I dislike making double posts, but I felt I needed to post this bit of info out as well. I'd advise you to read the one above before this.
In the first emergency meeting of the National Security Council post-9/11, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld used every available opportunity to press the Iraq War case to Congress and the like. The idea was initially rejected at the behest of Colin Powell, but Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz held secret meetings about opening up a front against Saddam; Powell was excluded. In such meetings, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld created a policy that would later be dubbed the Bush Doctrine (based on the Wolfowitz Doctrine), centering on preemptive attacks and the war on Iraq, which the "Project for a New American Century" (a neoconservative think tank that promotes global American leadership) had advocated in their letters before the meetings.
The intelligence services were tasked with finding WM Ds
and providing justification for the attack, but, according to British journalist John Kampfner, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz believed that the established security services "were too bureaucratic and too traditional in their thinking." As a result, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz set up what came to be known as the 'cabal', a cell of eight or nine analysts in a new Office of Special Plans (OSP) based in the U.S. Defense Department. According to an unnamed Pentagon source quoted by someone named Hersh, the OSP "was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld believed to be true — that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States."
Within months of being set up, the OSP rivaled both the CIA and the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, the DIA, as President Bush’s main source of intelligence regarding Iraq’s possible possession of weapons of mass destruction and connection with Al Qaeda. Hersh explains that the OSP relied on data gathered by other intelligence agencies and also on information provided by the Iraqi National Congress, or I.N.C., the exile group headed by Ahmad Chalabi (also the ones that Wolfowitz wanted to take over Iraq after Saddam was ousted).
According to Kampfner, the CIA had ended its funding of the I.N.C. "in the mid-1990s when doubts were cast about Chalabi’s reliability." Nevertheless "as the administration geared up for conflict with Saddam, Chalabi was welcomed in the inner sanctum of the Pentagon" under the auspices of the OSP, and Wolfowitz did not see fit to challenge any of Chalabi’s information. In essence, the actions of the OSP (Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld) led to the Bush administration "fixing intelligence to support policy" (as Kampfner put it) with the aim of influencing Congress in its use of the War Powers Act.
I'll reiterate what Serocco said - why wasn't Wolfowitz on headline news
for all that?
edited 13th Jan '12 8:30:53 AM by Sledgesaul