History Analysis / JapanTakesOverTheWorld

22nd Sep '15 3:09:34 PM Soufriere
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The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter''[[labelnote:]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a ''a million dollars dollars'' per ''square meter''[[labelnote:]] square meter[[labelnote:∞]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
22nd Sep '15 2:46:13 PM Soufriere
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The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter''[[labelnote:]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter''[[labelnote:]] meter''[[labelnote:]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30,000,000 per square meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
22nd Sep '15 2:45:37 PM Soufriere
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The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming]], who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans. Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property Property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', meter''[[labelnote:]] (that's $92,903.13 per square foot!)[[/labelnote]]; land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen 30,000,000 per square meter[[note]]$218,978 meter[[note]] ($218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], rate, or $20,343.74 per square foot)[[/note]]; and the value of the Imperial Palace was more greater than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". decades" (and possibly a third). Banks became zombie banks, institutions, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: death while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A States (a similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there.) there). Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming]], who'd Deming,]] who had been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during World War II. The American automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with him, so Deming went to Japan and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans.Americans'. Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can could pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.business. ----
6th Jul '15 10:39:50 AM megarockman
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Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
to:
Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), Force]]) and instead relying on the United States for military muscle via the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yoshida_Doctrine Yoshida Doctrine]] and the [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_the_United_States_and_Japan current Security Treaty]], the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
21st Apr '14 5:35:21 PM AugustDerleth
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Wrong word for the concept
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
to:
The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism corporations and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.
5th Feb '14 5:58:30 PM TheRedRedKroovy
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in WestGermany, but the ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. The American automakers didn't want to have anything to do with them, so they went to Japan. This was how Japan was able to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans. Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with China, Russia, and North Korea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works and government subsidization of business.
to:
Actually, the The Japanese hypergrowth of the 1970s and '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, [[ValuesDissonance but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 meter[[note]]$218,978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while and the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) UsefulNotes/{{California}}''. Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos. A major factor in Japan's boom was the necessity of rebuilding all the infrastructure after WorldWarII.UsefulNotes/WorldWarII. While a burden in the 1950s and '60s, by the '70s the Japanese economy was enjoying the benefits of much newer, more modern factories than the United States. (A similar situation happened in Europe, particularly in WestGermany, UsefulNotes/WestGermany, but the ColdWar UsefulNotes/ColdWar was more of a factor there.) Also, the West put quite a bit of investment into the reconstruction of post-war Japan, particularly during allied-occupation the Allied occupation and the decades that followed. They also got help from several of the men [[http://www.wyohistory.org/encyclopedia/w-edwards-deming W. Edwards Deming]], who'd been responsible for researching major means of improving manufacturing efficiency during WorldWarII. World War II. The American automakers automakers, comfortable with their own profits and confident in their future, didn't want to have anything to do with them, him, so they Deming went to Japan. This was how Japan was able and taught them how to make cars that were both more reliable and cheaper than the Americans. Plus, as a bonus, thanks to [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Japanese_Constitution Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution]] prohibiting Japan from maintaining a military (though it [[LoopholeAbuse never mentioned anything]] about a ''[[InsistentTerminology Self-Defense]]'' [[UsefulNotes/KaijuDefenseForce Force]]), the lucky ol' Japanese government [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_security_of_Japan doesn't have to worry]] about spending as much on defense as it normally would with China, Russia, UsefulNotes/{{China}}, UsefulNotes/{{Russia}}, and North Korea UsefulNotes/NorthKorea so close by -- and thus can pump a lot more money into public works works, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and government subsidization of business.
22nd Dec '13 4:25:22 AM Sen
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza shopping district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
22nd Dec '13 4:24:59 AM Sen
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (At the height of the property bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', land in the Ginza district cost 30 million yen per square meter[[note]]$218.978 at about the 1988 dollar-yen exchange rate[[/note]], while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered two "lost decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
21st Apr '13 5:56:06 PM TheRedRedKroovy
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, a housing bubble, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at (At the height of the property bubble bubble, office space in Tokyo's main business district went for a million dollars per ''square meter'', while the value of Imperial Palace was more than ''all the real estate in UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a two "lost decade" (or two).decades". Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
6th Apr '13 7:31:03 PM EarlOfSandvich
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Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''all the real estate in {{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
to:
Actually, the Japanese hypergrowth of the '80s was built on a system of buddy-buddy relationships between various corporations and the government. At the time, [[ValuesDissonance this system appeared to be a triumph of modern corporatism and state-directed capitalism, but nowadays, we just call it "crony capitalism"]]. Predictably, this created an unsustainable economy [[{{DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything}} [[DoesThisRemindYouOfAnything based on *ahem* loose credit, selling below profit, and toxic loans]]. At its peak, property values became massively overinflated, to the point where prime real-estate in Tokyo could sell for more than the entire [=GDP=] of smaller countries. (The value of Imperial Palace in Tokyo at the height of the property bubble was more than ''all the real estate in {{California}}''.UsefulNotes/{{California}}''.) Once the bubble popped, the economy stagnated, and Japan entered a "lost decade" (or two). Banks became zombie banks, the central bank got its hands stuck in a liquidity trap, and Japanese twenty-somethings faced a fate worse than death: while their fathers had enjoyed lifetime employment at one company, they moved from temp job to temp job, failing to build much in the way of careers. In short, they weren't half as inhuman as the mythos.
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