Aye, that's true. Come to think of that phrase describes the Wehrmacht very well in the pre-Stalingrad/El Alamein days, and they were successfully doing it.
Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.From what little I know, I think I'd postulate that Rommel is the reincarnation of Lee, i.e. the tragic but awesome leader guy stuck with the dickwads in a conflict that is otherwise hugely morally tipped towards the other side, who's good at what he does but can't do everything alone, and inevitably loses because the other side has more shit in general...
"Shit, our candidate is a psychopath. Better replace him with Newt Gingrich."Only because Monty was literally playing the World War One playbook page by page short of building big ass trenchlines. His use of tanks and infantry at El Alamein could only in hindsight be construed as "reckless", like that of the first tank offensives of the First World War 20 years earlier.
Seriously his tactics boiled down to massive and continuous artillery barrages and sending as many tanks and infantry at the target as he could until the target went away.
Which is amusing because in 1944 Patton was basically running blitzkrieg whereas Monty hadn't learned much if anything. (And Patton was running rings around Monty in terms of ground captured and enemy casualties inflicted by then.)
Monty was using set-piece attacks, yes, but I can't fault him for that—especially as those tactics worked. It doesn't carry the glamour of maneuver warfare, but if had tried playing by the maneuver playbook against Rommel, he probably would've had the same thing happen to him that happened to Auchinleck—i.e., Rommel runs circles around him. The Wehrmacht was more experienced on that count, so by playing by his own rules he managed to break the back of the Afrika Korps.
Besides, maneuver works best after you've bypassed the heaviest defenses, instead of crashing right into them. The Germans learned that at Kursk.
Charlie Stross's cheerful, optimistic predictions for 2017, part one of three.And it cost him. Immediately after El Alamein he was suffering from severe diminishing returns. By Sicily he was overtaken in the tactical department by Patton and Eisenhower, by the end of France he was struggling to not get fired for incompetence because everyone around him with a command was doing better than he was.
I feel terrible for only knowing about that name from a special event in World Of Tanks.
edited 12th Jan '12 7:22:54 PM by Joesolo
I'm baaaaaaack@ Tom: I thought it wasn't his competance, but his enormous ego that was the problem?
Anyhow, Monty was the best we had (and let's just say in Britain he is Rommel's Worthy Opponent).
And the Germans did have a massive logistics problem — just see how many types of vehicle were in their fleet c.1943 (including captured/impressed vehicles). It didn't help things.
Keep Rolling On^ Both. His ego was such that he acted like everything was his idea yet on the battlefields of Sicily and France he was slow and ineffective. He got bogged down in that one town in France when the Omaha/Utah pockets were racing through the countryside of Normandy on the way to Cherbourg and beyond. (And the Utah/Omaha pockets of Normandy were the only real organized resistance in that part of France. Everything else outside Cherbourg was poorly organized, understrength and had severe supply issues owing to USAAF/RAF bombing/attack campaigns in the months prior to Overlord.)
And don't get me started on his lack of foresight and flexibility overseeing Market Garden. We lost a lot of good boys there in vain possibly delaying us from capturing Berlin before the Soviets.
Given the way he ran things and his results, Monty didn't deserve a combat command after Africa.
edited 13th Jan '12 4:34:45 AM by MajorTom
...and yet, he was loved by the Soldiers that served under him. The slowness was, in part, to make sure everything was ready before the attack, not to rush in without preperation and planning and get everything wrong.
Wasn't that the point of Operation Cobra
? Tie the Germans down around Caen and then let the Americans rush around and encircle them?
It worked, didn't it? Remember the Falaise Pocket
and the "Day of The Typhoon"?
edited 13th Jan '12 4:46:08 AM by Greenmantle
Keep Rolling OnThat's one part of the problem, actually. The maintenance and logistics system is running on peacetime settings - which means, for example, that a truck isn't allowed to operate if one of its headlights isn't working. Given the very limited transport capabilities of the Bundeswehr, a lot of non-essential stuff has to be shipped through a very narrow channel. Not to mention all the stuff that has to be regularly inspected by a very limited group of certified personal. (The fun that was collecting half the fire extinguishers in the batallion, driving them to a base far away, and getting them back them a few weeks later.) There also isn't such a thing as decentralized acquisition in the field - If a Wolf's wiper broke, we could just drive to the nearest Mercedes vendor and get a new one. Difficult in Afghanistan.
Remember, the whole Bundeswehr was structured around the idea of fighting right here, with its support never farther away than 100-200 km, less in most cases. It wasn't supposed to fight on foreign ground - my old division was stationed ~60 km from the German/German border, and it was supposed to hold it (until the Brits arrived).
To be fair, it has already gotten better in the last ten years. Back in 2000, exchanging a tank's main gun involved the following players: the tank company's support sergeant, the batallion's administrative group, the nearest support batallion (don't ask me what happened there), the batallions transport platoon, the materials group (yours truly), and the batallion's maintenance group. Plus a paper trail of a few miles. No computers involved. Nowadays, a lot of this chain has been outsourced to civilian contractors and unified in the joint support branch.
Keep in mind, the Bundeswehr has only been operating on foreign ground for roughly 15 years. (The navy for about twenty, but nearly no one knows much about that.) Forming a few expeditionary divisions on paper is one thing, adapting the entire bureaucratic and support apparatus behind it takes time.
edited 13th Jan '12 4:50:02 AM by kurushio
^^ At the same time he was supposed to make progress at Caen. Not be stuck in a pseudo-World War One set piece battle. Normandy was all about keeping the Germans from re-grouping. Caen almost let them regroup in the east. If the Germans would have beaten him at Caen they could have raced their Panzers across the Normandy coastline and cut the Normandy landing forces in two leading to unacceptable losses for the Allies.
edited 13th Jan '12 4:52:00 AM by MajorTom
Ah, yes. Nice amount of detail, kuru, and it very much sounds true. However, one things I noticed:
edited 13th Jan '12 10:09:18 AM by Octo
Unbent, Unbowed, Unbroken. Unrelated ME1 FanficGot a bum headlight? Circle-X that crap, good to go.
My memories of how Direct Support Maintenance worked, back in the Nineties:
Unit X would have a busted radio (I fixed radios so I'm biased). The Operator woudl tell his Commo sergeant that "it ain't workin' right, Sarge," and Commo wodl take a gander at it.
Commo would look at it, and exchange the bad one with one of their good ones, and the Operator would go away happy.
Commo would then arrange to drop off the radio to us (if they were in Group - otherwise, Division units had to use their own Divisional maintenance units).
We'd sign for it in a gigantic ledger book, tag it MCC "F", start a mantienance record form, and stick it it the queue.
I'd go toss it up on the AN/GRA-114B test set and fiddle with it, pluck out the bad cards and put whatever card that had failed on order through Shop Office. Usually, I had to turn the bad card into the Office parts clerk, but that was only with some parts that the Depot wanted. Whole mess of codes on the FEDLOG to get that right, but usually the parts clerk would let us know that they needed a turn-in part to order the replacement.
Get the part sometime within the millenium, instal it, test the widget. Passes, I'm happy. Complete the work order forms, MCC "A" the radio, and arrange for the unit to come pick the thing up.
Their Commo guy show up five minutes before closing time, sign for their gear, and go away happy.
If a Division's DS shop wasn't able to fix it, then they would come to us to fix their stuff.
edited 13th Jan '12 11:09:26 AM by pvtnum11
Happiness is zero-gee with a sinus cold.IIRC the British Corps in Germany was responsible for the area south of Hannover to somewhere roughly north of Goslar. (South of the I German Corps) Was your division attached to the British Corps similar to how some German brigades in Central Army Group were attached to either of the two American corps?
Just what was the allied conventional plan should the Soviet Union invade anyway? Beyond avoid getting steamrollered before the Americans can reach the continent and then cling on desperately?
The term "Great Man" is disturbingly interchangeable with "mass murderer" in history books.The plan was for the Bundeswehr to hold the line for a week or so, until the Allied forces could regroup behind the Rhine. Basically the Rhine was to be the fall-to line, and the Bundeswehr's only real purpose was to buy time.
Could be worse - initially the fall-to line were the Pyrenees. That's a primary reason why France opted out of NATO's joint military structure, because they were understandably peeved about plans that would give them up just so.
Unbent, Unbowed, Unbroken. Unrelated ME1 FanficPretty much "Forward Defense" with a bunch of nukes sprinkled on top as part of "Flexible Response". The '80s saw the development of concepts like "Air Land Battle" on part of the Americans and "Follow-On Forces" attack on part of NATO. However, both concepts relied much on means that were not available until after the end of the Cold War and perceived the Soviets as a slow, unthinking enemy lacking any finesse.
By the 1990s, the days of the large-scale mechanized armies were being trumped by hi-tech solutions well short of resorting to nukes, brought to us by the Information Age. This could not be done before its time. Even in 1991 numbers and depth of these new technologies was too thin as the first Gulf War showed. But, the message was evident and the Soviet military leadership saw it.
edited 13th Jan '12 1:57:47 PM by Breakerchase
The doctrine was called "forward defense". There's a nice Google Docs
page on the details.

I don't mean to cast aspersions on his tactical abilities, which were indeed very good. He just tried to do too much with too little.
With cannon shot and gun blast smash the alien. With laser beam and searing plasma scatter the alien to the stars.