The General Russia Thread

On March 18, a theatrical production took place in Russia. It involved elaborate stage settings, set designs and a handpicked cast of actors. Among them was the young socialite who held her cards close to her heart; the authoritarian mustached statesman calling for a return to better times of the past; and the ostentatious radical who saw conspiracies everywhere. An underdog character was written out of the script. A well-funded promotional campaign—posters plastered across the country, highly produced television ads, and constant announcements on public transit—ensured a packed house the day of the premiere. Two thirds of the population took advantage of the free transportation to the event, where they were delighted to find free sausages, discounted socks, and raffles for electronics (such as iPhones) that few can afford. The production starred Russia’s most renowned personality, who largely kept out of public view until the main event. The star of the day was, of course, Vladimir Putin and the production was the Russian presidential election. Indeed, the theatrical production that took place on Sunday in Russia was a ritual, akin to a coronation. It resembled a real democratic process in appearance only.

While Sunday’s event in Russia had all the trappings of a normal democratic election, as Masha Gessen has noted, it offered citizens no real choice. These were the most well executed staged nationwide “elections” in Russia’s post-Soviet history. Everything was planned to the last detail; reportedly worried about turnout, the government even organized transportation to the polling stations. The most interesting part of the so-called elections was not the result, which was well-known in advance, but the impressive mobilization capacity displayed by the state to physically get people to polls to cast a meaningless vote in an “election” where the outcome is already known.

One may wonder why the Kremlin needed to go through all the trouble and expend such resources on a fake election. After all, the votes could easily be manipulated by the authorities to deliver the “right” results. But the authorities took extra steps to ensure that there were no surprises. For good measure, there were many instances of brazen ballot stuffing. In addition, 1.5 million votes—or two percent of the total vote—appeared overnight. Millions of additional votes were cast in regions reporting suspiciously round turnout numbers of 85, 90, and 95 percent, leading to allegations of vote rigging by opposition activists. Alexey Navalny, the only independent opposition candidate who posed even a minor threat to Putin, was blocked from running under trumped-up charges. In the lead up to the elections, Navalny called for a countrywide boycott, urging Russians to not legitimate Putin’s rule. So the pressure was on to deliver to Putin the results he wanted: 70 percent of the vote and 70 percent turnout for his 70th birthday, which he will celebrate during his fourth term.

This is because Putin craves legitimacy and acknowledgement. This desire expresses itself in his pursuit for Russia to be treated as an equal partner—a great power—on the world stage, as well as in his desire to be loved by the people. Putin wanted and needed to outdo his own results in the 2012 elections and importantly, Medvedev’s results in the 2008 elections. With 77 percent of the vote and 67 percent turnout—Putin’s new personal best in his eighteen years in power—he essentially got everything he wanted and with very little effort on his part.....

Following his triumph on Sunday, the editor in chief of RT (the Kremlin’s propaganda network) said that Putin was no longer a president but a “vozhd”—a word describing a leader closer to a Tsar or an Emperor, which was once used to describe Stalin. One by one, Western leaders called Putin to congratulate him on his “victory:” German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that he hoped that Moscow and Berlin “will be able to counter alienation” and continue the two countries “trust-based dialogue.” The EU president, Jean-Claude Juncker, wrote in a letter that “our common objective should be to re-establish a cooperative pan-European security order.” And President Trump also called to discuss “shared interests,” apparently against his staff’s advice. Thus, the fake and expensive elections were well worth it: They transformed Putin from president to vozhd and Russia to a Potemkin village—all seemingly with the West’s consent.

A new scandal is adding fuel to the fire of Russian fears about Chinese penetration of Siberia and the Russian Far East. The Russian media in those regions is reporting that in order to sell Russian agricultural products to China—something that benefits both local oligarchs and Moscow—Russian taxpayers are being forced to subsidize the sector. And those taxpayers are reportedly receiving nothing back in return, because what the Chinese are willing to pay is less than the costs Russians incur producing the food (Babr 24.com, March 22, 2018; RBK, November 23, 2017).

Were this a single isolated development, it might not be that significant. But it comes on top of others that have sparked headlines like “The Siberians Feel They are Losing Baikal to China” (Regnum, February 27), “Baikal: Appropriated by Bureaucrats and Seized by China” (Regnum, February 13), and “Russian Only for the Time Being: China Takes Control of Baikal” (Regnum, January 15). Thus, this recent agricultural subsidies scandal could prove to be the straw that broke the camel’s back. Notably, it links Russians’ anger at their own government—as exemplified this week in the furious reaction to official responses to the Kemerovo mall fire disaster (Meduza.io, March 26, 27; The Moscow Times, March 27, 28)—with public concern about what those same officials are allowing or even encouraging China to do on Russian territory.

Chinese involvement in the Transbaikal and adjoining regions is most obvious and has inspired most outrage in three inter-related areas. First is the massive influx of tourists who often behave badly, use only Chinese facilities and so bring little money to Russian firms, and are hated by the local population. Second, Chinese citizens have been buying up land on Lake Baikal that Russians are not allowed to purchase as well as acquiring various Russian companies. All this has been leading to an influx of Chinese permanent residents. And third, the entirely illegal Chinese logging operations in the region are being protected by Russian criminal groups and Russian officials allied with them.

Chinese tourism is what the region’s Russians see most often and are most appalled by. According to a poll conducted jointly by the Lake Baikal Foundation and the NAFI Analysis Center, 79 percent of Russians are concerned about the growth in the number of tourists, workers and businessmen from China; 63 percent say that the Chinese violate Russian environmental protections and other laws more often than tourists from elsewhere; and 59 percent want the government to impose strict limits on this influx of Chinese into their areas (Regnum, February 27). They believe that Moscow has failed to keep its promises to protect Lake Baikal and their rights in its pursuit of money from the Chinese (Regnum, June 15, 2017; June 16, 2017; February 13, 2018; February 16, 2018).

The behavior of the Chinese tourists helps to explain why Russians feel this way. According to local people, Chinese guides tell Chinese tourists that “Baikal is China’s northern sea, that their ancestors used to live there, and that the territory only belongs to Russia for the time being. These guides also reportedly encourage Chinese visitors to buy property and businesses in order to make money over the next decade. Many are doing so, and that constitutes the second challenge residents of the Transbaikal and other Russian regions in the area see (Babr 24.com, January 12; Regnum, December 12, 2017, January 15, 2018).

In the words of one local, there are now so many Chinese businesses that the “Chinese are everywhere. There are thousands of them. Thank goodness there are not millions.” They violate laws with impunity, locals allege; and they flaunt their power: One company even put up a banner declaring that Baikal belonged to the Heavenly Kingdom 200 Years Ago.” Other local people are complaining that China is not sending scholars but “only poorly raised tourists, purchasers of raw materials, renters of enormous territories and purchasers” of everything they can get their hands on (Irk.ru, December 22, 2017).

Meanwhile, in the neighboring Altay region, the Chinese are reportedly engaging in collusion with Russian counterparts in the government and criminal worlds in order to carry out illegal logging operations. The Chinese come through Mongolia and Kazakhstan and thus are often ignored upon entry. But once in the region, they cut down and haul away lumber either from government-controlled lands or from lands of questionable legal provenance in ways that residents can see. This is what China promises Russians, many in those regions feel: the stripping away of Russia’s natural wealth and the sharing of profits with Russians prepared to cooperate with them (Irk.ru, June 20, 2017).

Last year, local Russians were angry. Now, they are furious and have even launched an online petition demanding that the authorities end the illegal Chinese logging operations in the Transbaikal and punish those Russians who have been cooperating with the outsiders. Those behind the petition say that Russian officials have failed to uphold their duty and protect Russia and the rights of Russians (Regnum, December 12, 2017). And it is that linkage between the influx of Chinese and the attitudes of Russians toward their own leaders that is creating a combustible new situation (Regnum, February 6, 2017; November 17, 2017; November 22, 2017)—one that may both feed on and feed into the outraged Russian protests that followed the fire in Kemerovo.