History YMMV / SuperBowl

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really. The immediate situation favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed, but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock. The Seahawks did not hurry to the new line of scrimmage, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a delay-of-game penalty. It was crucial that they not use their last one on this drive because, if they scored, the clock would have stopped, giving the Patriots anywhere between thirty and sixty seconds to get back into field goal range to tie the game. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit[[note]]this is the one link in the chain that probably ''can'' be considered a mistake regardless of the rest[[/note]]: they ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down, hoping to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using one of his two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel. When Belichick didn't react as expected, they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making: they could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run. They could call the run anyway, but with so little time, they had to score at all costs – the time it would take to disengage from the scrum, mark the spot, get set, and call another play would probably use up everything left. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy – an incompletion stops the clock, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

*** Hindsight will probably point to the latter, given the Falcons' growing reputation as "Chokelanta" in the years since, with an actual 28-3 lead being among MANY that Atlanta threw away in 2020 alone. However, it's also possible that it's the other way around -- that the ShockingDefeatLegacy of this Super Bowl rattled the team so hard that they can't seem to get rid of the yips of having "28-3" in their heads every time they have a lead (even in the many games where they've choked since then, there were moments where they regained the lead in more games than not); on the side of the win being New England's heroics rather than Atlanta's failure, Brady had to play essentially flawless football to come anywhere within reach of a tie, let alone a win, setting records for passing efficiency and yards, and if a lesser signal caller had been called to the task for New England, this would have been a commanding Atlanta win.

*** Hindsight will probably point to the latter, given the Falcons' growing reputation as Chokelanta in the years since, with an actual 28-3 lead being among MANY that Atlanta threw away in 2020 alone.
*** It's possible that the ShockingDefeatLegacy of this Super Bowl rattled the team so hard that they can't seem to get rid of the yips of having "28-3" in their heads every time they have a lead. Even in games in 2020 where they've choked, there were moments where they regained the lead. Brady had to play essentially flawless football to come anywhere within reach of a tie, let alone a win, setting records for passing efficiency and yards, and if a lesser signal caller had been called to the task for New England, this would have been a commanding Atlanta win.

** Super Bowl XXXI: Packers QB Brett Favre and DE Reggie White both set Super Bowl records (Favre for the longest touchdown pass, White for the most sacks by a single player) and would likely have battled it out for Super Bowl MVP if not for the heroics of special teams returner Desmond Howard, who clinched the award over both of them with his 99-yard kick return touchdown.

** "Marshawn Lynch was a dominant goal line running back." This is not supported by contemporary data. In 2014, the league average success rate of running plays from the 1-yard line was 57% -- 61 of 105 such plays. Lynch's personal hit rate was 20%, 1 for 5, while the Seahawks as a whole only scored in 2 for 6 – 33%. That sixth rush was by Russell Wilson, successful in his only attempt. The rushing game at the goal line ran through Beast Mode and it wasn't great. This also wasn't just a down year. From 2012 to 2014, Lynch scored on 5 of 12 rushes, 41%, compared to the league average of 57.8%. He represented 17 of 23 such rushes by the Seahawks as a whole, which had a similar scoring percentage to him. Had the player in question been a lesser known running back with comparable record on goal line runs, no one would question Seattle's decision to rely on Russell Wilson and the passing game rather than said running back, but because of Lynch's reputation as a dominant running back (which he was ''in general'', but not for this particular type of situation), many people were (and remain) convinced that handing the ball off to Lynch would have been a virtually guaranteed touchdown.

** "Marshawn Lynch was a dominant goal line running back." This is not supported by contemporary data. In 2014, the league average success rate of running plays from the 1-yard line was 57% -- 61 of 105 such plays. Lynch's personal hit rate was 20%, 1 for 5, while the Seahawks as a whole only scored in 2 for 6 – 33%. That sixth rush was by Russell Wilson, successful in his only attempt. The rushing game at the goal line ran through Beast Mode and it wasn't great. This also wasn't just a down year. From 2012 to 2014, Lynch scored on 5 of 12 rushes, 41%, compared to the league average of 57.8%. He represented 17 of 23 such rushes by the Seahawks as a whole, which had a similar scoring percentage to him.[[note]]Now, there's no question that Lynch was a dominant running back ''in general'', but his strength was making plays in the open field where he had more space to work with (like his famous "Beast Quake" run in the 2010 playoffs), as opposed to the short "punch it in" runs right on the goal line that would have been needed in this case.[[/note]]

* WhatAnIdiot: In XXXI, the Patriots are down 21-35 against the Packers late in the third quarter. To allow their tight end Ben Coates to get open quicker, they leave offensive tackle Max Lane one-on-one against perennial All-Pro defensive end Reggie White, a player who has to be double-teamed every single snap (and could still make plays while double-teamed). The result is that Patriots quarterback Drew Bledsoe is sacked three times by White, including a sack late in the fourth quarter, one of two plays that seal the game for the Packers.

* BestKnownForTheFanservice: Among football fans, Super Bowl XXXVIII is often considered to be one of the greatest Super Bowls ever, a thrilling match-up that came down to a field goal. Among non-fans, it will always be remembered as "the game where Music/JanetJackson [[WardrobeMalfunction flashed her nipple]]."

** Was Super Bowl LIII an old school defensive showdown between the New England Patriots and the Los Angeles Rams, or were both teams alternating the IdiotBall, with the Patriots merely making fewer mistakes than the Rams? This depends on how much you value defensive football. Seeing a 3-3 game well into the fourth quarter is a major culture shock for young fans used to prolific scoring, but is old hat for older fans from an earlier era. What can be said is that Bill Belichick devised a game plan that kept the NFC's highest scoring offense out of the red zone for the entirety of the game, and Tom Brady, despite playing an altogether middling win on offense compared to his electric performance in his previous three appearances, still built a convincing win past a defense headlined by the reigning Defensive Player of the Year.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really. The immediate situation favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch (worth noting this was entirely intentional on the part of the Patriots, who deliberately set their defense to make a run nearly impossible in order to ''force'' Seattle to pass). Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed, but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock. The Seahawks did not hurry to the new line of scrimmage, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a delay-of-game penalty. It was crucial that they not use their last one on this drive because, if they scored, the clock would have stopped, giving the Patriots anywhere between thirty and sixty seconds to get back into field goal range to tie the game. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit. They ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down. By doing so, they hoped to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using of the Pats’ two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel. Now they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making because Belichick wasn’t biting. They could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run. They could call the run anyway, but with so little time, they had to score at all costs – the time it would take to disengage from the scrum, mark the spot, get set, and call another play would probably use up everything left. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy – an incompletion stops the clock, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.
** “The throw was bad[=/=]the interception was easy.” A matter of opinion, but unsupported by the game itself. Firstly, the actual pass was right on the mark and delivered into a window that was not covered by any Patriot defender. If there's anything to criticize, it's that he didn't angle the throw downward to the receiver's waist, which made the ball hang in the air longer than it should have. In addition, defending this play was a feature of Patriots practices leading up to the Super Bowl because Patriots football guru Ernie Adams noticed that they liked to use it a lot – but in each instance, Butler failed to defend it because the receiver would gain outside leverage over him. During the Super Bowl, it was not just Butler, but also Brandon Browner, a former Seahawk, making the correct read that blew it up. Butler’s man was actually Jermaine Kearse, but diagnosing the play at the line, Browner told Butler to defend the inside of the goal line against Ricardo Lockette. Browner, in turn, jammed Kearse at the goal line. This did two things. First, it deprived Wilson of his second read, so the pass would go to Lockette or be thrown away. Secondly, it boxed Lockette into running an interior route because if he moved outside, the pass would have to float directly over Browner’s head. This is the red-flag throw that should be avoided. He ran inside, and Butler shadowed him, but the timing had to be perfect or else Lockette would have had enough of a window to catch the ball in traffic and break the plane of the endzone. That this defensive stand resulted in an interception required precise timing and communication on the part of the Patriots, and two cornerbacks independently making the correct read. This one is especially tough to break down because our understanding of the process is so deeply tied to the outcome, but that doesn't mean it was a thoughtless throw. Additionally, even if it ''was'' a bad throw, that's a separate issue from the question of whether the play ''call'' was bad -- pretty much any play call has a risk of backfiring if the play is poorly executed, so unless the coach has reason to expect that the execution will be poor (which was not the case for Seattle here), a failure doesn't necessarily mean the underlying call was bad -- but the two are often lumped together as if it was all a single question.

** "The passing play was riskier than the run." Again, this is an unsupported statement. While the Seahawks' goal line passing was anemic -- 1 for 2 in 2014 and 3 for 8 in 2012-2014 -- none of the failures were interceptions. Moreover, the pass play they ran in XLIX had been previously completed 109 times consecutively, at various points in the red zone, without an interception. On the other side of the ball, the Patriots were more vulnerable to the goal line pass than the goal line rush, giving up scores on 3 of 4 passes at the 1-yard line and 11 of 18 runs. Now, factor in the fact that Seattle's ground game ran through a powerback who was low percentage at the goal line, and you can build a case for the pass.

** “The throw was bad[=/=]the interception was easy.” A matter of opinion, but unsupported by the game itself. Firstly, the actual pass was right on the mark and delivered into a window that was not covered by any Patriot defender. If there's anything to criticize, it's that he didn't angle the throw downward to the receiver's waist, which made the ball hang in the air longer than it should have. In addition, defending this play was a feature of Patriots practices leading up to the Super Bowl because Patriots football guru Ernie Adams noticed that they liked to use it a lot – but in each instance, Butler failed to defend it because the receiver would gain outside leverage over him. During the Super Bowl, it was not just Butler, but also Brandon Browner, a former Seahawk, making the correct read that blew it up. Butler’s man was actually Jermaine Kearse, but diagnosing the play at the line, Browner told Butler to defend the inside of the goal line against Ricardo Lockette. Browner, in turn, jammed Kearse at the goal line. This did two things. First, it deprived Wilson of his second read, so the pass would go to Lockette or be thrown away. Secondly, it boxed Lockette into running an interior route because if he moved outside, the pass would have to float directly over Browner’s head. This is the red-flag throw that should be avoided. He ran inside, and Butler shadowed him, but the timing had to be perfect or else Lockette would have had enough of a window to catch the ball in traffic and break the plane of the endzone. That this defensive stand resulted in an interception required precise timing and communication on the part of the Patriots, and two cornerbacks independently making the correct read. This one is especially tough to break down because our understanding of the process is so deeply tied to the outcome, but that doesn't mean it was a thoughtless throw.

** "Marshawn Lynch was a dominant goal line running back." This is not supported by contemporary data. In 2014, the league average success rate of running plays from the 1-yard line was 57% -- 61 of 105 such plays. Lynch's personal hit rate was 20%, 1 for 5, while the Seahawks as a whole only scored in 2 for 6 – 33%. That sixth rush was by Russell Wilson, successful in his only attempt. The rushing game at the goal line ran through Beast Mode and it wasn't great. This also wasn't just a down year. From 2012 to 2014, Lynch scored on 5 of 12 rushes, 41%, compared to the league average of 57.8%. He represented 17 of 23 such rushes by the Seahawks as a whole, which had a similar scoring percentage to him.[[note]]Now, there's no question that Lynch was a dominant running back ''in general'', but his strength was making plays in the open field, where he had more space to work with (like his famous "Beast Quake" run in the 2010 playoffs), as opposed to the short "punch it in" runs right on the goal line.[[/note]]

** "Marshawn Lynch was a dominant goal line running back." This is not supported by contemporary data. In 2014, the league average success rate of running plays from the 1-yard line was 57% -- 61 of 105 such plays. Lynch's personal hit rate was 20%, 1 for 5, while the Seahawks as a whole only scored in 2 for 6 – 33%. That sixth rush was by Russell Wilson, successful in his only attempt. The rushing game at the goal line ran through Beast Mode and it wasn't great. This also wasn't just a down year. From 2012 to 2014, Lynch scored on 5 of 12 rushes, 41%, compared to the league average of 57.8%. He represented 17 of 23 such rushes by the Seahawks as a whole, which had a similar scoring percentage to him.[[note]]Now, there's no question that Lynch was a dominant running back ''in general'', but he tended to be better at making plays when he had more space to work with (like his famous "Beast Quake" run in the 2010 playoffs) as opposed to the short "punch it in" runs right on the goal line.[[/note]]

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really. The immediate situation favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense (it's worth noting here that the Patriots knew exactly what they were doing and were trying to force). Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch. Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed, but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock. The Seahawks did not hurry to the new line of scrimmage, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a delay-of-game penalty. It was crucial that they not use their last one on this drive because, if they scored, the clock would have stopped, giving the Patriots anywhere between thirty and sixty seconds to get back into field goal range to tie the game. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit. They ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down. By doing so, they hoped to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using of the Pats’ two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel. Now they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making because Belichick wasn’t biting. They could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run. They could call the run anyway, but with so little time, they had to score at all costs – the time it would take to disengage from the scrum, mark the spot, get set, and call another play would probably use up everything left. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy – an incompletion stops the clock, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably [[IdiotBall the worst play call in history]], or did they make a reasonable decision and just get blindsided by the Patriots' defense? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots' defensive play calling was specifically designed to make a pass the only reasonable option. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** "Marshawn Lynch was a dominant goal line running back." This is not supported by contemporary data. In 2014, the league average success rate of running plays from the 1-yard line was 57% -- 61 of 105 such plays. Lynch's personal hit rate was 20%, 1 for 5, while the Seahawks as a whole only scored in 2 for 6 – 33%. That sixth rush was by Russell Wilson, successful in his only attempt. The rushing game at the goal line ran through Beast Mode and it wasn't great. This also wasn't just a down year. From 2012 to 2014, Lynch scored on 5 of 12 rushes, 41%, compared to the league average of 57.8%. He represented 17 of 23 such rushes by the Seahawks as a whole, which had a similar scoring percentage to him.

** "The situation favored the run." Well, not really. The immediate situation favored the pass. Seattle had its passing offense on the field, matched against a Patriots goal line heavy run defense. Running the ball would have created a blocking mismatch. Now, it can be argued that the positional mismatch didn’t really matter and that repeatedly hammering Beast Mode would have gotten them the yard they needed, but they were also short of time. Kearse was pushed out of bounds after his amazing catch, but that only stops the game clock and not the play clock. The Seahawks did not hurry to the new line of scrimmage, and therefore had to use one of their two remaining time-outs just to avoid a delay-of-game penalty. It was crucial that they not use their last one on this drive because, if they scored, the clock would have stopped, giving the Patriots anywhere between thirty and sixty seconds to get back into field goal range to tie the game. At this point, the Seahawks attempted a BatmanGambit. They ran a run play that got them to the 1-yard line and deliberately let the clock run down. By doing so, they hoped to bait Patriots head coach Bill Belichick into using of the Pats’ two remaining time-outs to stop the clock, which in turn would give the Seahawks time to swap out players for goal line running personnel. Now they were stuck in a dilemma of their own making because Belichick wasn’t biting. They could use their time out, but then that would show their hand and Belichick would know it was a run. They could call the run anyway, but with so little time, they had to score at all costs – the time it would take to disengage from the scrum, mark the spot, get set, and call another play would probably use up everything left. The pass seemed like the obvious remedy – an incompletion stops the clock, the specific play they called up had a very high success rate, it would take advantage of a defensive mismatch in personnel, and it did not rely on Lynch suddenly becoming good at goal-line running.

** “The throw was bad[=/=]the interception was easy.” A matter of opinion, but unsupported by the game itself. Firstly, the actual pass was right on the mark and delivered into a window that was not covered by any Patriot defender. If there's anything to criticize, it's that he didn't angle the throw downward to the receiver's waist, which made the ball hang in the air longer than it could have. In addition, defending this play was a feature of Patriots practices leading up to the Super Bowl because Patriots football guru Ernie Adams noticed that they liked to use it a lot – but in each instance, Butler failed to defend it because the receiver would gain outside leverage over him. During the Super Bowl, it was not just Butler, but also Brandon Browner, a former Seahawk, making the correct read that blew it up. Butler’s man was actually Jermaine Kearse, but diagnosing the play at the line, Browner told Butler to defend the inside of the goal line against Ricardo Lockette. Browner, in turn, jammed Kearse at the goal line. This did two things. First, it deprived Wilson of his second read, so the pass would go to Kearse or be thrown away. Secondly, it boxed Lockette into running an interior route because if he moved outside, the pass would have to go directly over Browner’s head. He ran inside, and Butler shadowed him, but the timing had to be perfect or else Lockette would have had enough of a window to catch the ball in traffic and break the plane of the endzone. That this defensive stand resulted in an interception required precise timing and communication on the part of the Patriots, and two cornerbacks independently making the correct read.

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably [[IdiotBall the worst play call in history]], or was it a reasonable call and they just got outplayed by the Patriots' defense? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots' defensive play calling was specifically designed to make a pass the only reasonable option. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably the worst play call in history, or did they just get blindsided by a superb defensive play? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots' defensive play calling was specifically designed to make a pass the only reasonable option. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably the worst play call in history, or did they just get blindsided by a superb defensive play? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots had intentionally set things up so that the Seahawks would have no choice but to pass. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably the worst play call in history, or did they just get blindsided by a superb defensive play? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots defense was intentionally putting the Seahawks in a position where a run would clearly go nowhere in order to force them to pass. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably the worst play call in history, or did they just get blindsided by a superb defensive play? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots defense was intentionally putting the Seahawks in a position where a run would clearly go nowhere. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably the worst play call in history, or did they just get blindsided by a superb defensive play? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and/or superior play by the Patriots' defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions, and that the Patriots defense was intentionally putting the Seahawks in a position where a pass was the only realistic option. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Was the key play that cost the Seattle Seahawks a victory in Super Bowl XLIX arguably the worst play call in history, or did they just get blindsided by a superb defensive play? More than five years removed from the moment, it's still a contentious debate. Those who blame the play calling are sure to bring up the fact that Seattle had one of the most dominant running backs in the league in Marshawn Lynch, and therefore had no business running a pass play instead of a run; those who feel it was just bad luck and a good opposing defense will point out that for all he was dominant in general, Lynch was one for five on one-yard touchdown attempts, that Seattle didn't have their run blockers on the field, and that 108 comparable plays had been run in the preceding season and none of them resulted in interceptions. (Although both sides will agree that Russell Wilson's short throw contributed to the outcome.)

** Super Bowl LIII's halftime show was infamous for multiple reasons. Music/JayZ, Music/CardiB, and Music/{{Rihanna}} reportedly declined to headline the show in solidarity with Colin Kaepernick, who accused the NFL of blacklisting him over his kneeling during the national anthem in protest of police brutality. This lead to the artists that did perform being compared to strikebreakers and a petition for headline act Music/Maroon5 to drop out of the show. Then there was the outrage that ensued from ''WesternAnimation/SpongeBobSquarePants'' fans when "Sicko Mode" by Music/TravisScott was played instead of "Sweet Victory" from the fan favorite episode ''[[Recap/SpongeBobSquarePantsS2E15TheSecretBoxBandGeeks Band Geeks]]'' as a tribute to the show's recently deceased creator Stephen Hillenburg, even after implying that it was going to be played by showing an animation of Squidward introducing it beforehand! These seem to be the only thing anyone remembers about not just that halftime show, but [[UpToEleven that entire Super Bowl]]!