistan’s countryside. But still, it is not a foregone conclusion that they could take Kabul easily. The Afghan military has some 200,000 battle-hardened soldiers, including the highly trained special forces. In the cities, which saw relative freedoms and rights compared to the dark period of the Taliban regime, the government, despite its infighting, corruption and incompetence, still commands support. There is no Northern Alliance this time. The Taliban have already taken northern districts, including Badakhshan and Takhar. The only force that is standing up to the Taliban is the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. India should urgently step up training Afghan forces and provide military hardware, intelligence and logistical and financial support so that Kabul can continue to defend the cities. New Delhi should also coordinate with other regional powers to support the Afghan government because if the government forces crumble before the Taliban, the prospects for a political settlement would be narrowed. Why should a winning Taliban make concessions?
Regional solution
There is a convergence of interests between India and three key regional players — China, Russia and Iran — in seeing a political settlement in Afghanistan. These three countries have already opened public, direct talks with the Taliban. But these contacts are largely tactical in nature. For China, whose restive Xinjiang province shares a border with Afghanistan, a jihadist-oriented Taliban regime would not serve its internal interests. Russia, which fears that instability would spill over into the former Soviet Republics, has already moved to secure its Central Asian perimeter. For the Shia theocratic Iran, a Sunni Deobandi Taliban with which it had almost gone to war in 1998, will continue to remain an ideological, sectarian and strategic challenge. None of these countries would like to see the Taliban taking over Kabul militarily, which means there would be an isolated Sunni Islamist regime in a country with fractured ethnic equations. There would neither be legitimacy for a Taliban regime nor peace in Afghanistan.
India, to break this impasse, should take a layered approach. Its immediate goal should be the safety and security of its personnel and investments. The long-term goal should be finding a political solution to the crisis. And if a political solution is not achieved, it should seek non-conventional methods, like what it did in the 1990s, to offer support to its allies within Afghanistan and retain some influence. None of this can be achieved unless it works together with the regional powers.
Russia has cultivated links with the Taliban in recent years. India would need Russia’s support in any form of direct engagement with the Taliban. When it comes to Afghanistan, Iran is an irreplaceable country. It shares a long border with Afghanistan and has built contacts through several stakeholders in the country, especially the ethnic minorities. The original objective of India’s Chabahar project in Iran was to create a direct access to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. This direct access is critical for India in all different scenarios — move supplies to Kabul in larger quantities, retain its presence in the event of a civil war or carry out covert operations if the Taliban take power by force. But India, under pressure from the U.S., slowed down on the Chabahar connectivity projects, which finally prompted Iran to drop India and go ahead. Building strategic ties with Iran, irrespective of the U.S.’s policy towards the Islamic Republic, is essential for India’s Afghan bets. Finally, India should talk with China, with the objective of finding a political settlement and lasting stability in Afghanistan.
Central to this approach is India striking the right balance between its continental realities and the U.S.’s pivot to maritime Asia. The U.S., and the West in general, are done with Afghanistan. India, as one of the countries that would be impacted by the consequences of American withdrawal, has to work with Eurasian powers to protect its interests and stabilise Afghanistan.
Factory Fire Reveals Bangladesh’s Child Labor Problem
Soon after the fire, the lobby outside the Dhaka Medical College morgue began to gradually crowd with rows of stained body bags lined up on the floor. In between the larger bags lay the uncomfortably smaller ones.
The weight of the hours that flew by added to the grimness of the space. Families and friends of the victims gathered at the site of the accident, or lined up outside nearby hospitals to give their samples for DNA testing, in order to identify and collect information, or take home the bodies of their loved ones.
In the midst of this sea of people, a middle-aged woman named Sheema Akter roamed about haphazardly, hoping to find traces of her daughter, 12-year-old Shanto Moni, who had gone to work at the factory that morning. “I did not want her to work here but as schools were closed, she wanted to utilize the time by working,” Akter told TBS News.
Shanto Moni, who worked at the Shezan juice processing unit, was just one among dozens of children who had signed up for work at the factory to earn a little extra money, in order to contribute to their families who have struggled to stay afloat since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most of them were below the age of 18.
According to another report published by the national daily Prothom Alo, the names and age of some of these children were: Shanto (12), Takiya (14), Munna (14), Nazmul (15), Mahmud (15), Kompa (16), Himu (16), Ripon (17), and Taslima (17), in addition to many more.
Speaking of her 11-year-old nephew who had gone to work the same day as the fire and is now missing, Laizu Begum recalled, “We heard that the door of the floor where my nephew worked was padlocked. Then we realized, after seeing how big the fire was, that he is probably dead.”
It took firefighters and rescue teams more than 24 hours to put out the blaze.
Not long after, Abul Hashem, the owner of Hashem Foods, and his four sons were among the eight people arrested in connection with the Shezan factory fire, including managers and supervisors who were in charge of looking after the factory premises. Alarmed by the presence of children on the list of missing persons, an inquiry into child labor at the factory had been launched, as confirmed by Bangladesh’s Labor Minister Monnujan Sufian. “If child labor is proved, we will take action against the owner and the inspectors,” she said. In the meantime, social media users on Facebook and elsewhere began to condemn the practice of child labor at factories across the nation.
Child labor in Bangladesh is widespread and commonplace. One of the largest investigations on the subject, conducted by the Overseas Development Institute in 2016, collected surveys of approximately 2,700 slum households, which revealed that child workers dwelling in slums participate in nearly 64 hours of strenuous work per week. “Our survey raises serious concerns over the issue of child labor in the supply of garments from factories in Bangladesh to consumers in Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere,” reported the London-based think tank.
Bangladesh’s garment industry, one of the largest in the world, has connections with some of the world’s most popular brands, such as H&M, Primark, and Zara. It is also infamous for employing young and underage workers, some on full-time hours, to manufacture their goods. The collapse of Rana Plaza in 2016 marked one of the worst tragedies in the country’s developmental history, claiming the lives of more than 1,100 workers and injuring hundreds of others. That disaster was the first time that evidence of the involvement of child laborers in the global apparel industry in Bangladesh was revealed on such a large scale.
According to recent accounts, nearly 13.5 percent of the total number of persons between the ages of 5 and 17 were employed in the workforce in Bangladesh as of 2019. That percentage, however, is believed to have gone up significantly in the past two years, with the rapid transmission of the COVID-19 pandemic and the severe economic consequences left in its wake.
Bangladesh’s legal framework sets out several minimum ages of employment for different sectors of work. For example, Section 76 of the Factories Rules establishes that children above the age of 14 are allowed to be legally employed at factories. However, the section does not specify a minimum age difference for either light or hazardous forms of work, thereby not taking into consideration the physical and emotional dangers involved.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines child labor as work that “is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children; and/or interferes with their schooling” (emphases in the original). Full-time factory work would fit both definitions – but is technically legal in Bangladesh for children aged 14 and above.
International bodies such as the ILO and UNICEF have long encouraged the responsible authorities to take measures to ensure a gradual decline in the number of children in the workforce, and grassroots non-governmental organizations such as Sohay have been involved in the initiation of educational programs for former child laborers. Regardless, stressing the eradication of child labor in countries like Bangladesh without preparing a back-up plan may turn out to be relatively ineffective. More and more families are reliant on the monetary contributions brought in by their working children, especially during times of political or economic crises and natural disasters.
The same afternoon that the chemical-induced fire swallowed one floor after another of the Rupganj factory, three young girls – Shamima, Lisa, and Faria, aged 15, 16, and 18, respectively – were spotted standing together outside the gates of the now-torched building. When asked about their presence, they anxiously answered that they were waiting there so they would receive their share of their monthly wages.
“We need the money. My father and mother both work. My sister works too, but rent is high and living in this area is expensive,” Shamima told TBS News.
“We joined work to support our families. Most of our co-workers were children,” added Lisa.
The workers at the Rupganj factory were paid 5,300 Bangladeshi taka a month, reports say, which is equivalent to $62.51. Complaints regarding not being paid wages on time – or at all – also surfaced upon further questioning. Faria informed a reporter, “Our bonus from last Eid has not yet been paid. We are still owed some over time.”
After receiving information about the employment of underage children at the factory and their probable exploitation, TBS News contacted K.M. Abdus Salam, the secretary of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, according to a recent report. In response, Salam replied that officials from the ministry had inspected factory many times in the past, but that he was not aware of any child labor violations.
Edited by xyzt on Jul 27th 2021 at 6:37:31 PM
Well, well.
Islamabad's pointing the finger at Afghanistan/India for the bombing attack on July 14 on the bus that killed nine Chinse nationals.
Beware the Crazy Man.
I'm sure India and Afghanistan can't hear much of the accusations over all the Pakistani gloating they're listening to right now.
Given the fearsome reputation of the Afghan NDS, a descendant of the Soviet-era Kh AD, I'd be less accusatory and less boastful if I were Islamabad. Wouldn't be surprised if they tried a hit on one or more Pakistani Corps commanders...
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
Pronounced YAK-you-luss
An interesting thread from acclaimed journalist and Afghanistan specialist Anand Gopal on the complex relationship between Pakistan and the modern Taliban. Long story short, the Taliban aren't completely self-sufficient, but they're much less beholden to Pakistani interests than is popularly believed.
Gopal's Twitter feed is also a pro follow for details on the ongoing fall of the Afghan government and the context surrounding it.
Edited by Iaculus on Aug 13th 2021 at 2:01:38 PM
What's precedent ever done for us?
Beware the Crazy Man.
Oh I agree with this analysis. Alas, I wonder if Kabul has the ears to listen...methinks not. And certainly India is all too happy to help out any possible revenge missions...
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
Is the NDS capable of doing such things in Pakistan, considering their SF units are being forced to retreat from some battles against the Taliban and their new militia pals?
In the name of being honest
Gopal's analysis tracks with what I know from Antonio Giustozzi's The Taliban at War, which chronicles the rise of the insurgency through interviews with members on the ground. Whatever material support the Taliban get from the Pakistani government has long been overtaken by what they get from their main supplier, the Afghan government.
Echoing hymn of my fellow passerine | Art blog (under construction)
The Inner Line Reserve Forest runs along the 146.6-km Assam-Mizoram border. Not clearly demarcated, it separates the Aizawl, Kolasib and Mamit districts of Mizoram from the Cachar, Hailakandi and Karimganj districts of Assam. About 300 Mizo families — all residents of Mizoram’s border town Vairengte — have broomstick or areca nut plantations in the hilly Aitlang, which Mizoram claims is in Kolasib district. Assam claims it is in Hailakandi district and has periodically been evicting Mizo “encroachers”.
The last time Lalchhandama and a few others lost their broomstick plantations to such an eviction drive was about 10 years ago. “We would wait for things to cool down in a few days and reclaim our land,” he said. But he had a bad feeling when fellow cultivator Darthanzaua narrated how the officials from Assam were more organised than ever before during the eviction drive on June 29. Apart from destroying the plantations of 18 families, the Assam police set up camps in the vicinity in no time. “I switched to areca nut on my 1.5-hectare land two years ago. I am not sure if I will get back my land this time, let alone start cultivation again,” he said.
Disrupting life
Aitlang is aerially about 5-km west of Auto Stand on National Highway 306, Mizoram’s lifeline, where the conflict took place in July. The Auto Stand, almost midway between Vairengte and Assam’s Lailapur town where three-wheelers from both the States terminate, is now a Mizoram police checkpoint. In the 4-km stretch of the highway between the Mizoram police checkpoint and the Assam police barricade at Lailapur are two barriers, about 100 metres apart, each manned by a unit of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). The CRPF units have been stationed as a neutral force at violence-prone spots along the inter-State border after the July 26 incident. The CRPF replaced the Border Security Force and the Sashastra Seema Bal which were deployed after arson and violence on October 17, 2020, under the operational control of the Mizoram police and the Assam police, respectively.
About 10-km east of Lailapur, Riyazuddin Laskar is more worried than relieved by an instruction from local authorities in Assam to stop paying ‘tax’ to his Mizo landowner. Laskar, a Bengali Muslim, has been residing for more than a decade on the farmland Laltimliana claims he owns in the disputed stretch of the volatile inter-State border.
Laltimliana’s thatched house is the last civilian structure in the Assam-controlled territory at Dholakhal Kulicherra Forest Village, referred to as Saihapui V in Mizoram, near the ‘line of control’ – the Kalakhal stream – flanked by temporary camps of the CRPF.
Laltimliana’s house is about 500-metres north of his tenant Laskar’s, in the Mizoram-controlled part of Saihapui V, beyond three layers of security – two of CRPF on either side of the culvert and a unit of the Indian Reserve Battalion inside the Mizoram-controlled territory. The ‘V’ stands for Vairengte.
Laskar, like most Assam-based contract farmers on ‘Mizo-owned land’ along the inter-State border, had struck an annual deal with Laltimliana. This entailed handing over 80 maunds of rice as ‘tax’ to Laltimliana in lieu of staying and farming on his land. A maund in the border areas equals 30 kg, almost eight kg less than the measure elsewhere in Assam. The contract farmers subsist by growing three crops a year, usually keeping the yield of two crops for their own consumption or for selling in the local markets. “I have not paid tax to my landowner this year. But I am worried this could be the end of my farming in this area and of years of association with the Mizo landowners,” Laskar said. Laltimliana is the second Mizo landowner Laskar has worked with.
Radheshyam Chauhan and Ramlal Chauhan of Frenchnagar, west of Dholakhal Kulicherra, face a similar dilemma. They have not been to work on the paddy fields, fish ponds, areca nut and broomstick plantations in the adjoining Mizo-controlled Paglachhara. The ‘border’ here starts where a road ends about 100 ft from the elevated Frenchnagar Khasiapunji LP School, now a camp of the Assam police commandos.
The camp set up after the July 26 incident has forced Bijon Malakar and his family to spend their nights at home. Their house adjoins the school. “We used to send our women, children and the elderly away to spend the nights at the house of relatives since the border violence started in October 2020. The fear of attacks increased after Intaz Ali, a firewood collector from Lailapur, was killed in Mizoram 10 months ago. Intaz invariably took the road beside this school,” he said.
Blood notice
A series of wooded low hills with patches of plantations and small valleys characterise the inter-State boundary. The Kulicherra area has four forest villages – Phainum, Upper Phainum, Buarchep and Saihapui V – marked as Cachar’s ‘Mizo section’. The four villages have about 600 people listed as voters in both Assam and Mizoram. Locals said the road and the Bengali-medium Upper Phainuam LP School damaged in a bomb attack by miscreants in October 2020 were built by the Assam government while Mizoram provided electricity and water supply.
“Whatever is our status on paper, we are emotionally, ethnically and culturally with Mizoram. We hope the Assam government will give back the land our forefathers have been occupying since 1925. What will Assam gain by robbing us of our land and livelihood as well as depriving their contract farmers caught in no man’s land,” Samuel-a, the son of Laskar’s landlord Laltimliana asked.
It is not a question of taking or ceding land but of a violation of the Supreme Court’s 1996 order banning the felling of trees and non-forestry activities in forests across the country, officials in Assam said. “The law is absolutely clear. Irrespective of status and ownership, there cannot be any non-forestry activities in forest areas. And they (Mizoram) have over the years built permanent structures, thereby breaking up the land,” Jatindra Sarma, Southern Assam Circle’s Chief Conservator of Forests, said.
Records of the Assam Forest Department show that the encroachment on the Inner-Line Reserve Forest started in 1985, two years before Mizoram was upgraded from a Union Territory to a State.
“The incident of encroachment first recorded was during November 1985 when a portion of Kalaland and Shantipur area inside Singla Reserve Forest (part of the Assam-Mizoram border in Karimganj district) was occupied with the help of the armed forces of Mizoram. Gradually, they encroached a total of 75 ha clearing natural vegetation and practising jhum (slash-and-burn cultivation on hill slopes) and cash crop plantation,” a report prepared by the Forest Department on July 5 said.
Officials said some farmers in Assam showed the Mizos the way to encroach the forest. These farmers came up with the idea of contract farming, replacing the trees with plantation crops that ensured them a steady income.
Unlike the border forests of Karimganj and Hailakandi districts, the Cachar Division was relatively free from encroachment until October 17, 2020, the Forest Department report said. That day, “three temporary bamboo shops on NH-306 were burnt down by miscreants from Vairengte”, leading to a law-and-order problem in the border areas. “Mizoram police accompanied by IR Battalion of more than 30 armed personnel entered Inner Line Reserve Forest and constructed a temporary post at Kulicherra Forest Village,” the report said.
Manoj Kumar Singha, the beat officer at the Lailapur Forest Beat House, the last Assam government structure on the edge of the de facto boundary, said the Mizoram authorities had used the COVID-19 situation to grab Assam’s land inch by inch. “Almost every day, our men on patrol saw them advance the testing centre for incoming passengers towards Assam. Whenever we objected, they would say it was a temporary set-up to be removed,” he said.
Before long, Mizoram set up a police outpost atop Rengtilila, a mound beside the Auto Stand that had been cleared of an illegal plantation a few days ago, Singha said.
A notice that was to have been served to the Mizoram authorities for removal of the outpost led to the July 26 incident. “We had registered a case against several Mizoram officials under various sections of the Assam Forest Regulation such as trespassing and encroachment. Based on that, we went to serve them the notice to come to our office on a specified date and give a written explanation. They refused to accept the notice and then all hell broke loose,” Sunnydeo Choudhury, the Divisional Forest Officer said. He was transferred out of Cachar Division after the incident.
Assam police officials said the attack on them appeared to have been planned. “The Mizoram officials became aggressive and in no time, a large crowd gathered firing air gun pellets and throwing stones. We fired a few teargas shells to disperse the mob before the Mizoram police started firing from behind bunkers on higher ground,” a senior Assam police officer who received an air gun injury said. He said the Assam police retaliated after 20 minutes of firing from the other side only to evacuate their dead and the injured. “We never thought a normal notice to people occupying our own land could cause such bloodshed,” he added.
According to the Mizoram government, the Assam police’s version of the incident is a web of lies. “Why would 200 officials and policemen come trooping here if not to create trouble? They started the firing that led to the unfortunate incident on our territory. We are pained by the loss of lives because of the provocation,” the State’s Home Minister Lalchamliana said.
The killing of six policemen led to a 13-day economic blockade on Mizoram that was lifted after senior Assam ministers negotiated with the Lailapur locals in Assam and promised justice for the slain policemen.
Bangladeshi bogey
Border conflicts became a fairly regular feature from the mid-1990s. Silchar-based historical researcher Sanjib Deb Laskar said the conflicts intensified after the BJP-helmed North-East Democratic Alliance stirred sub-nationalism across the Northeast. The incidents took a serious turn after the Centre’s push for settling Assam’s border disputes with Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland ahead of the celebration of India’s 75th year of Independence.
Two British-era notifications are at the root of the Assam-Mizoram border conflict. One was derived in 1875 from the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation Act, 1873, which prescribes a permit for Indians beyond Mizoram to enter the territory. Mizoram follows this while Assam swears by the ‘constitutional boundary’ decided in 1972 (when the Lushai Hills district of Assam became the Union Territory of Mizoram), based on a 1933 notification. Mizo leaders say the 1933 notification is not acceptable as their ancestors had not been consulted. Assam leaders reject this argument since the scenario, they say, was similar during the 1875 notification.
“When the Mizo Peace Accord (with the extremist Mizo National Front that became a political party now ruling Mizoram) was signed in 1986, the boundary of 1933 was agreed to be made Mizoram’s boundary,” Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma said.
Political experts in Mizoram said the Constitution of India does not explain the constitutional boundary. “The Mizos have lived under a colonial wrong and our leaders have time and again said the only acceptable boundary is the 1875 notification since the voices of our leaders seeking re-organisation of the Mizo-inhabited areas were never heard,” Aizawl-based college teacher and member of Mizoram’s boundary committee, Joseph Lalfakzuala, said.
Mizoram Chief Minister Zoramthanga said Assam was trying to grab its land for settling ‘Bangladeshi migrants’ in Barak Valley. This seemed to have gained traction in the Northeast, especially with the BJP seen as eyeing the land of neighbouring States to settle Hindu Bengalis under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. The Congress was earlier accused of using Bengali Muslims as a buffer in the disputed belt.
Deb Laskar contested this theory. “The Bengali Hindus and Muslims living in areas near Mizoram are agriculturists of Sylhet (in Bangladesh) origin settled since 1650. The contract farmers on land claimed by the Mizos are not locals, but are from other parts of Barak Valley. In contrast, many Mizos came from eastern Asia in the 1800s and tribesmen would often raid areas up to Silchar. One must remember these raiders were the reason why the British raised the Cachar Levy in 1835, which became the paramilitary Assam Rifles later on,” he said.
“The bogey of Bangladeshi comes up when all arguments fail in the Northeast. No one in Lailapur or adjoining areas has been left out of the National Register of Citizens. We have been demanding a similar exercise in Mizoram to find out how many are domicile Mizos and how many are migrants from Myanmar,” Lailapur-based social worker Abul Hussain Barbhuiya said.
The indigeneity of the Mizos can never be in doubt, said Famkima, the chairman of the joint council of four villages that comprise Vairengte town. “Mizos are not encroachers too because the land always belonged to us. In fact, the old maps show our territory is as far as Dhalai (between Vairengte and Silchar). If Assam wants to remove the encroachment, they should start with those occupying our land in the plains of Barak Valley that should have been ours. In football terms, Assam has scored an offside goal because of the adventurism of its Chief Minister and it is the duty of the Centre to don the role of a fair referee,” he said. Dhalai is the constituency of Assam Forest Minister Parimal Suklabaidya, a BJP veteran and a key player in the Assam Forest Department’s bid to reclaim “encroached” forests along the border.
Solving conflict
But he agreed Mizos and Bengalis and other communities in Assam cannot live in conflict forever. “We have a history of interdependence, and the sooner the boundary issue is resolved, the better for us,” he said.
“The boundary issue should have been resolved in 1947 but we cannot keep on complaining. The give-and-take policy that Assam and Meghalaya are pursuing can be a way forward for the vague Assam-Mizoram border too. How long can two sister States keep on reopening old wounds? Our job is to recommend, and a solution requires political will from both sides,” Lalfakzuala said.
He recalled how Assam rejected a Supreme Court-appointed commission’s report that prescribed transferring 70% of the disputed land to Arunachal Pradesh while accepting another panel’s report that advised Meghalaya to hand over a disputed village to Assam. Similarly, both Assam and Nagaland rejected the recommendations of two panels to settle their border disputes that have killed 136 people since 1979.
Assam’s Urban Development Minister Ashok Singhal, who along with Border Affairs Minister Atul Bora had met their Mizoram counterparts for easing the boundary tension, said the boundary should be properly demarcated and the Mizoram government should propose a mechanism for that.
“The Reserve Forest cannot be encroached by either side, and there should be a proper investigation of the July 26 incident. Those guilty must be punished for the boundary issue to be resolved since policemen have died and people in Assam are emotionally charged,” Singhal, also Cachar’s ‘guardian minister’, said.
The angst is apparent at the 6th Assam Police Battalion at Jayfarpur near Silchar. Forty-nine-year-old Shyamsundar Dushad, one of the policemen killed, was a havildar attached to this battalion. “We received ₹50 lakh from the government as compensation. But this is not the justice we seek. Whatever may be the trigger, they committed a crime and should be tried as criminals,” said his widow, Lakshmi Dushad.
“The dead policemen were not Bangladeshis, were they? In a region of diverse communities, we want peace for normal life and a non-militarised boundary. But I hope the killing is not forgotten like the excesses committed by extremist groups after they come to the mainstream,” Barbhuiya said. His reference was to the Mizo National Front which has been ruling Mizoram since December 2018.
After the Minister’s remarks at the annual meet of the Confederation of India Industry stirred up a hornets’ nest in higher echelons of the government, the CII was asked to pull down the video from its You Tube channel. An edited version was uploaded on Thursday night but this was also blocked by Friday evening.
Calling out Tata Sons’ president for infrastructure, defence and aerospace, Banmali Agrawala, Mr. Goyal expressed deep anguish that Tata Sons had opposed rules to help consumers framed by his Ministry. “Me, Myself, My company — We all need to go beyond this approach,” said Mr. Goyal, who also holds charge of the Ministries of Textiles and Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution.
“Kya aapke jaisi company, ek do aapne shaayad koi videshi company kharid li… Uska importance zyaada ho gaya, desh hith kam ho gaya? (A company like yours, maybe you bought one or two foreign companies, now their importance is greater than national interest?” Mr. Goyal said, adding that he had conveyed the same message to “Chandra” (Tata group chairman N. Chandrasekharan).
The Tata group declined to comment on the Minister’s remarks. Queries to the CII did not elicit a response at the time of going to press. The Hindu has a recording of Mr. Goyal’s remarks.
While government officials conveying their priorities to business leaders isn’t unusual, Thursday’s episode is perhaps unprecedented as specific attendees were questioned about their business practices with insinuations they were not acting in the national interest.
Industry leaders were particularly flummoxed as Mr. Goyal’s remarks, indicating a troubling lack of faith, came just a day after Prime Minister Narendra Modi assured industry of complete support and urged them to take more risks and invest in the country.
Questioning domestic businesses’ priorities and commitment towards India, Mr. Goyal even challenged Tata Steel to demonstrate if they can sell their products in Japan and Korea, arguing that companies in those countries are ‘nationalistic’ and won’t buy imported steel. Indian industry, by contrast, would import even if it helped them save just 10 paise in the finished cost of goods, and then lobby to avoid the levy of anti-dumping duties on such imports, he asserted.
“Hum nationalistic spirit ki baat karte hain, to kai log humein media mein dakiyanoosi bolte hain, backward bulaate hain. Japan, Korea, mein koi backward nahi bulaata (When we talk of the nationalistic spirit, many in the media call us orthodox and backward. Nobody in Japan, Korea calls this backward),” he said.
These impromptu jibes came in response to innocuous ideas from a few CII members, including Mr. Agrawala who had simply broached the need for a greater emphasis on skilling the youth, and DCM Shriram chairman Ajay Shriram’s request to help smaller firms that have been hit harder by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Minister’s remarks on Tata Sons were presaged by the insinuation that Indian firms structure FDI transactions in a manner that violates the spirit of the rules.
“I tell you all to rise above fanciful schemes…. the ways you are shown to structure transactions, add this caveat and put this structure. This is how the law can be broken, do this partnership that will be compliant of FDI rules… Lord knows where the spirit of the rules is, but somehow you squeeze it into the ambit of the rules,” the Minister said.
“At least you should resist the greed of these foreigners. You are welcome to do good, honest business. But in wrongdoings… when I read names that have entered partnerships with Falana Dhimkana (anyone and everyone),” he trailed off.
Earlier, the Minister noted that “too much profit in a few hands can lead to a lot of problems for a country” and urged industrialists to not “let the greed of some deprive the need of many”.
At one point, he expressed disappointment that Indian industry wasn’t giving early-stage funding for start-ups despite him having “talked to Uday (Kotak), Pawan (Goenka), Tatas, Ambanis, Bajajs, and the Birlas” to pitch in. “Even if a few don’t make money, you can sacrifice this much for the country,” he noted.
Hinting that development is also industry’s responsibility, he referred to undeveloped tribal areas near the commercial capital Mumbai, stating: “There’s a limit to how much the country can tolerate such inequality. There was total resistance when we were trying to get land in Palghar for high-speed rail corridor. Why? They asked: What have you done for us? You are taking our land and getting roads, infrastructure, railways — but there’s no improvement in our life. This could be a cause of worry if people run out patience sometime.”
“Synergy can’t just be our policy should come early and we should get incentives. It is a joint and severed responsibility, not the responsibility of government alone,” Mr. Goyal emphasised.
Edited by xyzt on Aug 14th 2021 at 4:30:15 PM
Beware the Crazy Man.
![[up]](https://static.tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pub/smiles/arrow_up.png "[up]"){kind=icon}
Here is the thing though, with the impending fall of that government, those resources are going to be used up quite fast. Pakistan knows this and will try to dangle money in front of them.
Either it works or the Taliban try to take out the middle man and start raiding Pakistan proper.
Oh I don't mean any uniformed force carrying out missions. I'm talking undercover. Not everyone who has fled into the night has given up after all. In some cases it was simply that they had nothing to fight with and were surrounded that caused them to fall away.
In the name of being honest
Oh, but that's why they've been talking to the government of Turkmenistan over the long-awaited TAPI gas pipeline. Wanting an open route to Central Asian trade and gas was one of the main reasons Pakistan started to back the Taliban back in the '90s, and the Taliban have figured out that they might just as well seize some leverage for themselves on that front.
Edited by eagleoftheninth on Aug 14th 2021 at 4:20:09 AM
Echoing hymn of my fellow passerine | Art blog (under construction)
Beware the Crazy Man.
Which still requires cooperation with Pakistan so the gas flows or to hold Pakistan hostage by threatening the pipeline.
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
That would be so interesting to see if the NDS can pull it off (by themselves or with other special forces unit) ideally. Sadly, I heard that most of them are ordered to stay near Kabul.
Maybe in another timeline (or maybe when I'm able to write a novel about the NDS).
In the name of being honest
Random, but TIL that Haryana had Tamil as an official language until 2010, purely as a middle finger to the Punjabi Suba movement by way of denying Punjabi an official language status.
Edited by eagleoftheninth on Aug 22nd 2021 at 6:52:49 AM
Echoing hymn of my fellow passerine | Art blog (under construction)
Beware the Crazy Man.
Doesn't surprise me. Indian interstate politics are anywhere from snarky to downright petty to actually dangerous....
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
Why Telugu
Telugu was made the state’s “second language” — to be taught in schools — but it was not the “second official language” for official communication. And the reason reportedly concerns Haryana’s disputes with Punjab. Haryana was carved out of Punjab on November 1, 1966, but till date the two states continue to be in dispute over water sharing, education, airport and even a joint state capital in Chandigarh. A number of veteran politicians, bureaucrats and journalists said that it was around 1969 when Haryana’s third Chief Minister, Bansi Lal, got so upset with the repeated disputes that he decided to introduce any other language as the second official language. The objective, apparently, was to prevent making Punjabi an official language.
Officers and political sources cited additional reasons behind Bansi Lal’s decision. The government wanted to promote a South Indian language as the South was witnessing intense anti-Hindi agitations in those days. “Bansi Lal wanted to show that if a North Indian state could adopt a South Indian language, they should not protest against Hindi,” a veteran said.
Veteran politicians and bureaucrats also recall that Bansi Lal wanted to give Haryana’s students the opportunity to learn at least two Indian languages, one from the North (Hindi) and the other from South (Telugu). A few recall that at that time, Bansi Lal is said to have toyed with the idea of a sister-states relationship with Andhra Pradesh, but the idea did not mature because the then Andhra Pradesh politicians did not see much benefit from such a relationship with a remote, newly created northern state.
What it means
Practically, there is not much relevance for a second language in a state, except that it needs to be taught in schools if students opt for it. It is primarily recognised as such with a specific objective, usually as a gesture towards a particular community that comprises a significant population in a state. But once it is declared, the government is bound to provide specific infrastructure for teaching the second language in schools. A former bureaucrat explained that it creates job vacancies and people get employment. Thus, when Telugu was incorporated as second language in Haryana to be taught in schools, teachers were also appointed to teach the language.
Where it stands
Current and retired bureaucrats of Haryana recalled that since the decision had been taken by then Chief Minister Bansi Lal, it had to be implemented. Thus, the state government in the early 1970s appointed around 100 teachers to teach Telugu in government schools. Gradually, however, all those teachers were either accommodated in the teaching of other subjects or resigned, since there were no students to teach Telugu to. The idea did not take off as expected. In June 2017, incumbent Chief Minister Khattar visited Hyderabad and hinted at introducing Telugu as a correspondence course through a university or a college in Haryana. “Many people from Telangana work in Faridabad and Gurgaon and the idea is to help their children learn their mother tongue,” Khattar said while addressing a Making of Development India (MODI) programme in Hyderabad on June 9, 2017.
Punjabi is official
Haryana’s Official Languages Act was enacted in 1969. With this Act, the Punjab Official Languages Act, 1960, which was earlier applicable to Haryana, was repealed. Hindi was now specified as official language of the state and English was to be used for legislative and judicial correspondence (with Hindi-translated copies). Telugu was not mentioned in the Act, 1969. The Act also had three amendments, but Telugu never found any mention in any of those.
The last amendment was in 2004, during Om Prakash Chautala’s regime, when Punjabi was introduced as the second official language of the state. “The Haryana Official Language (Amendment) Bill 2004” was moved by then Parliamentary Affairs Minister Sampat Singh and passed unanimously. It said that as per the 1991 Census, 7.11% of the population was Punjabi-speaking and thus it was essential to declare Punjabi as the second official language in addition to Hindi, which was then an official language along with English. It was unanimously passed in the Vidhan Sabha on December 1, 2004; the Governor gave his assent on December 14; a notification was issued on December 15. It was aimed at wooing the Punjabi electorate ahead of Lok Sabha elections in 2005.
In 2009, Bhupinder Singh Hooda promised voters that he would declare Punjabi as the second official language — which the amendment had already done. Once elected to power, Hooda’s government on January 28, 2010 issued a notification declaring Punjabi as the state’s second official language for the purposes of “receipt of representation scripted in Punjabi by the state government and its office; and promotion of Punjabi language and Punjabi literature”.
Edited by xyzt on Aug 22nd 2021 at 7:34:37 PM
To no one's surprise, pro-Islamist groups in Pakistan are now doing the same tactics as the Taliban.
Pakistan's feeling the heat now that gunfire in the Afghanistan-Pakistan land border has increased with the Afghan Taliban in power.
Beware the Crazy Man.
Good. Let them enjoy the fruits of their labors.
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
Honestly will wait and see how Taliban fanboys will react.
ISI Chief Faiz Hameed arrived at Kabul's Serena Hotel.
Looks like he's meeting some VI Ps.
Beware the Crazy Man.
Naturally.
I have to wonder, given Taliban difficulty in Panjshir, if the new regime in Kabul demands Pakistan help them out with that. Would be even more interested to see what Pakistan would respond and how if they agreed...
Granted, not a given, but the Taliban drive hard bargains, so who knows...
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...
Rumor has it that he’s talking on having a Pakistani training team sent to Kabul to professionalize the Taliban into a military and raise another intelligence agency.
Also, Omar Zakhilwal was reported to be speaking to the ISI's DG.
Edited by Ominae on Sep 5th 2021 at 2:07:03 AM
I have very little pity for the government in Colombo, given their own conduct of late...
Final Fantasy, Foreign Policy, and Bollywood. Helluva combo, that...