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Edited by Mrph1 on Nov 30th 2023 at 11:03:59 AM
Trump's actions there were one of the things that sickened me most and there's nothing I don't hate about that man.
At least he reversed course to occupy the oil fields (for selfish craven reasons) and the Kurds took up residence beside the US troops to avoid bombing.
Because, you know, not wanting to die.
Edited by CharlesPhipps on Aug 12th 2020 at 8:35:11 AM
Author of The Rules of Supervillainy, Cthulhu Armageddon, and United States of Monsters.You're right.
Here's an update of the horrible situation now:
https://newint.org/features/2020/06/11/big-story-kurds-betrayed-again
Edit:
I rewrote what I said and put a part I deleted back in.
Edited by CharlesPhipps on Aug 12th 2020 at 8:36:45 AM
Author of The Rules of Supervillainy, Cthulhu Armageddon, and United States of Monsters.Fun fact! The top result for a Google search of "biden taiwan" is another article from the same source and the same author
except more recent, and it describes Biden in far more optimistic tones (from the Taiwanese point of view), though it stops short of declaring that Biden has fully come around to considering the defense of Taiwan against Chinese aggression a major strategic priority.
That said, while I understand the desire to see the US publicly commit to defending Taiwan, it's a very tricky issue and I find it hard to blame Biden for hedging his bets. China is a nuclear power. Military intervention against Chinese forces would be an act of war. Is Biden willing to risk nuclear war to defend Taiwan? "Maybe, it depends on the situation" seems like a good — if understandably unsatisfying — answer to me.
Really from Jupiter, but not an alien.What does matter the most is that for the Taiwanese, once their nation is gone and assimilated into China, it's effectively gone, along with everything they built; healthcare, LGBT rights, democracy, plurality, freedom of speech. Their very identity will disappear, forcibly assimilated into China, and subject to the same totalitarian security policies.
The imperialist will have scored another triumph, and will be emboldened further, free to harass India or Vietnam next.
As for the Taiwanese, they'll be effectively stateless, without a cultural identity or homeland, like the Hongkongers now, the Kurds, and even the Jews.
The Taiwanese already went through a terrible period
where a unique form of apartheid was practiced on them. They struggled for 40 years trying to get their identity and culture back, and will defend it again if they have to. Hence their high military spending.
Edited by TheWildWestPyro on Aug 12th 2020 at 9:24:41 AM
Honestly, that first article was pretty positive on Biden too. It started with explaining Biden's past balancing between China and Taiwan, noted when he sometimes favored China, but noted he's always been committed to Taiwan even if never explicitly saying so. It ends on a note of confidence in Biden:
" As a presidential frontrunner with the longest foreign policy resume in decades, Biden can surely “make it clear” that he would be both a capable and willing potential commander-in-chief in a new era of U.S.-China competition – including showing his continued commitment to Taiwan."
Is there a reason to believe China will trigger armageddon rather than give up Tawain?
And yes, I'm aware of the same for the USA but it's a question of who would push the button first.
Edited by CharlesPhipps on Aug 12th 2020 at 11:02:10 AM
Author of The Rules of Supervillainy, Cthulhu Armageddon, and United States of Monsters.That's the game-theory problem. If China doesn't think America will escalate to nukes or risk attack by Chinese nukes, then they can invade Taiwan without fear of the Chinese coast suddenly turning into glass. (China talks big about being able to absorb a nuclear war, but Xi isn't an idiot and he knows better.)
That said, what's likely to happen is either Biden or Trump sending a carrier group or two to block the PLAN. In a conventional naval war, China is fucked. The question is whether China will believe America will fight for Taiwan.
The best thing for the US to do concerning that is to keep China guessing. It's a careful balance where they have to avoid being too obvious so that China doesn't see them as a threat and focuses more on their own internal problems without making it so that China can just roll into Taiwan unchallenged. If the US makes too big a show of protecting Taiwan, China will feel pressed to make a strong response in return. If they publicly abandon Taiwan, China will annex it in a heartbeat.
Cross-posting from the Military thread: Related article from Forbes: Here’s How China Could Defeat Itself
The U.S. military increasingly has one overriding preoccupation: Figuring out how to deter China or, in the event of war in the western Pacific, defeat it.
But it's possible that, in time, China will defeat itself. Economic mismanagement, poor governance, ecological crisis and external pressure could combine to flatten the country’s growth and erode its power in the region and globally.
That's one possible future that the California think-tank RAND gamed out in a July study.
"What will China look like by 2050?" the RAND analysts asked. "The answers are provided by analyzing trends in the management of politics and society and studying national-level strategies in diplomacy, economics, [science and technology] and military affairs."
The study sketches, and ranks, four major possibilities.
A "triumphant" China that grows, prospers and gains influence until it matches or exceeds the United States in most measures of power. The RAND analysts rated this outcome as "unlikely."
An "ascendant" China that struggles with internal discontent, water-shortages and a slowing economy and yet still manages to become Asia’s dominant power. Probable.
A "stagnant" China that fails to address widespread poverty and environmental degradation while also managing external crises. Possible.
Finally, an "imploding" China that enters its second century as a modern state in a state of collapse. Unlikely.
Leaving aside the unlikely outcomes, the stagnant possibility is the most interesting, as it reveals how China might defeat itself, like many established world powers eventually do—and like the United States arguably is in the process of doing under the leadership of President Donald Trump.
"In this scenario, the forecast is for sun and warmth through the mid-2020s, then significant cooling followed by a prolonged cold spell," the RAND report imagines.
"Between 2030 and 2050, China's economy stalled and now lags well behind other great powers. There is no clearly discernible economic growth. While Beijing claims annual growth rates of between one and two percent, these official figures are dismissed as not credible."
"Official corruption remains endemic," the report continues. The ruling Chinese Communist Party "has retrenched internally, doubling down on the slightest hint of dissent or rumble of popular unrest."
The Party manages to maintain strict control of the ethnic-Han heartland, but outlying provinces with large minority populations have begun to push back against repressive rule. "Xinjiang proved extremely troublesome, and 2039 witnessed serious and widespread disturbances in far western China coinciding with the 30th anniversary of the July 2009 communal riots in Urumqi."
Hong Kong remains a source of unrest, "especially in the immediate countdown to July 2047, when the territory's status as a [special autonomous region] expired. Starting in the late 2030s, thousands of Hong Kong's wealthiest residents, including many prominent [People's Republic of China] citizens—most of whom also held non-PRC passports—departed the city, taking their capital with them."
Most Hong Kong residents can’t leave, however. They "target their anger and frustration at Beijing, which they blame for the economic downturn."
As the Party struggles to maintain control internally, it all but gives up trying to expand regionally. That spares Taiwan forced "reunification" by way of an armed invasion.
Free from the Chinese threat, Taiwan grows more assertive. "Economic stagnation on the [Chinese] mainland combined with widespread social unrest has caused Taipei to indefinitely postpone any possible moves toward enhancing cross-strait ties."
North Korea likewise shrugs off Chinese attempts to manage it. "Tensions on the Korean Peninsula persist, and Pyongyang continues to thumb its nose at Beijing, while at the same time improving ties with Seoul and sustaining a diplomatic rapprochement with Washington."
"Beijing's relations with both Seoul and Tokyo are cool, in part because China's economic stagnation has adversely affected the economies of South Korea and Japan. Relations between Beijing and New Delhi in 2050 are strained, and India has taken advantage of China's internal problems, waning diplomatic influence and declining economic clout."
Desperate to prove that China still is strong, Beijing "occasionally manufactures political-military crises with small weak neighbors to deflect domestic discontent—the regime deliberately picks a fight with a foe it knows it can defeat or easily cow."
But the truth is undeniable. China has stagnated. "Regional military competition is tempered as the [People's Liberation Army] struggles to maintain rough parity with the armed forces of other great powers in Asia."
The great conflict with China that U.S. military planners envisioned as recently as 2020 now seems unlikely in this version of the future, circa 2050. The United States might not have won its long cold war with China, but it certainly didn’t lose.
All without anyone firing a shot.
Someone is using the late Herman Cain's Twitter account to bash Biden and Kamala.

An alliance to America is not worth much to anyone these days after Trump abandonned the Kurds.