As China Deploys Nuclear Submarines, U.S. P-8 Poseidon Jets Snoop on Them

OKINAWA, Japan—Swooping down to 500 feet over the western Pacific, Cmdr. Bill Pennington pilots his U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft toward an unidentified vessel off southern Japan.

Japanese and Chinese officials are holding informal talks in Beijing this week, in an attempt to forge a framework for managing territorial disputes at sea, particularly around the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands. The meeting is timely, as Japan has sought better overall relations with China in the last few months and the two circle around the topic of whether their two leaders will meet on the sidelines of next month’s APEC summit, also in Beijing. These talks also occur as tensions between the two countries, which had heightened with frequent naval confrontations around the disputed islands, have now eased noticeably.

A Japanese delegation of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, led by former officers of the Air and Marine Self-Defense Forces, are meeting with several Chinese defense specialists on Wednesday and Thursday, “to promote private-sector dialogue aimed at averting accidental armed conflicts,” according to sources who spoke with the Yomiuri Shimbun. While current and former defense officials on both sides will be meeting, the talks are deemed a “private-sector effort,” in an attempt to facilitate the creation of a hotline between official defense authorities. The idea of a hotline, which was resurrected in September, would provide a direct link between Japanese and Chinese military officials in order to clear confusion and facilitate dialogue to contain the kinds of incidents that have occurred around the disputed islands for more than two years now.

A Japanese defense ministry official that spoke with the Yomiuri said that both governments hope to resume talks over the hotline by year’s end, while foundation officials have said “There will be two days of talks in the Chinese capital followed by two more meetings that will be held in Japan or China in the coming months, with a report expected early next year.”

These talks between defense officials are likely to be much more fruitful in terms of improving the tense maritime situation in the East China Sea than any quick meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping at the APEC Summit. The envisioned hotline might also help to prevent further near mid-air collisions between surveillance and fighter aircraft. The two countries’ overlapping Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) have led to several close calls.

The stated timeline for the hotline will also likely occur roughly alongside the expected update to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines, which according to unofficial statements from both sides could now happen as late as next April. If so, then the hotline could prove to be increasingly useful, as Japan is seeking to enhance cooperation, particularly in relation to China’s growing military presence in the East China Sea. If Japan and the U.S. are set to better define and even increase Tokyo’s role in regional defense, then the ability to reach out to China and quickly deescalate unintentional conflict will become paramount.

KMT Party Loses Big in Taiwan

Taiwan’s ruling KMT party was hit hard in a slew of local elections on Saturday. The party lost across the board, and Premier Jiang Yi-huah, head of the Cabinet, announced his resignation in response. The Christian Science Monitor reports.

However the arbitration works, "it won't change the history or the facts of China's sovereignty over the South China Sea islands as well as the adjacent waters," Xu said.

According to Xu Hong, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry’s Department of Treaty and Law, the government decided to release the paper to clear up misperceptions of China’s position. “Some people, who do not know the truth, have questioned China’s position of not accepting or participating in the arbitration. Some others, who harbor ulterior motives, have made … accusations or insinuations that China does not abide by international law,” Xu explained. In response to those criticisms, Xu said, the position paper “debunks the Philippines’ groundless assertions and projects China’s image as a defender and promoter of the international rule of law.”

The crux of the matter is that China does not believe that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the case. More broadly, China rejects the notion that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) can be used to decide South China Sea sovereignty issues, which Beijing maintains is at the heart of the Philippine case. “To decide upon any of the Philippines’ claims, the Arbitral Tribunal would inevitably have to determine, directly or indirectly, the issue of territorial sovereignty over both the maritime features in question and other maritime features in the South China Sea… The issue of territorial sovereignty falls beyond the purview of the Convention,” China’s position paper concludes. One of the first things the tribunal will have to decide is, in fact, whether it has the jurisdiction to consider the case at all. China has just made clear its position: that the case should not be allowed to move forward.

The position paper then responds to the core points of the Philippine case: that China’s claim of “historic rights” is inconsistent with UNCLOS and that China’s claims to waters surrounding maritime features exceeds the 200 nautical mile limit set by UNCLOS. China responded by saying that the underlying issue of sovereignty must be solved first. “Only after the extent of China’s territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on the extent of China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea,” the paper argues. In other words, before UNCLOS or other international bodies can address the issue of maritime claims, China and other disputants have to work out who owns what.

China also points out that back in 2006 it officially declared that it does not accept the compulsory settlement procedures provided for by UNCLOS, including those dealing with maritime delimitation. Since the Philippine case is effectively asking the tribunal to rule on whether or not the disputed areas belong to the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf, the tribunal’s decision is inevitably tied up with the process of maritime delimitation. Even if the tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on the case, China maintains it would be under no obligation to accept the ruling. “By initiating the present compulsory arbitration as an attempt to circumvent China’s 2006 declaration, the Philippines is abusing the dispute settlement procedures under the Convention,” the position paper states.

Finally, China claims that, by filing its case with the arbitral tribunal, the Philippines is violating an existing agreement to settle the South China Sea dispute through negotiations with China. “The Philippines is debarred from unilaterally initiating compulsory arbitration,” China argues, citing both unspecified bilateral agreements and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by China and the ASEAN member states in 2002. Accordingly, China claims that the Philippine case is not a goodwill effort to peacefully solve the South China Sea issue, but an attempt “to put political pressure on China.”

China’s position paper concludes:

The unilateral initiation of the present arbitration by the Philippines will not change the history and fact of China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters; nor will it shake China’s resolve and determination to safeguard its sovereignty and relevant maritime rights and interests; nor will it affect China’s policy and position of resolving the disputes in the South China Sea by direct negotiation and working together with other States in the region to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.