HGW XX/7
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I'd agree that the NEP was reasonably effective, especially compared to the nightmare that was war communism. It was also the only time the USSR actually came close to its founding ideals - the growth of workers' cooperatives and even cultural freedom during the Soviet Twenties was quite striking considering what came before and after it. But the idea that Trotsky would be some saving figure or that would have behaved any differently is kinda misguided; he argued against the NEP in the first instance and he displayed nothing but standard-issue brutality against the Kronstadt mutiny and the various peasant uprisings caused by War Communism.
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I think the convergence between private industry and the Chinese government is without direct precedent; there are some superficial similarities to Nazi corporatismnote or the economy of Italy under fascism, but its not quite to the same degree. Perhaps a close example might be the various South/Central American nations that ended up as corporation-controlled banana republics - except in this case the corporations are based in the same nations they control.
edited 5th Sep '14 2:43:56 PM by Achaemenid
Schild und Schwert der Partei
Show an affirming flame
Well, let's see. China is still Communist to the extent that the real power resides in the Party rather than the government institutions; Norman Davies—in the most darkly interesting description of a state that I've read—called the Soviet Union the world's biggest front organization for the CPSU, and to some extent the institutions of Chinese government are the same: they don't wield power, but do the work the local Party bosses tell them to.
At the same time, the Party bosses don't just have their status and their connections to work off of: many of them are quite wealthy due to connections with the right corporations, or else substitute for populist political power if they're media-savvy enough. In most corrupt states, power comes from which agencies you have contacts with: security, economic, development, et cetera. With China, there's an additional layer of obfuscation due to the opaqueness of the Party.
Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.
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While my research of Trotsky attests to his record of following Internationalist doctrines of spreading communism worldwide compared to Stalin's more cautious "socialism in one country" beliefs, it should be noted that one must resist the temptation of predicting someone's future actions simply by past self-stated claims; politicians in general are notorious for eating their own words throughout their careers, as the unpredictable nature of society and life make it close to impossible to adhere to a single philosophy as time goes by.
That being said, Trotsky historically has demonstrated that he was at least conscious of his boisterous personality, and adapted to accommodate changing obstacles to his interests throughout his political life; an issue of Armchair General magazine
mentions that:
Note the mention of former Czarists in Bolshevik service; for all of his reputation of being a ruthless hunter of enemies of the revolution, Trotsky, unlike most of his peers including Stalin, was uniquely willing to work and cooperate with the deposed Czar's officers and integrate them as "military specialists" and "advisors" into the Red Army's leadership. According to the article, "by 1920, 270,000 former Czarist officers and noncommissioned officers - among them a young cavalry sergeant named Georgy Zhukov - would serve in the Red Army, comprising 75% of the Red Army's officer corps."
There's a general hunch between historians that a Trotsky-led USSR would've seen a much more modernized and capable military by the time of World War II than that of how history played out - his aforementioned cooperation with former Czarist officers is generally taken as a sign that he wouldn't be relentlessly purging the Red Army's officer corps as Stalin did; although there's a chance that he may say You Have Outlived Your Usefulness to the ex-Czarists, I doubt that Trotsky would be willing to Kill Em All and shoot himself in the foot that way.
However, I cannot effectively argue for Trotsky's economic practices: his career as a revolutionary almost entirely consisted of managing the military while Lenin did all of the economics, and because of this, there's relatively little academic ground to argue that Trotsky would've been a better economist than Stalin. On one hand, there's a chance that he may have bended to figures more experienced in economics under the pressure of his own inexperience with the matter, while on the other he'd probably struggle as Stalin initially did.
I suppose that you've won this debate Achaemenid, as a fascinating and perceptive essay that I've read online while writing this concludes that:
I apologize for derailing this thread if I did, so I'll get it back on track.
The supposed capture of a Chinese ISIS militant is ". . . additional evidence that terrorism in China has a strong international connection." says a Chinese commentator. Despite the fact that the militant's ethnicity is unknown as of now, the general presumption in China is that he's a Uighur, and the responses online with broken Engrish are generally something along the lines of "we chinese are glad to see these muslims' death!" and "kill them all!".
While this is true, however, one must bear in mind that this is the modern age and China is no longer as isolated from the rest of the world as before. In fact, I dare say that China is far more open to the rest of the world as it ever has been (the most open Impterial China ever got was during the Ming Dynasty when Zhang He traveled around the world. And that lasted for one emperor's reign). Therefore it is highly likely that other powers will interfere should such scenario occur (the US might not like a destablised China for example due to trade and whatnot).
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That's rather an understatement - no one wants a unstable China falling into Ukrainian chaos for the same aforementioned reasons involved huge economic investments; well, except maybe the Uighurs and EITM, if they even exist, in Xinjiang. However, should an imaginary repeat of 1989 take place, I suspect that the world would initially stand aside and watch for the first few weeks or months, before finally getting off the fence and actively taking sides if an actual civil war breaks out.
The Russian and Chinese governments seem really keen for everyone to believe (certain) regional separatist movements are somehow derived from evil Islamic terrorism, from even the flimsiest indicators.
Reminds me of how Anders Brievek was initially assumed to be a Muslim fanatic. Bad form whether it turns out to be true or not.
edited 5th Sep '14 10:44:44 PM by editerguy
Are South Korea’s Best Days Behind Her?:
One key problem is that South Korea’s export markets are shrinking. Exemplary of this trend is the country’s relationship with its largest trade partner, China. After enjoying 31 straight months of surpluses, South Korea is now a net importer of goods from China. In part, this decline comes from Beijing’s efforts to “rebalance” its economy, curbing its massive consumption of inputs. But this is only one part of the problem. South Korean enterprises face significant challenges from China’s domestic manufacturers, whose increased competitiveness in petrochemical products and IT have reduced market shares for Korean exporters.
To some degree, there will be short to medium term dividends from ratifying the planned free trade agreement with China; however, efficiency gains from lower barriers to trade will not last forever.
Something that may greatly improve long-term prospects for export enterprises is the prudent deregulation of the market. Analysts point to the rapid rise of business regulations during the previous Lee Myung-bak administration as a key burden on producers seeking to expand business operations. While the Park administration has promised to spur productivity by eliminating unnecessary regulations, the task has proved to be more difficult than expected. At the same time, these challenges are further complicated by the government’s push to eliminate public and private sector collusion following the Sewol ferry disaster.
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The Indians are more likely than not going to build up relations with China cautiously, especially since the latter launched a border incursion in 1962 and that you've also got that whole thing with the Dalai Lama's asylum in the former. Xi Jinping's recent visit to Sri Lanka is also bound to set off some alarms on the continent that Beijing is clearly trying to gain influence among its neighbors.
Didnt India's PM recently visit Japan?
V
Wasn't it the other way round? Either way, India's brought some flying boats from Japan.
edited 17th Sep '14 5:57:55 AM by Greenmantle
Keep Rolling On
HGW XX/7
Doubtless they will be delivered sometime in 2034. 
China refuses to explain whereabouts of envoy to Iceland:
Ma Jisheng left Reykjavik for China in January this year but did not return in March as expected. A New York-based Chinese language site reported on Tuesday that he and his wife had been seized by state security on suspicion of espionage.
Ma served in China's embassy in Tokyo twice, finishing his last posting in 2008. The allegations are particularly sensitive given the marked deterioration in relations between China and Japan in recent years, and especially since the election of prime minister Shinzō Abe.
The two countries are locked in a long-running territorial dispute over uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, known as the Diaoyu to the Chinese and Senkakus to the Japanese, and China complains Japan has failed to fully atone for its brutality in the second world war.
Ma's lengthy absence from Reykjavik was first highlighted by an Icelandic newspaper this month. He has been ambassador only since December 2012 – meaning that if he is not returning his posting has been cut unusually short.
Mingjing News then reported the espionage claims, with Hong Kong's Ming Pao newspaper picking up the story. Some mainland Chinese news sites carried the reports but subsequently deleted them.
Asked whether the reports were true, Hong Lei, spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, said: "I have no information on this." He gave the same answer when asked for Ma's current whereabouts and to clarify who was the Chinese ambassador to Iceland.
A spokeswoman for Iceland's foreign ministry, Urdur Gunnarsdóttir, confirmed that Ma was to have returned in March. She said the Chinese embassy in Reykjavik had stated in May that he would not return to his post for personal reasons. There has been a caretaker ambassador since then, Gunnarsdóttir said.
Ma's CV has been deleted from the website of the Chinese embassy in Iceland and it has a blank where his name would normally appear in a welcoming address. The last reference to him in the news section dates from September last year. Older articles about him were still visible there and on the foreign ministry website.
Ma was a secretary at the Chinese embassy in Japan between 1991 and 1995, and a minister counsellor between 2004 and 2008. Prior to becoming ambassador to Iceland, he worked as deputy director of information in the foreign ministry. A Japanese government official told Reuters: "We are aware of the media report. But it's basically China's domestic issue and therefore the Japanese government would like to refrain from commenting."
He's not gonna make it out alive, right?
Of course he is. Any day now he will appear on TV confessing his crimes, expressing remorse, and encouraging everyone to support the Party.
HGW XX/7
I suspect he will be put in charge of a municipal sewage plant in Outer Mongolia.
Schild und Schwert der Partei
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That'd be a generous sentence considering how "selling secrets" to a rival country is generally labeled as treason is most, if not all, states in the world - and the punishment for treason is also limited to death or a pathetic existence for life in a lao-gai.
HGW XX/7
Do we know that's actually what he did, though, or is this just more shadow games from Xi Jingping?
Schild und Schwert der Partei
I suspect he will be put in charge of a municipal sewage plant in Outer Mongolia.
Isn't Outer Mongolia the independent country we know whereas Inner Mongolia's the one under Chinese control?
HGW XX/7
Oh, I thought it was the other way round. Always get me Inner and Outer Mongolias mixed up, what am I like?
Schild und Schwert der Partei
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Being an embassy official working in close proximity to a Japanese one, he'd be in a convenient role to do so - this sort of stuff was commonplace between the U.S and the Soviets during the Cold War. Plus, although researchable details are blurry for obvious political reasons, conversations between peers and relatives from the mainland hint that Xi's recent "anti-corruption" purges mainly target domestic officials such as whatever remnant allies of Bo Xilai that are still left - politicians overseas aren't really much of a direct threat to Xi's power, since they're unable to rally up popular and political support when living in a foreign population.
China's Revisionist Orientation:
But what about the rules of the game? In the raging debate in which Dingding Chen argued for a halt to U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance on the grounds that it is unlawful, his critics at first contend that international law is straightforward, unequivocal, and not open for rival interpretations. Yet at the same time the idea that it is possible for China to “redefine a legal precept” and that countermeasures should be taken seems to indicate muddy waters of interpretation. At one extreme international law is nothing but ruler practices, at the other international law is infallible, transparent, and always just. In between there might be a middle ground worth taking, but I am not going to take a stance on international law in order to further the argument of China’s revisionist orientation. To avoid quarrels over international law, another way of approaching the issue is to look at the intercept strictly in terms of standards of behavior. Revisionist orientation thus connects to a rejection of “the dominant norms of interaction.” In this case, the norms of interaction concern U.S. surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to which China indeed rejects. The implications of such a stance are inherently normative and cannot be decided in an unbiased and neutral way.
Of course, much falls back on how the United States makes use of its preventive power.
According to the Brookings Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon, who recently published Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, the United States “should not and would not pull back” and the smaller voices that preach retrenchment in the American debate will not “win the game.” Thus, if the fundamental problem “is that Beijing wants a sphere of influence, while Washington is not willing to accede it,” then the antithesis of China’s new type of great power relations is facing an uncompromising thesis. Often, when history is faced with such a situation struggle ensues until a new synthesis emerges and creates something new out of the clashing projects.
China's President is a Paper Tiger.
Chinese courts sentenced an Uighur professor for being pro-separatist, who's known for being critical to Beijing's policies towards Xinjiang.
HGW XX/7
"What's so wrong with splitting up?" - Chinese netizens on the indyref.
A very interesting piece by Foreign Policy about how the Chinese interweb views the referendum.
Yes, that's satire.
Cross-posted to the Scottish indy thread.
Schild und Schwert der Partei
The comparison I've usually used was Gilded Age US. The US managed to pass reforms and anticorruption measures while enduring quite a degree of social stress; the question is if the CCP can do the same.
Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.