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Edited by Mrph1 on Nov 30th 2023 at 11:03:59 AM
What about a gay Russian Nazi?
Anyway, the turd from Turning Point will be ostracized for this and that's enough. The state does not need to be involved.
No, you're petitioning the government to kill them. (The difference being that petitioning the government is legal.)
Plus, if you ban genocide advocacy, then the genocide advocates will just masquerade behind "unrestricted free speech" advocacy.
That, and we have a really, really strong tradition of political freedom. Pretty sure that the UK also considers it protected speech (I could be wrong), and we're the UK's extremely rambunctious firstborn child.
edited 13th May '18 3:34:15 AM by Ramidel
It does not paint a very rosy picture of the mod team if a thread got locked because people were asking for the rules to be enforced against genocide advocates and the mods didn’t want to do that.
“And the Bunny nails it!” ~ Gabrael “If the UN can get through a day without everyone strangling everyone else so can we.” ~ CyranWhite people telling minorities that they must tolerate calls for their extermination in the name of protecting the free speech of the white people calling for it is more or less the definitive example of white privilege.
There is no world in which laws against calls for mass murder make a society less safe, and invoking the spectre of totalitarianism in order to defend the right to call for genocide is not only a baseless slippery slope fallacy, but frankly tasteless. Fascism did not gain a foothold in Germany because there were hate speech laws. Fascism gained a foothold in Germany because public discussions of killing all the Jews were seen as publicly acceptable and unworthy of condemnation. The first step to committing genocide is making it publicly palatable, and demanding the right to publicly debate the virtues of mass murder is one obvious way of doing that.
Multiple Western countries have hate speech laws restricting calls for genocide, mass murder, and the like. The very fact that they have not metamorphosed into totalitarian hellholes invalidates the "it's a slippery slope to dictatorship," argument. The fact that they feature fewer issues with groups like the Klan or alt-right (please note: not no issues, fewer issues, proving racism exists in Canada does not refute this argument) should give Americans pause to consider that maybe life for minorities does get better if white folks can't walk around yelling for them to be lynched.
UK hate speech laws prohibit inciting religious or racial violence. Demanding the massacre of a religious or ethnic group would presumably fall under that.
edited 13th May '18 7:41:49 AM by AmbarSonofDeshar
I used to be all for "free speech as long as it doesn't involve violence." I was raised to believe that people should be allowed to express their opinions, whatever they should be, and that you needed to respond with words. it included also things like expressing that with rights to serve while encouraging them not to. It took a Nazi agreeing with me to realize I was a fool.
Because the side which favors "free speech" in this is inevitably the bad guys because they want protections while doing everything they can do to suppress the alternative. They also use their speech to rally violence and intimidate.
So, yeah, I am all for government officials being barred from expressing opinions that genocide is good.
edited 13th May '18 8:26:36 AM by CharlesPhipps
Author of The Rules of Supervillainy, Cthulhu Armageddon, and United States of Monsters.Of course! Wouldn't want a white man's ability to make tasteless jokes to be infringed upon, would we? Much better to tell minorities they have to live with his threats.
It should be noted here that while there's zero evidence that hate speech laws lead to totalitarianism, there's lots of evidence that tolerance for hate speech leads not only to totalitarianism, but to hate crimes, even in democratic countries. The last time the USA had a sustained public debate about whether to massacre a minority, large sections of the population took it as tacit permission to go and carry out said massacres (see: Sand Creek, Camp Grant, et al). This is not an isolated example in American or world history; it's always easier to commit an act of mass murder when you know you've got a large part of the public behind you.
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It's not just Nazis who agree with you friend. It's the ACLU and anyone with a liberal conscience.
The State has no right to silence political dissidents. And this applies to EVERYONE. We talk so much about the KKKI and Nazis but these same laws protect Louis Farrakhan and the Nation of Islam. Or BLM marchers threatening "pigs in a blanket, fry 'em like bacon."
Your last point though is a very different matter. Public officials should absolutely be restricted from saying stuff like that as they are figures of authority and thus have certain standards they must adhere to. I'm only talking about rando's.
Here's a pretty good and informative paper on the subject of free speech/the advocacy of violence that goes over its history.
Martin Redish - "Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger"
The propriety of protecting some unlawful advocacy is reinforced by a consideration of the effects of denying constitutional protection to all such speech. A total ban on even the most frivolous forms of unlawful advocacy would have a great impact on daily discourse. Statements such as, "I wouldn't bother paying that parking ticket," or "a little marijuana never hurt anyone," could be grounds for constitutionally per- missible prosecutions. Chicago White Sox broadcaster Jimmy Piersall could be jailed for his comment last season that slugger Greg Luzinski"oughta be shot" for not running out a ground ball. 2 ' Such constraints on normal, harmless statements are unacceptable, even if the statements are "unlawful advocacy." If the first amendment means anything, it represents a value judgment that the interchange of ideas, information and suggestions is to be kept free and open, at least if the interchange presents no real threat of harm to society. 2 The meaning of the first amendment would be severely truncated if people were driven to self-censorship by fears that innocent comments could be construed as unlawful advocacy. Thus, it is not difficult to accept that a blanket exclusion of unlawful advocacy from the first amendment's scope is improper. But it does not follow that all unlawful advocacy is to receive absolute protection. Several commentators have suggested such a result, but it seems unwarranted by either the language 24 or history 25 of the first amendment.
If neither of the extremes of total protection or total exclusion is acc- ceptable, it is necessary to delineate a constitutional standard which will provide guidance in individual instances to determine whether unlawful advocacy is to be protected.
[...]
This Article takes the position that the clear and present danger test is the most effective means of determining the level of constitutional protection to be afforded advocacy of unlawful conduct. Before I articulate and defend that position, however, I include this Section to perform the preliminary function of defining the particular version of the test I endorse. Since the process of definition involves the resolu- tion of ambiguities, this Section also undertakes analysis of the questions left open by past applications of the clear and present danger test. The version of the clear and present danger test endorsed here favors a generally protectionist view of the right of free speech. On the whole, it validates the stringency that the language of the test imports "[t]o modem ears:" the phrasing of the test demands "a serious evil, a substantial likelihood that speech will cause the evil, and a close tem-poral nexus between speech and evil." Because of the test's checkered history and the unclear nature of its current application, the version of the test advocated by this Article is a product of theory, not of history or of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements. Therefore, my analysis of historical ambiguities is not bound by history; in general, I resolve those doubts in favor of protecting free speech. This rough for- mulation guides my approach to four ambiguities that should be resolved if future applications of the clear and present danger test are to rise above the confusion of past cases: first, the issue of intent as a substitute for the likelihood of harm; second, the need to distinguish direct from indirect advocacy; third, the type of threatened substantive evil that justifies suppression; and fourth, the degree of imminence required.
1. The Role of Intent The early proponents of the clear and present danger test appeared to be willing to substitute a finding of the speaker's intent to bring about unlawful conduct for a showing of danger that the harm would actually come about. In other words, either clear and present danger of harm or intent to cause it would justify suppression. Given the rationale adopted here to justify constitutional protection for at least some kinds of unlawful advocacy, 87 it makes little sense to remove that protection solely because the speaker intended the result. For it is only the actual harm that justifies suppression of speech. It is a hallmark of our free society that we tolerate all viewpoints, even those of "fringe" elements, who advocate illegal conduct, so long as they present no real threat to society. Only a danger of true harm justifies curtailing the flow of free and open discourse. Continued substitution of a finding of intent for a showing of a genuine threat to society would cause people to censor their thoughts and words. Such censorship is undesirable; avoiding it facilitates attainment of the goal of the free speech clause.
2. Direct v. Indirect Incitements The Supreme Court has never faced the question of whether a distinction should be drawn between direct and indirect advocacy of un-lawful action, but it is readily apparent that suppression of indirect advocacy should be very difficult to justify. While a showing of some real threat of harm should be necessary to justify suppression of even direct advocacy, courts should uphold punishment for indirect advocacy only in the most extreme circumstances. In other words, a court should be more willing to allow suppression of a statement that on its face urges another to commit a crime ("Let's overthrow the government;" "you should kill that cop") than of statements that on their face urge no illegal act but which are assertions of fact or opinion that might lead another to commit a crime ("this government represses minorities;" "that cop harassed me yesterday"). I urge the distinction because failing to observe it, and demanding no greater justification for suppression of speech that does not advocate crime on the ground that it might lead to harm, would permit majorities to penalize unpopular minority views, ultimately for no other reason than dislike of or disagreement with those views. Drawing a line between direct and indirect advocacy does not have the effect of totally preventing suppression of indirect advocacy. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which assertions of fact or opinion that do not advocate illegal conduct are sufficiently likely to cause immediate harm that society is justified in suppressing them in order to protect itself. To shout, "the man in that jail tortured and killed my mother" in front of an unruly mob outside a jail is a classic example. 89 But only such truly exacerbating circumstances, in which listeners' re- actions are easily predictable, should justify upholding suppression of a statement which does not on its face urge unlawful conduct. 90
3. Types of Substantive Evil Threatened As originally phrased, the clear and present danger test did not differentiate among various "evils;" the criterion was simply whether the evil threatened by some speech was one which Congress had the power to prevent. 91 If the goal of the test is protecting as much speech as possible without unduly endangering society, however, some rough demarcation is advisable. 92 Society's interest in suppressing speech is simply not as strong where the speech advocates only minor transgressions. In his Whitney concurrence, Justice Brandeis wrote that "even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of those functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious." 93 This added consideration has the effect of making the test more protectionist in that it makes it more difficult for a government to justify suppressing the advocates of some illegal course of conduct if the threatened evil is not deemed "relatively" or "extremely" serious. Though it is difficult to predict exactly which harms will be so labelled, common sense indicates that the more "serious" crimes are those for which society has imposed the most severe penalties. Governments should be allowed more latitude in suppressing advocacy of the serious crimes than in punishing those who incite lesser offenses. While I do not suggest a strict rank-ordering of crimes according to their seriousness, I think that courts should take the seriousness of the advocated offense into account in applying the clear and present danger test.
At first blush, deciding whether to uphold some suppression of speech by balancing the imminence of the threatened harm against its seriousness makes perfect sense. After all, the clear and present danger test is really a balancing process which contrasts the need to protect expression with the danger of harm to the state. Thus, if the substantive evil involves violence to persons, it is only reasonable that society will be less willing to risk that ultimate consequence than when the "evil" in question is illegally walking on the grass. An analysis that takes the seriousness of the threatened harm into consideration is reminiscent of the "sliding scale" test invoked by Hand and Vinson in Dennis. 94 Ultimately, however, the Dennis Court's test effectively deleted the requirements that the danger be either clear or present when the potential harm was severe. If the clear and present danger test is to perform its function of assuring that speech is suppressed only when truly justified by societal need, courts must in every case require some showing that the danger is real. Even where the most serious substantive evils (such as murder or violent overthrow) are threatened, evidence should be required to show (1) that a specific crime has been advocated, (2) that the crime advocated is to be committed either at a specific time or within a specific range of time, (3) that the time occur within the not-too-distant future (usually within at most a period of months) and (4) that there is a clear likelihood that the advocacy would be acted upon.
4. Imminence The Supreme Court has never explicitly laid out its understanding of the imminence required by the test. My interpretation of the "present" component of the test is very different from the Court's most recent permutations, the all-purpose "imminence" requirement used in Brandenburg, at least to the extent that the Court meant that danger must be "immediate." 95 In resolving this one ambiguity, I have chosen an alternative that is potentially less protective of speech interests. My objections to the imminence requirement are both practical and theoretical. First, requiring true imminence in every case is un- realistic and unduly insensitive to society's legitimate interest in self- protection. Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings of a Brandenburg-style imminence requirement are weak. The practical point is that a stringent imminence standard unduly restricts authorities' ability to deter criminal conduct. For example, what of the individual who urges another, "when your husband returns from Europe on the 11 th of the next month, you should kill him"? Unless we deny the word "imminence" its legitimate meaning, we cannot say that such advocacy will produce "imminent" illegal conduct. Yet the language may well present a threat of violence that is sufficiently serious to justify society's desire to punish it.
One might be inclined to accept suppression of non-imminent criminal solicitation, but to stand by a strict imminence requirement where advocacy of ideological crimes is involved. But to do so would be to create an indefensible double standard, for it is easy to hypothesize cases where advocacy of ideological non-imminent crimes is equally deserving of suppression. There is the example of a racist who, some time before the Bicentennial, urges other racists to select a black to execute in honor of that day when it arrives. Or what of the terrorist who convinces a comrade to plant a bomb in a public place next month to protest government policies? Both involve advocacy of purely political or ideological crimes that are not to be committed "imminently"; therefore, neither would be punishable if an imminence standard were strictly followed. Yet I have little trouble concluding that such advocacy may be punished, so long as it is clearly probable that it would be acted upon. By foreclosing such punishment, the all-purpose imminence requirement pushes first amendment protection to an impractical extreme.
My theoretical objection to the Brandenburg-style "imminence" requirement is that it harks back to the "marketplace of ideas" rationale for protecting unlawful advocacy. For it assumed that so long as there is sufficient time for rebuttal and reasoned consideration, we can rest assured that "truth" will best "falsity." Only when danger is so "imminent" that there is not time for response and discussion should suppression be upheld. As noted above, however, there is simply no basis for the conclusion that the opportunity for reasoned response will always defuse unlawful advocacy. Requiring imminence in every case in the belief that if it is not present the advocacy will never lead to harm is theoretically unjustifiable. My version of the test replaces the universal requirement of imminence with a flexible method of determining the level of immediacy needed in each case. The test should depend in part on the factors outlined above: the directness of the advocacy and the seriousness of the crime threatened. Where a very serious offense is directly and forcefully advocated, a lesser showing of imminence will justify suppression; at the other end of the scale, greater evidence of imminence would be required in the case of indirect advocacy of a less serious offense.
Speech should be allowed on purely ethical grounds but pragmatically, a Leftist clamoring for the US government to be able to silence political dissidents is suicide. Even with the laws as they are, the 20th Century saw the government doing its best to suppress Leftists.
Furthermore, we all know about the problems with US police. Do you want to give them even greater excuses to pick on minorities? Hand them the power to arrest people for the crime of "saying something" and then see who wins in court in a battle of pure he-said she-said between a respected officer and some "no angel."
Oh yeah and if you ever want to criticize Israel again, be prepared to have Antisemitic hate speech laws slammed on you the second you speak out. It has happened in France.
To be fair, there absolutely is legal precedent for action taken against potential subversives. There's a reason why even telling a tasteless joke at an airport could get you in serious trouble. This is precisely what NSA watchlists and the like are for.
And with Nazis, they are legitimately an enemy of the American people and her state. A person spreading Nazi propaganda could be strongly argued to be a collaborator and a terror risk.
Leviticus 19:34![]()
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So basically, "If you try to outlaw any form of speech, you might as outlaw all speech!"? Yeah, sorry, but that's not how it works. Preventing Nazi's and the like from speaking out does not guarantee that everyone will suddenly be kept from saying what they want or arrested for doing so. Countries like Canada have proven that you can have Hate Speech laws without turning the nation into 1984, and any attempts to prove otherwise have amounted to nothing more than faulty cherry picking and arguments in bad faith. The point being, trying to outlaw specific forms of speech isn't going to automatically lead to free speech being outlawed or compromised. And countries like Canada are proof of that.
edited 13th May '18 8:53:29 AM by kkhohoho
So, should we start getting these hate speech laws passed while the current president of the US, who says both the "Alt-Left" and Nazis are equivalent, is in power? And tell me, are Canadian police as gun happy around minorities?
Sorry, Canada is not the US. Countries and cultures are different. Shocking I know but it's the truth. Something that works in Country A may not work in Country B. Much like how France is remarkably intolerant of religion, America is remarkably intolerant of socialist viewpoints and minorities.
I'm not going to give more power to something that doesn't deserve it based on its long, long history of opposing everything I believe in.
...Nik. Buddy. My man. You're seriously comparing the KKK and Nazis to BLM.
Cam we just acknowledge that this happened? I feel like we glossed over this a little.
Here's this non-logic again. "Just because hate-speech laws work everywhere else doesn't mean they'll work in America because we're different!"
Of course, it's never explained how we're different.
edited 13th May '18 9:20:48 AM by PhysicalStamina
i'm tired, my friend

Latin America has had a fairly complex relationship with Nazism, on top of everything else mentioned.
They should have sent a poet.