Community consultations for Australia’s 2016 Defense White Paper hit the nail on the head: Australia has publicly taken a “stand” but not taken a “side” in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

That’s not to say the issue is not of core national interest. All three of the stated Strategic Defense Interests in the 2016 white paper that “drive Australia’s defense strategy” relate to the South China Sea: a secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication; a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; and, a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.

These drivers of Australia’s defense strategy haven’t shifted on the South China Sea. Indeed, they have for more than half a century remained incredibly consistent.

Handwritten, often illegible, pre-1959 filings from the Department of External Affairs (a forerunner to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) offer one of the first Australian accounts of concern over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The declassified memos and documents, many marked Secret, record Australia’s strategic concern over the islands and reveal Canberra’s long-running desire to see a peaceful resolution to the disputes. Among the documents is a briefing on the military significance of the disputed islands from Australia’s Joint Intelligence Committee in 1959. It read:

On 27th April 1950, in connection with the formation of a draft peace treaty with Japan, the Defense Committee agreed that it was in Australia’s strategic interests to work for U.S. Trusteeship of the Spratly Islands. In fact, the Peace Treaty left the question of sovereignty unsettled.

It continued:

In May 1950, Australia was concerned, for strategic reasons, that the Spratly Islands might fall into Chinese Communist hands. In an attempt to forestall this, the United Kingdom was sounded out about accepting trusteeship of the islands. The United Kingdom replied that they would probably be unwilling to do anything which would embarrass them in relations with the Communist Chinese. They foresaw the danger their occupation of the islands might be resisted.

The briefing demonstrated a clarity on the strategic importance of the islands and potential avenues for resolution. Australia’s eagerness for the U.K., which has a sound basis as a potential claimant of the Spratly Islands (outlined here), to take an active role in trusteeship of the islands fell on deaf ears. Instead the U.K. deflected, suggesting instead that France may be better placed in their claim given they had not yet recognized China.

Yet more prophetically the briefing noted that:

If, in the longer term, the Communist Chinese were to develop the islands militarily, they could make a nuisance out of themselves on the international shipping and air routes on the pretext of infringements of territorial waters and air space and might even shoot down an aircraft occasionally. Again, there is little the West is likely to do, except protest.

The briefing showed a depth of thought on the South China Sea far exceeding the small-Australia views of the day. This “nuisance” factor was explained further, with the briefing suggesting the possible construction of airfields, radar and radio intercept stations, as well as surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles on the islands, but the document questioned the efficacy of such new facilities.

The 1959 Australian declassified document noted:

Although it would be possible to build airfields on the larger islands, these would only be of limited value because of restrictions on the length of runways (maximum length would be about 5000’ on Itu Aba) and the direction of the prevailing winds. However, looking further ahead to vertical take-off fighters and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles the islands could become more useful, provided, of course, the occupying power was able to guarantee adequate logistic support.

And continues:

If air warning radars or radio intercept stations were erected in the Paracels it would extend considerably the cover which the Communist Chinese now enjoy from stations on Hainan and in North Vietnam. Bases in those islands would probably also have similar advantage to the West.

In conclusion, it noted:

Provided the United States maintains its present air and sea supremacy in the area, it could, if it wished, quickly neutralize any Communist Chinese Military bases on the islands.

After the briefing had been circulated in Australia’s policy community, the briefing was forwarded to the Australian Embassy in Washington for discussion with the U.S. State Department. The response from U.S. officials left a lot to be desired. A cable (SAV.489; Secret; 30th August 1959) from the Australian Embassy quoted the Deputy Director of Chinese Affairs as saying that on the island disputes in the South China Sea, the “United States policy was one of ‘let sleeping dogs lie’.” As a scribbled note from an Australian official on an archived copy of the cable recorded, “Politically, this is not a very satisfactory outcome.”

The National Archives of Australia also catalog intelligence sharing on the disputed islands between Canberra and London from the same period. Australia’s prescient analysis on the disputes fell on deaf ears there, as well as in Washington. Almost 60 years later, and now faced with China-the-superpower instead of China-the-minnow, the document reads as if a blueprint for China’s development of the islands. For Canberra, the briefing demonstrates a long-held concern over the South China Sea.

Indeed, much of what is documented in the archives is relevant today. In recent years this hesitancy to speak plainly on the disputes has given way to greater confidence and direct statement of Australia’s interests, as seen progressively in Defense White Papers from 1994 until 2016. Even before then, the 1987 Defense White Paper explicitly noted the routine nature of surveillance over the South China Sea by RAAF Orion aircraft. “Australia will also continue to… operate Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft from Butterworth to maintain surveillance over the South China Sea,” It says. Overflights continue today with RAAF AP-3C Orion surveillance aircraft.

This consistent policy position demonstrates the central national interest of the South China Sea for Australian foreign and economic policy. The previous “let sleeping dogs lie” approach should be a prompt for today’s decision makers to engage deeply with all parties on the issue, while continuing to conduct routine operations in and above the South China Sea. If this falters, the outcome will be very unsatisfactory indeed.

Indonesia renamed the northern reaches of its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea as the North Natuna Sea on Friday, the latest act of resistance by Southeast Asian nations to China's territorial ambitions in the maritime region.

Seen by analysts as an assertion of Indonesian sovereignty, part of the renamed sea is claimed by China under its contentious maritime boundary, known as the 'nine-dash line', that encompasses most of the resource-rich sea.

Several Southeast Asian states dispute China's territorial claims and are competing with China to exploit the South China Sea's abundant hydrocarbon and fishing resources. China has raised the ante by deploying military assets on artificial islands constructed on shoals and reefs in disputed parts of the sea.

Indonesia insists it's a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute but has clashed with China over fishing rights around the Natuna Islands, detaining Chinese fishermen and expanding its military presence in the area over the past 18 months.

Unveiling the new official map, the deputy of maritime sovereignty at the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Arif Havas Oegroseno, noted the northern side of its exclusive economic zone was the site of oil and gas activity.

"We want to update the naming of the sea [and] we gave a new name in line with the usual practice: the North Natuna Sea," he told reporters.

In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said he didn't know anything about the details of the issue, but said the name South China Sea had broad international recognition and clear geographic limits.

"Certain countries' so-called renaming is totally meaningless," he told a daily news briefing. "We hope the relevant country can meet China halfway and properly maintain the present good situation in the South China Sea region, which has not come easily."

More than 100 Chinese tourists took part in a flag-raising ceremony on one of the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, according to mainland media.

The gathering took place over the weekend on Yagong Island, located between Vietnam’s northeast coast and Hainan Island, China’s southernmost province, Shanghai-based news site Thepaper.cn reported on Monday.

Video footage of the ceremony shows a group of Chinese visitors carrying flags and singing along to the Chinese national anthem, and chanting nationalistic slogans such as “long live China”.

“Here I feel that we look very dignified and solemn, because it is the motherland’s most southern point. I have always felt in my heart that I would come to this place,” tourist Deng Runping told the news website.

“Finally my dream was fulfilled, and I feel very proud to be standing here looking at the Chinese flag.”

The tiny island, known in Vietnam as Dao Ba Ba, has an area of just 1 hectare. It was occupied by China after a battle with South Vietnam in 1974 and has a population under 100, mostly fishermen.

In recent years, China has ramped up efforts to increase its presence on the Paracel archipelago, which is also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. China tries to strengthen navy in face of growing US challenge to South China Sea claims

Beijing’s island building in the South China Sea, which includes adding military fortifications in the Paracels and Spratlys, has also caused international concern. In May, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a US think tank, said satellite images showed China had deployed new military weapon platforms to Woody Island, the largest of the Paracels.

China shipped over more than 100 tonnes of soil, 200 tonnes of fresh water and 400 trees to Yagong Island in 2013 as part of its “green transformation” to make the Paracel chain more habitable. Beijing is also trying to make Yagong Island a patriotic tourist destination and, also in 2013, set up a regular cruise line from Sanya in Hainan bringing tourists and groceries to the island.

The Paracels are surrounded by productive fishing grounds as well as potential oil and gas reserves.

Adam Ni, a policy researcher at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, said the flag-raising ceremony would likely fuel nationalistic sentiment in China.

“They clearly had tacit support from the Chinese government. Chinese state media is likely to use this material for nationalistic propaganda,” Ni said. “The Chinese government, by stoking nationalism, can put itself into a better negotiating position on international disputes, such as in the South China Sea.” South China Sea rivalries may be played out at disputed Mischief Reef, observers say

But Greg Raymond, also from the ANU centre, did not see the ceremony as particularly provocative given that the Paracels have been controlled by China for some time.

“When looking at the backdrop of China developing the islands, installing garrisons and troop facilities, these are already a potent expression of ownership and nationalism,” he said.

Patriot force halfway thru major modernization

FORT SILL, Okla. — The Army's Patriot Air Defense battalions are upgrading their fire-control computers, communications, radars and operator interfaces while adding more capable missiles in a refit that is scheduled to continue through 2021.

"Right now we're conducting the most significant Patriot modernization since the early 1990s," said Col. Mark A. Holler, commandant of the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Sill.

About 25 years ago, units began receiving Patriot Advanced Capability 3 — or PAC-3 — missiles combined with an overhaul to command and control systems and related software.

Upgrading again, the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement — or MSE missiles — fielded a few years ago brought extended range and more maneuverability due to a more powerful rocket motor and larger fins. However, radar limitations prevented utilizing PAC-3 MSE missiles to their full capability.

Now Patriot units are undergoing a system-wide upgrade, to include radar improvements that will enable them to use the full capability of the PAC-3 MSE missile.

CONFIG 3+/PDB 8

BEIJING (Reuters) - China's defence minister said on Monday that resolving the "Taiwan question" is his country's "greatest national interest," and that no force could prevent China's "reunification."

Separatist activities are doomed to failure, Defence Minister Wei Fenghe said at the opening in Beijing of the Xiangshan Forum, which China styles as its answer to the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore.

Tensions between China and Taiwan have ratcheted up ahead of the self-ruled island's presidential election in January. Taiwan is China's most sensitive territorial issue.

"China is the only major country in the world that is yet to be completely reunified," Wei said.

"Resolving the Taiwan question so as to realise China's full reunification is the irresistible trend of the times, China's greatest national interest, the righteous path to follow and the longing of all Chinese people."

Proudly democratic Taiwan has lambasted China for its authoritarian rule and for being a threat to regional peace, while China has heaped pressure on Taiwan, whittling away at its few remaining diplomatic allies.

China regards Taiwan as its sacred territory, to be brought under Beijing's rule, by force if needed, a message President Xi Jinping reiterated at the start of this year.

China translates the word "tong yi" as "reunification," but it can also be translated as "unification," a term in English preferred by supporters of Taiwan independence who point out that Beijing's Communist government has never ruled Taiwan and so it cannot be "reunified."

Defeated Nationalist forces fled to Taiwan in 1949 at the end of a civil war with the Communists. The People's Republic of China has never governed Taiwan, whose people have shown little interest in being ruled by autocratic Beijing.

China has also been angered by U.S. support for Taiwan, including arms sales. Washington has no formal ties with Taipei, but is bound by law to provide the island with the means to defend itself.

The U.S. and China are also locked in a bitter trade war, though they have been holding talks to end it.

"No one and no force can ever stop China's full reunification. We are committed to promoting the peaceful development of cross-Taiwan strait relations and the peaceful reunification of the country," Wei said.

"However we will never allow separatists for Taiwan independence to have their way, nor allow interference by any external forces. Advancing china's reunification is a just cause, while separatist activities are doomed to failure."

The United States has also angered China by repeatedly conducting what it calls "freedom of navigation" operations by naval ships close to islands China occupies in the South China Sea.

China claims almost all the energy-rich waters of the South China Sea, but neighbours Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims.

"The South China Sea islands and Diaoyu islands are inalienable parts of China's territory. We will not allow even an inch of territory that our ancestors have left to us to be taken away," Wei said.

Chinese law would allow coast guard to fire on foreign vessels in its waters

The China Coast Guard would be allowed to use weapons against foreign ships in its waters under a proposed revision to its maritime police law, according to a translated version of the document.

China’s National People’s Congress last month drafted the revised law, which has yet to be enacted, according to a Wednesday report by the Chinese legislation blog NPC Observer.

The coast guard would be authorized to use weapons “in the case of unlawful infringement by a national organization or individual,” according to the translated draft. It also O Ks “all necessary measures to stop the infringement and eliminate the danger on the spot.”

Beijing has spent years turning islands and reefs in the South China Sea into military bases and airstrips — but such territory could be vulnerable to attack and nigh indefensible in the event of war, a new report has warned.

The bases are "lonely in the distant sea," and far from both the Chinese mainland and other islands in the vast disputed waters, which span some 3.3 million square kilometers (1.3 million square miles), said Naval and Merchant Ships, a Beijing-based magazine published by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, which supplies the People's Liberation Army.

Under international law, whoever owns the contested string of islands in the sea will have the rights to all the resources in its nearby waters like fish, oil, and gas. More broadly, whoever controls this sea will also hold power over one of the world's most valuable trading routes — it hosts a third of all global shipping.

But while the distant bases expand Beijing's control over the area, they are also far from any help in the event of military action. Naval and Merchant Ships gave the example of Fiery Cross Reef, which is 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Sanya, a city on Hainan island, just off the southern Chinese coast, and 800 kilometers (500 miles) from the Paracel Islands, also controlled by Beijing. "Even if the support fleet rushes at the fastest speed, it will take more than a day to reach it," the report noted.

While some islands are equipped with air strips, coverage across the sea is limited, and most jet fighters that could be deployed would struggle to reach another island quickly enough to be effective, expending most of their fuel in flying the long distances between bases. Beijing currently has two aircraft carriers in operation, which could in theory be deployed to the South China Sea, but they too would have to be in range at the time of any incident.

The bases, the report added, are highly vulnerable to ambush, given their remote locations, and could be targeted by both US and Japanese long-range missile systems, or by naval forces in the region. And even were the islands themselves not attacked, they would be simple to blockade, starving forces of their supplies.

"Island shelters lack vegetation, natural rock and soil and other coverings, and the altitude is low, while the groundwater level is high. Personnel and resources cannot be stored underground for a long time," the report said, adding that any shelters built on the bases would have "very limited" anti-strike capabilities.

Of course, Beijing may rely on the fact that any attack against a base in the South China Sea — even an outpost considered illegal under international law — would be tantamount to an act of war against a nuclear power with vast military resources. The threat of Chinese retaliation may be sufficient to prevent the island bases from facing any attack.