Combat-Writing Thread

I don't know how realistic you are trying to get, but there is actually no such thing as a reliably "silent" killing method. People make a fuss when they die, even if they die instantly. The longer they take to die, the more of a fuss they make. Neither garroting nor stabbing someone is a particularly quick method of killing someone, but the knife has the advantage- while you can sometimes (not reliably under field conditions) achieve near instant kills with a knife, a garrote asphyxiates people, which takes some time.

Better than either of these methods is injecting someone with a fast acting poison while they sleep, but I don't see that working twice on the same patrol.

Well, I'll settle with near instant kill. XP

I'm a (socialist) professional writer serializing a WWII alternate history webnovel.

Heard the best way to kill quietly is to enter from under the back of the skull; cutting the neck ends up making tons of gurgling noises while the enemy takes several seconds to actually die.

If it's a jungle or forest environment, the marginal extra amount of noise may not matter so much.

Of course, if he's intelligent, he'll stop to take the other guy's weapons first. All it takes is for one nervous enemy to squeeze off a few shots, and the quiet approach is gone—at which point he'll be in a better position if he's as well-armed as his opponents are.

Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.

And, of course, there's the potential advantage of sowing confusion. Namely, if Random Scared Soldier (RSS) starts firing into the bush, and gets return fire from the same weapon(s) his side uses, he might think he's accidentally engaged a friendly unit and hold fire. This could provide a few seconds extra for your character to capitalise on.

There are a few downsides to this approach, however. For one thing, if your character fires his pilfered weapon too closely to friendlies, they might think they're under attack and start shooting at him! And this approach only works if the factions in question use different guns; if both use AK-74s, neither is going to be surprised if they get return fire from a AK-74.

Locking you up on radar since '09

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Do you mean while he's still alive or after he's dead? Sneaking a gun out from behind the owner's back would be monumentally stupid, because there's a high chance they'll be alerted and you'll be caught with your hands full (of a gun you're handling carefully/quietly and that you don't want to fire) while at close range with the enemy. Unless the enemy's leaving their weapons at a convenient distance, this seems like a very bad plan. (If you mean nicking a dead man's guns then ignore me, I've had no sleep in 48h.)

After the target is dead. The alternative should only be an option if you are grey-haired, long-eared, bucktoothed, and voiced by Mel Blanc.

Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.

Should note that for some people what they get shot at with isn't going to matter much to them; they'll figure whatever lunatic is shooting at them has it coming. This is especially true of poorly disciplined or green troops.

Nous restons ici.

Could someone explain the rationale behind the various kinds of squad-level infantry formations? What are the advantages or disadvantages of a wedge formation versus a line with respect to modern warfare? It's easy to think what they would be for ancient combat, but things are very different, so I'm not sure those same concepts apply.

yey

Relatively speaking, it has to do with frontage and who can see where; but modern formations tend to be a lot looser both on tactical spacing concerns (the idea being to make it hard to take down more than one person with a burst from an automatic weapon or a grenade) and because individuals are expected to make use of available cover on their own.

In general, though, the idea is to allow sub-squad portions of the formation like fire teams or even individuals to move and support each other, exactly as you would at larger unit levels of maneuver. A squad advancing line abreast can instantly bring all their fire to bear ahead without having to worry about each other's positions, hence why it's common for attack; a wedge offers greater flank security at the cost of exposing the "point" to the enemy and to some extent to friendly fire. Patrols in a modern environment usually go out in a rough single file because in the event of an ambush it's easier to just turn right or left and have everyone return fire than it is to deal with a flank attack in line abreast, and it limits the number of soldiers exposed to danger from ahead if they stumble directly into an enemy unit.

edited 21st Apr '15 12:39:24 PM by Night

Nous restons ici.

And though it may be less immediately obvious, units may move in one formation when combat is unexpected or unlikely (such as a road march) to maximise speed, whilst another may be used for a movement to contact or when combat is anticipated so as to ensure the greatest level of security.

A useful example may be as follows - if memory serves, Soviet armour would normally move in column to ensure the rate of advance was high as possible. This would continue until they came under effective fire, at which point they would reform into a line abreast, reorient on the enemy, and charge the hostile position.

Certain types of formation may also serve to conceal your true numbers (such as by moving in the same tracks as the person in front, etc.). This was something that Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRPs) took advantage of in Vietnam.

Locking you up on radar since '09

Interesting.

Another question: what exactly is screening? I've gathered something like, stationing a small force separate from your main body of troops in anticipation of an enemy attack so as to force an early engagement that the body can react to at its liesure? Is this correct?

yey

That's part of it. Screening is generally a cavalry job or equivalent (mech infantry, armored cars) and combines aspects of reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance into one task. A screening force moves ahead or to the flanks, providing both recon and denying the enemy's recon the ability to determine the exact location and movements of your main force. Ideally it is strong enough not to be simply swept aside by the enemy main force in march formation, but powerful enough to force him to waste his time deploying for a proper assault; bringing up artillery, getting units into line, showing his hand. This in turn allows your forces time to do the same, and to select ground advantageous to receive the enemy on, while the screening force falls back rather than fight the enemy main force in strength.

Nous restons ici.

The Sovs would routinely break off a significant part of their main force for the function, too; when one looks at their tactics in the advance, there's a striking emphasis on reconnaissance and forward elements. The "forward detachment" is a big part of it; it's essentially a heavily-reinforced semi-independent unit two echelons down from the parent formation (so a division FD would be a reinforced battalion), whose job is to seize vital terrain, find routes, and keep going forward.

What distinguishes it is that it's not an independent cavalry arm. The post-WWII Soviet military was so lavishly mechanized it could afford to use ordinary troops in the cavalry role. (Although it's worth noting that Soviet recon troopers were generally considered to be higher quality than their ordinary motor-riflemen; in Afghanistan, the Sovs would routinely cobble together ad-hoc raiding or ambushing units out of recce elements.)

Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.

Yeah, I remember reading the Soviets essentially had two screening forces for a formation that was on the move - the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol or CRP, and the advance guard. Both had similar jobs, but the CRP had the additional duty of delaying the advance of any enemy force they detected (such as by directing artillery or air strikes against them). If my half-recalled knowledge from a field manual is correct, it was anticipated that even a delay of one hour could allow the Soviet force to advance a not insignificant distance. The CRP might also be expected to bypass the enemy's screening units and strike at their main body.

The CRP and advance guard (which was a larger formation) were also intended to fix enemy elements in place for long enough that the unit's main body could join the fray if the CRP and advance guard could not decisively defeat them or were forced on to the defensive. Soviet formations could mass troops surprisingly quickly; again, going off a half-remembered field manual that analysed Soviet techniques, what was a bunch of IFVs and some mechanised infantry could rapidly snowball into several armoured units (complete with fire support) in the space of an hour if the enemy allowed themselves to be pinned. However, they always tried to manage it so that the commander had enough time to devise a basic plan of action before they reached the battle.

More pertinently, what are the advantages and disadvantages of essentially having two screening forces and/or the philosophy of committing large forces quickly if the screening unit(s) pin the enemy?

edited 24th Apr '15 7:46:51 AM by Flanker66

Locking you up on radar since '09

The main advantage is speed. The idea was to overwhelm the defending forces before they could mobilize an effective defense, or, alternatively, allow the main force to go around the defenders if they were already dug in. This worked reasonably well in the developing world against poor quality military forces; less well against Western trained professional forces, like the Israelies. Would likely have been a blood-bath if they had ever tried to use it on NATO.

The main disadvantage is that the faster forces risk leaving the slower forces too far behind. The Sovs were willing to live with that because they thought they had enough mobile reserves to reinforce forward isolated units. But against an opponent who knows how to use "Fight and Fall Back" tactics well, it sacrifices a lot of men.

That's all rather in-depth, thank you.

Anyone mind elaborating on the concepts of point-fire and area-fire? I think I understand these relatively well, but there are a couple of niggling issues I'd like to iron out if possible.

yey

There are two interrelated major risks, and a number of minor ones.

The first major risk is that it places a great deal of faith in your recon units to accurately get you data quickly, and this faith will sometimes be misplaced. You will commit without actually knowing what is on the field; you have attempted to attack units that are not there, triggered a head-on main-force collision that will gut you win or lose, or worse.

The second is that committing rapidly like this means that your main force is likely to arrive at the same time as enemy supporting arms like air and artillery start to become fully involved in the battle against your recon group, exposing your main force to them as they move into position. One barrage or bombing run in the right place can really screw things up, and the Soviet love affair with air-defense capability was a recognition that their doctrines risked this kind of thing.

A minor risk because it's not necessarily going to happen but it's still very real (and it's very common to Soviet-derived doctrine) is that with such a rapid decision cycle less of your actions are based on rational analysis of the situation than preordained by doctrinal fiat; and this makes you easier to lead around by the nose.

Another minor risk is that you are sticking a very significant unit out front of you, without much immediate support, and someone with a more conventional screening force may simply dance aside and let it run head-on into his main force; then you've lost your screen which happened to be a noticeable amount of your combat power and you're in the dark. This happened to the Iraqi army at Khafji, the Marines shot their heavy recon group to pieces coming in, causing the advance to halt at the town because they had no intelligence further on, and then when they had assembled something like a functional screening force again and tried to stage a counterattack against the Qataris it ran directly into the main force of Qatari AMX 30s leaving the Iraqi command in the dark. While admittedly they weren't that skilled, at least some of the comic-opera nature of the Iraqi attack has to be considered in light of that.

Nous restons ici.

That is the thing that struck me about the forward detachment theory: a battalion is a lot of troops to commit to a forward screen, and it's potentially a lot of troops to lose if something went wrong. I think the Soviet argument is that in a war against a prepared opponent, heavy losses will be nearly inevitable anyway; better to take those losses in a way that will gain you positional advantage and maintain the momentum, rather than, say, assaulting a dug-in position head-on. It's an example of making a trade-off between mobility and firepower.

The idea of a battalion-sized formation operating independently gained a lot of traction as a result of Afghanistan, although putting theory into practice took much longer.

Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.

The Sovs also didnt plan on leaving that battalion out there by itself for very long. The entire formation is supposed to be moving forward pretty much all the time. The overriding goal in Soviet tactics is to penetrate the enemy's rear areas.

Interesting and well thought out replies, thanks all!

From the sounds of things it seems like the advantages of the CRP and advance guard were rather marginal... so are there any actual benefits to the system, and if not then why did the USSR persist in its use?

@Galt:

In my understanding, both are just what they sound like! Point fire is fire directed against a single point, whereas area fire is fire that is delivered over an area rather than a lone aiming point.

Locking you up on radar since '09

If applied properly, having a strong forward screen can be immensely advantageous; once you're through the first line of defense, you needs to move quickly to prevent the enemy from reorientating and stopping your drive. For that, you need lavish reconnaissance—hence the constant focus on forward patrols—and ideally a quick-moving force to seize key terrain: hence the powerful forward detachment.

Proper operational use of forward detachments sees each major unit pushing out an advance guard. Some may run into strong resistance, but some will get through, and when the advance of a Corps or an Army is at stake it is worth losing a few battalions if it means pinning down the enemy force to be bypassed.

It's an inherently high-risk, high-reward tactic, but one that has been well-thought-out and which suited the aggressive mindset of Soviet operational art. Against a prepared defence, it came down to losing some forward troops but getting the main force past the defensive line, thus cutting it off, versus being conservative with your force, but staying in the dark as your recce troops get tangled up in fighting with enemy counterrecce and having to make a costly, slow attack as a consequence.

Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.

It also suited the Soviet conception of their primary operational units; they envisioned armies as unitary formations, throwing them around the way most people would divisions or brigades. At that level, it's an effective strategy, because you can absorb the losses.

For an army that conceives of their primary operational unit as a smaller formation than army or corps, it is less attractive; and the smaller the formation the more unattractive it gets.

Nous restons ici.

Is there a reason for that unitary formation mindset, be it military, political or philosophical? Any advantages other than trivializing the complexity of the strategies used?

Nihil assumpseris, sed omnia resolvere!

History. The Red Army's defining event was the Eastern Front of WWII, and the great campaigns—Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Dnieper River, Operation Bagration, Vistula-Oder, and eventually August Storm in Manchuria—were all carried out on such a scale, there had to be a new term used for them ("Operational Art", for a level beyond the tactical but below the grand-strategic). On such a scale, it makes sense to see corps, armies, and fronts as the base units, rather than divisions, brigades, and battalions; it was mechanized warfare on a scale never before seen, over distances previously unimaginable.

Logically, then, when preparing for WWIII, the Soviet Army drew on that memory. And far from trivializing the strategies required, the sheer scale required the ability to think and plan at the operational level. The fact that the Soviet Army routinely planned and fought at that level while their German counterparts usually focused on the tactical level and strategic level while only partly engaging with the linkage between the two contributed a lot to the Soviet victories.

For instance, Western training often involve carefully-coordinated fire and maneuver down to the fireteam and individual vehicle level. For the Soviets, on the other hand, everything at and below the company level involved rehearsed battle drills. While less flexible tactically, it had the advantage that it enabled rapidly-trained conscripts to quickly carry out simple orders. This might well have worked had WWIII broken out, but it was a serious disadvantage in Afghanistan (which was a platoon and squad leader's war—the level of leadership that the Soviets were deficient in).

edited 25th Apr '15 10:15:17 PM by SabresEdge

Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.