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Changed line(s) 5,7 (click to see context) from:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman in the Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lost competitiveness in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is an [=iPod=] in the Future]].
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman in the Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lost competitiveness in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is an [=iPod=] in the Future]].
Future]]. This was because Japanese industry became [[CripplingOverspecialization extremely adept at designing and manufacturing mechanical components]] which works well for cars, appliances, consumer devices and such and translates well to manufacturing analog electronics (particularly those based of vacuum tubes and discrete transistors) but didn’t port over to digital electronics and integrated circuits [[note]] Most IC chips are designed in the US and manufactured elsewhere in South East Asia[[/note]].
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Changed line(s) 5,7 (click to see context) from:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman in the Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is an [=iPod=] in the Future]].
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman in the Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind lost competitiveness in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is an [=iPod=] in the Future]].
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Changed line(s) 5,7 (click to see context) from:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman In The Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is An [=iPod=] In The Future]].
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman In The in the Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is An an [=iPod=] In The in the Future]].
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Changed line(s) 5,7 (click to see context) from:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is An [=iPod=] In The Future]].
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism (Everything Is a Walkman In The Future) era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is An [=iPod=] In The Future]].
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Changed line(s) 8,9 (click to see context) from:
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans'.
to:
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, '60s (where they were known to manufacture cheap products), by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans'.
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for ''a million dollars'' per square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* -- ''ahem'' -- [[HistoryRepeats loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for ''a million dollars'' per square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
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Changed line(s) 5,8 (click to see context) from:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans'.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans'.
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
mythos. Also, many Japanese electronics companies had been leaders in the CassetteFuturism era, but had [[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21992700 not adapted]] to the digital/software revolution, and have thus lagged behind in the era where [[EverythingIsAnIPodInTheFuture Everything Is An [=iPod=] In The Future]].
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than theAmericans'.
Americans'.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the
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Added DiffLines:
A longer term issue for Japan which was overlooked by the people who believed Japan would take over the world is an aging and declining population. While other first-world nations also feature declining birth rates among their native populations, immigration is keeping populations levels slightly rising or steady which countries such as Canada, the United States, and Great Britain can handle relatively easily as they have a history of multiculturalism and multiethnic population. Japan, for assorted reasons, has essentially no immigration in comparison: in 2015 there were 9,469 applications for Japanese citizenship approved compared to a population of 127 million. Canada, with a population of about 35 million, averaged almost 11,000 immigrant citizens ''per month'' in 2013 (total of 129,000), the United Kingdom--with a population half that of Japan--had 118,000 new citizens in 2015, and the United States naturalized 653,416 new citizens in 2014. Japan's annual number of new citizens was therefore about 33% less than an average ''week'' in the United States.
This trend, which currently shows no sign of abating, means a greater and greater portion of the Japanese economy is going to have to be devoted for caring for an aging population with fewer younger people to carry that burden, which both reduces the amount of resources Japan could direct to other countries and the population to do it.
This trend, which currently shows no sign of abating, means a greater and greater portion of the Japanese economy is going to have to be devoted for caring for an aging population with fewer younger people to carry that burden, which both reduces the amount of resources Japan could direct to other countries and the population to do it.
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustafinable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for ''a million dollars'' per square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustafinable unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for ''a million dollars'' per square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for ''a million dollars'' per square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable unsustafinable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for ''a million dollars'' per square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
Changed line(s) 5,6 (click to see context) from:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades" (and possibly a third). Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two a "lost decades" (and possibly a third).decade," and some say it still hasn't completely recovered almost 30 years later. Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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This, and the appreciation of the yen by mid-80s started a buying spree of American properties such as Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Columbia Pictures, and the Rockefeller Center, prompting feelings of insecurity especially in America, where Japan was often still remembered as an old foe.
to:
This, and the appreciation of the yen by mid-80s started a Japanese buying spree of American properties such as Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Columbia Pictures, and the Rockefeller Center, prompting feelings of insecurity especially in America, where Japan was often still remembered as an old foe.
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Changed line(s) 3,4 (click to see context) from:
Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades" (and possibly a third). Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
But once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades" (and possibly a third). Banks became zombie institutions, the central bank got stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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None
Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter''[[labelnote:††]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a ''a million dollars dollars'' per ''square meter''[[labelnote:††]] square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
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None
Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter''[[labelnote:†]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter''[[labelnote:†]] meter''[[labelnote:††]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
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None
Changed line(s) 1,7 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming]], who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming]], who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', meter''[[labelnote:†]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen ¥30,000,000 per square meter[[note]]$218,978 meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was more greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lostdecades". decades" (and possibly a third). Banks became zombie banks, institutions, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: death – while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the UnitedStates. (A States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there.) there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming]], who'd Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.Americans'.
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by-- – and thus can could pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.business.
----
Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by
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Changed line(s) 7 (click to see context) from:
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
to:
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
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Wrong word for the concept
Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
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Changed line(s) 1,5 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in WestGermany, but the ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. The American automakers didn't want to have anything to do with them, so they went to Japan. This was how Japan was able to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with China, Russia, and North Korea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in WestGermany, but the ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. The American automakers didn't want to have anything to do with them, so they went to Japan. This was how Japan was able to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with China, Russia, and North Korea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
to:
Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at (At the height of the property bubble bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a two "lost decade" (or two).decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
Is there an issue? Send a MessageReason:
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Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''all the real estate in {{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''all the real estate in {{California}}''.UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
Is there an issue? Send a MessageReason:
None
Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''the entire real estate value of {{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''the entire ''all the real estate value of in {{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
Is there an issue? Send a MessageReason:
None
Changed line(s) 1,2 (click to see context) from:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''the entire real estate value of {{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism".capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism, corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Another major factor is the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WWII. While a burden in the 1950s and 60s, by the 70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, of course, but the Cold War was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. The American automakers didn't want to have anything to do with them, so they went to Japan. This was how Japan was able to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.
Plus, as a bonus, the lucky ol' Japanese government doesn't have to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan worry spend as much on defense as it normally would with China, Russia, and North Korea so close by]] - and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
Plus, as a bonus, the lucky ol' Japanese government doesn't have to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan worry spend as much on defense as it normally would with China, Russia, and North Korea so close by]] - and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
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Plus, as a bonus,
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on loose credit, selling below profit, and *cough* toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and *cough* toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on loose credit, selling below profit, and *cough* toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism". Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on loose credit, selling below profit, and *cough* toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade".decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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Another major factor is the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WWII. While a burden in the 1950s and 60s, by the 70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, of course, but the Cold War was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. The American automakers didn't want to have anything to do with them, so they went to Japan. This was how Japan was able to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans. [[{{Tropers/Unistrut}} This Troper]] studied Operations Management in college.
Plus, as a bonus, the lucky ol' Japanese government doesn't have to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan worry themselves about defense spending]] - and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
Plus, as a bonus, the lucky ol' Japanese government doesn't have to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan worry themselves about defense spending]] - and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
to:
Another major factor is the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WWII. While a burden in the 1950s and 60s, by the 70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, of course, but the Cold War was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. The American automakers didn't want to have anything to do with them, so they went to Japan. This was how Japan was able to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans. [[{{Tropers/Unistrut}} This Troper]] studied Operations Management in college.\n\n
Plus, as a bonus, the lucky ol' Japanese government doesn't have to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan worrythemselves about spend as much on defense spending]] as it normally would with China, Russia, and North Korea so close by]] - and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
Plus, as a bonus, the lucky ol' Japanese government doesn't have to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan worry
