History YMMV / SuperBowl

** Super Bowl LIII's halftime show was infamous for multiple reasons. Music/JayZ, Music/CardiB, and Music/{{Rihanna}} reportedly declined to headline the show in solidarity with Colin Kaepernick, who accused the NFL of blacklisting him over his kneeling during the national anthem in protest of police brutality. This lead to the artists that did perform being compared to strikebreakers and a petition for headline act Music/Maroon5 to drop out of the show. Then there was the outrage that ensued from ''WesternAnimation/SpongeBobSquarePants'' fans when "Sicko Mode" by Music/TravisScott was played instead of "Sweet Victory" from the fan favorite episode ''[[Recap/SpongeBobSquarePantsS2E15TheSecretBoxBandGeeks Band Geeks]]'' as a tribute to the show's recently deceased creator Stephen Hillenburg, thanks to them implying that the latter was going to be played by showing an animation of Squidward introducing the show beforehand. These seem to be the only things anyone remembers about not just the halftime show, but that entire Super Bowl.

** Super Bowl LIII's halftime show was infamous for multiple reasons. Music/JayZ, Music/CardiB, and Music/{{Rihanna}} reportedly declined to headline the show in solidarity with Colin Kaepernick, who accused the NFL of blacklisting him over his kneeling during the national anthem in protest of police brutality. This lead to the artists that did perform being compared to strikebreakers and a petition for headline act Music/Maroon5 to drop out of the show. Then there was the outrage that ensued from ''WesternAnimation/SpongeBobSquarePants'' fans when "Sicko Mode" by Music/TravisScott was played instead of "Sweet Victory" from the fan favorite episode ''[[Recap/SpongeBobSquarePantsS2E15TheSecretBoxBandGeeks Band Geeks]]'' as a tribute to the show's recently deceased creator Stephen Hillenburg, even after implying that it was going to be played by showing an animation of Squidward introducing it beforehand! These seem to be the only things anyone remembers about not just that halftime show, but [[UpToEleven that entire Super Bowl]]!

*** Hindsight will probably point to the latter, given the Falcons' growing reputation as "Chokelanta" in the years since, with an actual 28-3 lead being among MANY that Atlanta threw away in 2020 alone. However, it's also possible that it's the other way around -- that the ShockingDefeatLegacy of this Super Bowl rattled the team so hard that they can't seem to get rid of the yips of having "28-3" in their heads every time they have a lead (even in the many games where they've choked since then, there were moments where they regained the lead in more games than not); the argument in favor of this version is that Brady had to play essentially flawless football to come anywhere within reach of a tie, let alone a win, setting records for passing efficiency and yards, and if Atlanta had been playing against a quarterback who couldn't do that (even Brady on an off day), this would have been a commanding Atlanta win.

*** Hindsight will probably point to the latter, given the Falcons' growing reputation as "Chokelanta" in the years since, with an actual 28-3 lead being among MANY that Atlanta threw away in 2020 alone; however, it's also possible that it's the other way around -- that the ShockingDefeatLegacy of this Super Bowl rattled the team so hard that they can't seem to get rid of the yips of having "28-3" in their heads every time they have a lead (even in the many games where they've choked since then, there were moments where they regained the lead in more games than not). The counterpoint to this is that Brady had to play essentially flawless football to come anywhere within reach of a tie, let alone a win, setting records for passing efficiency and yards, and if Atlanta had been playing against a quarterback who couldn't do that (even Brady on an off day), this would have been a commanding Atlanta win.

* NeverLiveItDown: [[NeverLiveItDown/SuperBowl Now has its own page.]]

* BestKnownForTheFanservice: Among football fans, Super Bowl XXXVIII is often considered to be one of the greatest Super Bowls ever, a thrilling match-up that came down to a field goal. Among non-fans, it will always be remembered as "[[TheOneWith the game where]] Music/JanetJackson [[WardrobeMalfunction flashed her nipple]]."

** Super Bowl XL is primarily remembered for its awful officiating (all of which favored the Steelers), much more than for anything that the actual ''players'' did.

### During the Super Bowl, it was not just Butler, but also Brandon Browner, a former Seahawk, making the correct read that blew it up. Butler’s man was actually Jermaine Kearse, but diagnosing the play at the line, Browner told Butler to defend the inside of the goal line against Ricardo Lockette. Browner, in turn, jammed Kearse at the goal line. This did two things. First, it deprived Wilson of his second read, so the pass would go to Lockette or be thrown away, and secondly, it boxed Lockette into running an interior route because if he moved outside, Wilson would have to throw directly over Browner’s head, which actually ''is'' a red-flag throw that even the most accurate quarterback would be unlikely to risk, and Lockette would know that (and if Lockette ''had'' run the outside route anyway for some reason, then either the Patriots would have had an easy interception or, more likely, Wilson would have thrown it away rather than take the risk).

At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would have likely left them no choice but to burn their last timeout, so they'd in essence be most likely throwing away a down and burning a timeout right when they couldn't afford to lose either. They could spike the ball to stop the clock and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning ''and'' cost them a down. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but the "repeatedly" part was going to be difficult because they were also short of ''time'', and run plays tend to eat up the most clock. What's more, they had only one timeout: Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. With only one timeout left, Seattle had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding).\\

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but the "repeatedly" part was going to be difficult because they were also short of ''time'', and run plays also tend to eat up the most clock. What's more, they had only one timeout: Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. With only one timeout left, Seattle had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding).\\

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they didn't actually have three chances to do so, as the narrative often suggests, because they were also short of ''time'', and run plays also tend to eat up the most clock. What's more, they had only one timeout: Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. With only one timeout left, Seattle had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding).\\

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they didn't actually have three chances to do so, as the narrative often suggests, because they were also short of ''time'', and run plays also tend to eat up the most clock. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. This left Seattle with only one timeout, so they had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding).\\
At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball to stop the clock and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. This left Seattle with only one timeout, so they had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding).\\
At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** "The passing play was riskier than the run." Technically true in that a turnover would be less likely on the run, but it wasn't nearly as big a risk as people think it was. While the Seahawks' goal line passing was anemic -- 1 for 2 in 2014 and 3 for 8 in 2012-2014 -- none of the failures were interceptions. Moreover, the pass play they ran in XLIX had been previously completed 109 times consecutively, at various points in the red zone, without an interception. Additionally, the risk that did exist is potentially outweighed by the fact that the play also had a better chance of ''working''; the Patriots were more vulnerable to the goal line pass than the goal line rush, giving up scores on 3 of 4 passes at the 1-yard line and 11 of 18 runs. Now, factor in the fact that Seattle's ground game ran through a powerback who was low percentage at the goal line, and you can build a case for the pass (since at the end of the day, trying a run and failing is no better than throwing an interception).

### During the Super Bowl, it was not just Butler, but also Brandon Browner, a former Seahawk, making the correct read that blew it up. Butler’s man was actually Jermaine Kearse, but diagnosing the play at the line, Browner told Butler to defend the inside of the goal line against Ricardo Lockette. Browner, in turn, jammed Kearse at the goal line. This did two things. First, it deprived Wilson of his second read, so the pass would go to Lockette or be thrown away, and secondly, it boxed Lockette into running an interior route because if he moved outside, Wilson would have to throw directly over Browner’s head, which actually ''is'' a red-flag throw that even the most accurate quarterback would be unlikely to risk, and Lockette would know that (and if Lockette ''had'' run the outside route anyway for some reason, Wilson would probably have been forced to throw the ball away).

### Even after Lockette, as expected, ran inside, Butler's timing had to be ''perfect'': if he was even the slightest bit early, it would have given Wilson a chance to spot the coverage and not make that throw, and if he'd been even the slightest bit late, Lockette would have had enough of a window to catch the ball before Butler could get to it (and once it was in his hands, there was virtually no chance that they'd be able to stop him before he could break the plane of the endzone). In other words, if Butler had mis-timed his play by as little as half a second, there would have been no interception.

** “The throw was bad[=/=]the interception was easy.” A matter of opinion, but unsupported by the game itself. This one is especially tough to break down because our understanding of the process is so deeply tied to the outcome, but that doesn't mean it was a thoughtless throw; in reality, the interception required a number of pieces to fall into place ''exactly'' right.
### Firstly, the actual pass was right on the mark and delivered into a window that was not at that moment covered by any Patriots defender. If there's anything to criticize, it's that he didn't angle the throw downward to the receiver's waist, which made the ball hang in the air longer than it should have.

*** Additionally, even if it ''was'' a bad throw, that's a separate issue from the question of whether the play ''call'' was bad -- pretty much any play call has a risk of backfiring if the play is poorly executed, so unless the coach has reason to expect that the execution will be poor (which was not the case for Seattle here), a failure doesn't necessarily mean the underlying call was bad -- but the two are often lumped together as if the former was an inevitable result of the latter.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. This left Seattle with only one timeout, so they had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding).
:At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

::At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

:::At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. This left Seattle with only one timeout, so they had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them (including the consideration that if they ''did'' score, they would then have to hold off the Patriots from responding). At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

### Even after Lockette, as expected, ran inside, Butler's timing had to be ''perfect'': if he was even the slightest bit early, it would have given Wilson a chance to spot the coverage and not make that throw, and if he'd been even the slightest bit late, Lockette would have had enough of a window to catch the ball before Butler could get to it, and once it was in his hands, there was virtually no chance that they'd be able to stop him before he could break the plane of the endzone. In other words, if Butler had mis-timed his play by as little as half a second, there would have been no interception.

** “The throw was bad[=/=]the interception was easy.” A matter of opinion, but unsupported by the game itself. Firstly, the actual pass was right on the mark and delivered into a window that was not covered by any Patriot defender. If there's anything to criticize, it's that he didn't angle the throw downward to the receiver's waist, which made the ball hang in the air longer than it should have. In addition, defending this play was a feature of Patriots practices leading up to the Super Bowl because Patriots football guru Ernie Adams noticed that they liked to use it a lot – but in each instance, Butler failed to defend it because the receiver would gain outside leverage over him. During the Super Bowl, it was not just Butler, but also Brandon Browner, a former Seahawk, making the correct read that blew it up. Butler’s man was actually Jermaine Kearse, but diagnosing the play at the line, Browner told Butler to defend the inside of the goal line against Ricardo Lockette. Browner, in turn, jammed Kearse at the goal line. This did two things. First, it deprived Wilson of his second read, so the pass would go to Lockette or be thrown away. Secondly, it boxed Lockette into running an interior route because if he moved outside, the pass would have to float directly over Browner’s head. This is the red-flag throw that should be avoided. He ran inside, and Butler shadowed him, but the timing had to be perfect or else Lockette would have had enough of a window to catch the ball in traffic and break the plane of the endzone. That this defensive stand resulted in an interception required precise timing and communication on the part of the Patriots, and two cornerbacks independently making the correct read. This one is especially tough to break down because our understanding of the process is so deeply tied to the outcome, but that doesn't mean it was a thoughtless throw. Additionally, even if it ''was'' a bad throw, that's a separate issue from the question of whether the play ''call'' was bad -- pretty much any play call has a risk of backfiring if the play is poorly executed, so unless the coach has reason to expect that the execution will be poor (which was not the case for Seattle here), a failure doesn't necessarily mean the underlying call was bad -- but the two are often lumped together as if the former was an inevitable result of the latter.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. This left Seattle with only one timeout, so they had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy -- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really; the immediate situation actually favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock, and the Seahawks couldn't get up to the new line of scrimmage fast enough to avoid a delay of game, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a penalty. This left Seattle with only one timeout, so they had to be circumspect about using it because they had to weigh the immediate situation against the possible scenarios in which not having any timeouts later on could hurt them. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of ''his'' two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel without having to burn a timeout of their own. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run, and with so little time left and no ability to stop the clock, a single run play could have eaten up all the time they had left, what with the time it would take to disengage from the scrum and mark the spot and all. They could call the run anyway, but the chance of success would be minimal and a failure would likely force them to use their final timeout. They could spike the ball and make the personnel switch, but that would also let Belichick know what they were planning and would cost them a down at a time where they really couldn't afford to throw one away. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy –- an incompletion stops the clock, the risk of anything worse than an incompletion was statistically minimal, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really. The immediate situation favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed (although see previous points about Lynch's actual efficacy in such situations), but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock. The Seahawks did not hurry to the new line of scrimmage, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a delay-of-game penalty. It was crucial that they not use their last one on this drive because, if they scored, the clock would have stopped, giving the Patriots anywhere between thirty and sixty seconds to get back into field goal range to tie the game. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of his two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run. They could call the run anyway, but with so little time, they had to score at all costs – the time it would take to disengage from the scrum, mark the spot, get set, and call another play would probably use up everything left. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy – an incompletion stops the clock, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.