History UsefulNotes / KatanasOfTheRisingSun

18th Jan '17 1:00:55 PM brianify
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The Navy's decision to include the United States in their offensive meant that Attack Plan South was hopeless and their defeat was inevitable. Despite their astonishing initial successes in seizing nearly all of south-east Asia save Burma and New Guinea, their increasingly out-dated and out-numbered forces were contained in little over a year and pushed back across the Pacific over the course of the next four years. A British-American Army overwhelmingly composed of ethnic Indians and Chinese, respectively, managed to halt the Japanese advance in the mountainous jungle of northern Burma - but had been unable to defend the 'Burma Road', the Guomindang's sole over-land link to the outside world[[note]] The Soviets could no longer run their (1937-41) horsecart+truck supply-chain to them through Mongolia and Xinjiang because now that they had been brought into the war they needed their entire stock of non-rail transport for themselves.[[/note]]. The U.S. Navy destroyed their sea and air forces while the Guomindang absorbed the bulk of the Japanese Army in China. Australia and New Zealand teamed up with the U.S. to recapture New Guinea then went West to liberate Indonesia when the U.S. turned North to recapture the Philipines. Japan's merchant fleet was devastated by the depredations of the U.S. Navy's submarines and Japan's numerous island garrisons were either cut off and left to "rot on the vine" or taken by overwhelming assault by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Two all-out, and rather pointless, Imperial Army offensives in China and Burma - meant to destroy the Guomindang once and for all and capture British India - failed and led to disastrous reversals.

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The Navy's decision to include the United States in their offensive meant that Attack Plan South was hopeless and their defeat was inevitable. Despite their astonishing initial successes in seizing nearly all of south-east Asia save Burma and New Guinea, their increasingly out-dated and out-numbered forces were contained in little over a year and pushed back across the Pacific over the course of the next four three years. A British-American Army overwhelmingly composed of ethnic Indians and Chinese, respectively, managed to halt the Japanese advance in the mountainous jungle of northern Burma - but had been unable to defend the 'Burma Road', the Guomindang's sole over-land link to the outside world[[note]] The Soviets could no longer run their (1937-41) horsecart+truck supply-chain to them through Mongolia and Xinjiang because now that they had been brought into the war they needed their entire stock of non-rail transport for themselves.[[/note]]. The U.S. Navy destroyed their sea and air forces while the Guomindang absorbed the bulk of the Japanese Army in China. Australia and New Zealand teamed up with the U.S. to recapture New Guinea then went West to liberate Indonesia when the U.S. turned North to recapture the Philipines. Japan's merchant fleet was devastated by the depredations of the U.S. Navy's submarines and Japan's numerous island garrisons were either cut off and left to "rot on the vine" or taken by overwhelming assault by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Two all-out, and rather pointless, Imperial Army offensives in China and Burma - meant to destroy the Guomindang once and for all and capture British India - failed and led to disastrous reversals.


Added DiffLines:

* BritsWithBattleships: The Japanese selected the Royal Navy, then the world's greatest naval power, as their mentor and model for the new Imperial Japanese Navy; this emulation extended to almost absurd degrees, from many early Japanese vessels being built in British yards to the Japanese Naval Academy being made entirely of imported British bricks. More significantly, it meant that the Japanese Navy inherited many of the strengths of the WorldWarI-era Royal Navy (long range capability, seamanship, tenaciousness, formidable firepower and speed) along with its weaknesses (tactical inflexibility, lower emphasis on ship armor and survivability).
8th Jan '17 12:54:01 PM MarqFJA
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** Ironically, this outlook wasn't actually that unpopular at the times, and even among the Allies there were some (most notably Russians, though largely because they had difficulty with producing enough radios to equip everyone) who subscribed to the idea that the radio was overrated for the lower level of the chain of command. On the other hand, when this prowed a wrong assumption, the Soviet Union invested an enormous effort to fill its ranks and vehicles/aircraft with as much equipment as needed, while Japanese ''continued'' to stick to it, once again demonstrating their lack of flexibility.

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** Ironically, this outlook wasn't actually that unpopular at the times, and even among the Allies there were some (most notably Russians, though largely because they had difficulty with producing enough radios to equip everyone) who subscribed to the idea that the radio was overrated for the lower level of the chain of command. On the other hand, when this prowed proved a wrong assumption, the Soviet Union invested an enormous effort to fill its ranks and vehicles/aircraft with as much equipment as needed, while Japanese ''continued'' to stick to it, once again demonstrating their lack of flexibility.
8th Jan '17 10:59:33 AM MarqFJA
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*** This is also what happened in course of sparking off the "Manchurian Incident," The Second-Sino Japanese War, and the undeclared border war against Soviet Union in 1939. They were all started by local commanders while the high command was internally divided or even disapproving of adventurism.
** From Japan's perspective, this helped them a lot in the Second-Sino Japanese War. General Yan Xishan (warlord of Shanxi province), Chairman Mao Zedong (warlord of neighbouring Sha'anxi province), the Guangxi Clique (of Guangxi province, natch), and the Guominjun (of Qinghai province) basically wanted absolutely nothing to do with one another and would have been perfectly happy for the Japanese to wipe out all the others if it meant that they got to rule over what was left of the country afterward. The only partial exception was Mao Zedong, who at least ''pretended'' to get along with the others but wasn't fooling anybody. It was the national government (under Lin Sen and UsefulNotes/ChiangKaiShek) at Chonqing's misfortune to have to deal with this shit daily, for eight years. And then a four-year civil war after that. Hooray.

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*** This is also what happened in course of sparking off the "Manchurian Incident," The Second-Sino Japanese Second Sino-Japanese War, and the undeclared border war against Soviet Union in 1939. They were all started by local commanders while the high command was internally divided or even disapproving of adventurism.
** From Japan's perspective, this helped them a lot in the Second-Sino Japanese Second Sino-Japanese War. General Yan Xishan (warlord of Shanxi province), Chairman Mao Zedong (warlord of neighbouring Sha'anxi province), the Guangxi Clique (of Guangxi province, natch), and the Guominjun (of Qinghai province) basically wanted absolutely nothing to do with one another and would have been perfectly happy for the Japanese to wipe out all the others if it meant that they got to rule over what was left of the country afterward. The only partial exception was Mao Zedong, who at least ''pretended'' to get along with the others but wasn't fooling anybody. It was the national government (under Lin Sen and UsefulNotes/ChiangKaiShek) at Chonqing's misfortune to have to deal with this shit daily, for eight years. And then a four-year civil war after that. Hooray.
4th Jan '17 4:23:24 PM MonsieurThenardier
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Added DiffLines:

* CurbStompCushion: The Battle of Manchuria was a Soviet victory, no doubt about that. But contrary to popular belief, despite being hilariously outmatched in every way the Kwantung Army Group was still intact and fighting the Soviets when the war ended with almost none of them having surrendered, and withdrawing to defensive redoubts in line with their plan. They only surrendered after the end of the war, being ordered to do so by the Emperor in response to the atom bombs. Considering that the Soviets were only inflicting casualties on them at a rate of about 2-1 despite their numerical and materiel superiority (Soviets had 12,031 killed compared to 21,389 Japanese in the eleven days of fighting), it is likely that they would have put up a very tough fight had the war dragged on to the tune of several hundred thousand Soviet casualties (they suffered 36,500 in only 11 days when they had the element of surprise, and the Japanese still had [[http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/AJRP2.nsf/530e35f7e2ae7707ca2571e3001a112d/e7daa03b9084ad56ca257209000a85f7?OpenDocument 665,000]] combat-capable men in Manchuria plus almost all their materiel).
** A specific example is the Battle of Mutanchiang. The Japanese Fifth Army held up half of Kirill Meretskov's First Far Eastern Front long enough to allow the First Area Army time to escape to new defensive positions while simultaneously inflicting heavy losses on the Soviets, destroying 300 Soviet tanks.
** A similar story was repeated in the north: at Hailar the Red Army 205th Tank Brigade with supporting infantry attempted to overpower the Japanese 80th Brigade's positions and occupy the city; that brigade, rated at 15 percent effectiveness, not only forced the 205th Tank Brigade to retreat but also allowed the nearby IJA 119th Division to withdraw to blocking positions in the mountains.
** The Britain vs Japan subset of the war in general was this. The China front was largely a CurbStompBattle in favor of Japan. The main front, against America, was a CurbStompBattle in the USA's favor. Britain and Japan's conflict was largely even, partly because both sides saw the theater as a secondary concern. In 1941-1942, the Japanese utterly curb-stomped the British and their allies out of Malaya, Burma, Singapore, and Hong Kong. They also sunk a significant amount of RN ships for no losses themselves. 1943-1944, when the Japanese were getting utterly rolled back by the Americans, they managed to repel a British-Chinese attack on their positions in Burma. It wasn't until 1944-1945 after William Slim got things together that the tide of the war against Britain turned against Japan, and even then it wasn't 100% one-sided.
12th Dec '16 10:25:41 PM Odacon_Spy
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* NeverRecycleYourSchemes: Inverted. The IJN in the South Pacific had a bad habit of repeating successful operations, in part due to their lack of fleet staff officers. They sometimes got away with it twice, but they rarely got away with it more than twice, either running into a U.S. Navy ambush or more often a minefield.

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* NeverRecycleYourSchemes: Inverted. The IJN in the South Pacific had a bad habit of repeating successful operations, in part due to their lack of fleet staff officers. They sometimes got away with it twice, but they rarely got away with it more than twice, thrice, either running into a U.S. Navy ambush or more often a minefield.
10th Dec '16 2:42:37 AM morane
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* KatanasAreJustBetter: The IJN officers had cheap, mass-produced katanas that were regularly used for torture and executions rather then fighting. Of course, fervent about the samurai spirit, they did use these for combat but few if any were trained in their proper combat use, and often broke or chipped their swords.

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* KatanasAreJustBetter: The IJN officers had cheap, mass-produced katanas katana-styled swords, called ''shin-gunto'' (New Army Sword) that were regularly used for torture and executions rather then fighting. Of course, fervent about the samurai spirit, they did use these for combat but few if any were trained in their proper combat use, and often broke or chipped their swords.



** When Japan began modernizing in late 19th century, the army forbade use of old katanas and issued European-style straight-swords and cutlasses in their place. Katanas were reintroduced in the Japanese army only in the 1930s!
** Nowadays, any WW2 katanas are often immediately confiscated and destroyed if found. With all the atrocities committed involving them, it's not surprising.

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** When Japan began modernizing in late 19th century, the army forbade use of old katanas and issued European-style straight-swords and cutlasses in their place. Katanas Katana-style swords were reintroduced in the Japanese army only in the 1930s!
** Nowadays, any WW2 katanas ''shin-gunto'' swords are often immediately confiscated and destroyed if found. With all the atrocities committed involving them, it's not surprising.
6th Dec '16 11:41:58 AM Morgenthaler
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We need warships like [[CoolShip floating iron castles]]\\

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We need warships like [[CoolShip floating iron castles]]\\castles\\
6th Dec '16 11:41:43 AM Morgenthaler
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* LastStand: Banzai charges, which can be summed up as "there's no question that we're gonna die here, so let's [[{{Badass}} do it awesomely]] [[TakingYouWithMe and take down as many of them as we can too.]]"

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* LastStand: Banzai charges, which can be summed up as "there's no question that we're gonna die here, so let's [[{{Badass}} do it awesomely]] awesomely [[TakingYouWithMe and take down as many of them as we can too.]]"
21st Nov '16 6:15:58 AM Odacon_Spy
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* WrongGenreSavvy: To the Japanese warfare was an artistic endeavor, to the US it was a matter of industry. To oversimplify, the Japanese thought in terms of blades (hence their obsession with [[FragileSpeedster Fragile Speedsters]] and the Americans in terms of tools (hence their obsession with durability). This played out in the Pacific war with US aircraft and ships frequently surviving damage that would have destroyed their Japanese counterparts twice over. U.S.S. Enterprise survived greater damage than the four Japanese carriers sunk at Midway on six different occasions.

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* WrongGenreSavvy: To the Japanese warfare was an artistic endeavor, to the US it was a matter of industry. To oversimplify, the Japanese thought in terms of blades (hence their obsession with [[FragileSpeedster Fragile Speedsters]] Speedsters]]) and the Americans in terms of tools (hence their obsession with durability). This played out in the Pacific war with US aircraft and ships frequently surviving damage that would have destroyed their Japanese counterparts twice over. U.S.S. Enterprise survived greater damage than the four Japanese carriers sunk at Midway on six different occasions.
21st Nov '16 6:15:15 AM Odacon_Spy
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** Eventually, this came to haunt them, as their increasingly exaggerated claims made it look like the Allies had unlimited resources--you can't repeatedly announce the sinking of dozens of enemy battleships without raising the question "how many do they ''have''--while anyone with a map could see that each new "great victory" was closer to home than the last one.

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** Eventually, this came to haunt them, as their increasingly exaggerated claims made it look like the Allies had unlimited resources--you can't repeatedly announce the sinking of dozens of enemy battleships without raising the question "how many do they ''have''--while ''have''"--while anyone with a map could see that each new "great victory" was closer to home than the last one.
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