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TRS cleanup: Would've been valid, if it weren't for NRLEP.
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The Soviet boomers had two differences to UsefulNotes/{{NATO}} ones. One, [[HellIsThatNoise they were noisier]]. Two, after the arrival of the "Delta" class, they had considerably more range. This meant that some Soviet submarines could, if need be, launch their missiles from the dock and hit the US.
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The Soviet boomers had two differences to UsefulNotes/{{NATO}} ones. One, [[HellIsThatNoise they were noisier]].noisier. Two, after the arrival of the "Delta" class, they had considerably more range. This meant that some Soviet submarines could, if need be, launch their missiles from the dock and hit the US.
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[[UsefulNotes/UltimateDefenceOfTheRealm British nuclear strategy]] was largely to coordinate with the US, but it had several differences informed by two major considerations. The first was the aforementioned lack of time; with possibly less than five minutes elapsing between receiving confirmation of a launch and the first mushroom clouds, it was accepted fact that the government would be wiped out before it could give launch orders. Royal Navy boomers therefore operated on a limited fail-deadly system; if they were unable to detect any of several signs of life from the UK, including Admiralty broadcasts and the [[Creator/TheBBC Today program]], the Captain was to open a set of sealed orders called the Letters of Last Resort and carry them out. This could mean anything from a full retaliatory strike to taking orders from Australia, depending on what the current Prime Minister decided when he or she wrote them. The letters are destroyed unread when the PM changes. Even today, Royal Navy Trident missiles don't need unlock codes transmitted from higher command to arm them.[[note]]This led to the joke that the only security on British nukes was an ordinary bicycle lock-- the ''actual'' joke being that this made it the ''most'' secure nuclear arsenal on the planet, given how long it took to requisition the Royal Navy for the keys or a pair of bolt-cutters.[[/note]]
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[[UsefulNotes/UltimateDefenceOfTheRealm British nuclear strategy]] was largely to coordinate with the US, but it had several differences informed by two major considerations. The first was the aforementioned lack of time; with possibly less than five minutes elapsing between receiving confirmation of a launch and the first mushroom clouds, it was accepted fact that the government would be wiped out before it could give launch orders. Royal Navy boomers therefore operated on a limited fail-deadly system; if they were unable to detect any of several signs of life from the UK, including Admiralty broadcasts and the [[Creator/TheBBC Today program]], the Captain was to open a set of sealed orders SealedOrders called the Letters of Last Resort and carry them out. This could mean anything from a full retaliatory strike to taking orders from Australia, depending on what the current Prime Minister decided when he or she wrote them. The letters are destroyed unread when the PM changes. Even today, Royal Navy Trident missiles don't need unlock codes transmitted from higher command to arm them.[[note]]This led to the joke that the only security on British nukes was an ordinary bicycle lock-- the ''actual'' joke being that this made it the ''most'' secure nuclear arsenal on the planet, given how long it took to requisition the Royal Navy for the keys or a pair of bolt-cutters.[[/note]]
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The PRC's management of its nuclear weapons generally focused on maintaining second-strike capability through the use of hundreds of dummy and hidden silos. This was necessary because Mainland China had only a tiny and primitive submarine industry to build on (Soviet help being terminated very early into the submarine corps' development), meaning that China's first experimental nuclear ballistic missile submarine wasn't launched until the late 1980s.
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The PRC's management of its nuclear weapons generally focused on maintaining second-strike capability through the use of hundreds of dummy and hidden silos. This was necessary because Mainland China had only a tiny and primitive submarine industry to build on (Soviet help being terminated very early into the submarine corps' development), meaning that China's first experimental nuclear ballistic missile submarine wasn't launched until the late 1980s.
1980s. Additionally, the PRC is the only declared nuclear weapons state to have a formal and explicit policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and has been since it first tested nuclear weapons in 1964.
